Wednesday, November 11, 2026
Analysis - Cherif Cordahi
- U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher Tuesday wrapped up his 11th tour of the Middle East seemingly no closer to engineering comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arabs than at his first visit, analysts say.
A peace agreement between Israel and Syria, a key element in regional security arrangements, remains as distant a prospect it was when the two sides began negotiations over three years ago in Madrid.
To add fuel to fire, the United States now has to deal with a new dispute over Egypt’s insistence that Israel sign the nuclear Non- proliferation Treaty (NPT) or Cairo too will not sign to extend it. Washington views both Israel and Egypt as the cornerstone of its Middle East peace policy.
U.S. efforts to goad Israel and the Palestinians into implementing the next phase of their outline peace plan seem to have been a little more successful.
As Christopher flew into the region last week, beginning his trip in Cairo, Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres agreed to set July 1 as a deadline for ending negotiations on the next phase that are now eight months behind schedule.
However, Israeli leaders have made it clear that, as with other deadlines in the 1993 Oslo accords, July 1 is not “a sacred date”.
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin has said that if Palestinians opposed to the peace deal carry out violent attacks against Israel in the intervening period, he will not honour the date.
Nor will Palestinian leader Arafat find it easy to keep his end of the bargain if, say, extremist Jewish settlers on occupied Arab land attack and kill Palestinians.
“It’s a very difficult situation,” says Lotfi el Kholi, an Egyptian analyst. “Both sides are caught by their own public opinions.”
Rabin, whose Labour government enjoys a slim majority in the Israeli parliament, is desperate to end violent Palestinian attacks against Israel. More Israelis — almost 100 — have died in Palestinian attacks since the peace agreement was signed in September 1993 than in the same period of time prior to the deal.
Arafat, whose legitimacy has waned considerably since he has been unable to move the process forward for almost a year, is equally desperate for the next stage — Palestinian elections and an Israeli redeployment on the occupied West Bank — to regain popular support.
After convening a meeting of the PLO’s highest decision-making body — the executive council — last month, Arafat has looked more and more to the United States to put pressure on Israel to concede.
But Washington is unwilling — in public at least — to apply pressure and Rabin feels his position before the Israeli electorate is too weak concede before ensuring their security.
Commentators argue that U.S. pressure, used in 1991 to push Israel to the negotiating table with its Arab enemies, should be used if only to provide Rabin with an excuse for making concessions.
Israelis generally feel they have to take note of the U.S. position because of its massive aid programme to the Jewish state.
While a U.S. role in easing differences between Israel and the PLO is potentially central, its part in bringing Israel and Syria together is more crucial. During his week-long visit to the region, Christopher paid two visits to each of Damascus and Jerusalem. He was scheduled to leave the region late Tuesday.
For the United States, peace between Israel and Syria lies at the heart of its current Middle East peace mission.
Shortly before Christopher’s arrival in Israel, Rabin outlined new plans for an Israeli withdrawal on Syria’s occupied Golan Heights, suggestions rejected by Damascus.
Rabin said Israel would withdraw partially to “test” Syria’s peace intentions for “two to three years”. Once ambassadors were exchanged and borders were opened, he said Israel would consider full withdrawal in return for full peace.
Led by President Hafez al Assad, Syria is adamant that any deal must make clear that Israel will make a full withdrawal.
At the heart of differences between the two sides, lies the extent of withdrawal and the scale of demilitarised zones.
The American Cable News Network (CNN) reported last week that the two sides were considering a 10-km wide strip of demilitarised land to separate their forces, followed by an additional three kms on either side of partially demilitarised land.
Israel denied the proposal saying it would leave almost 10 km of the 25-km wide Golan militarised, too close for comfort for the Jewish state.
Under the 1974 ceasefire agreement between the two sides following the Middle East war a year earlier, Syria accepted severe limits on its offensive ground forces 20 kms inside the border. It accepted similar terms — up to 25 kms — on the deployment of surface-to-air missiles.
Israel is adamant that it will not accept anything less than it gained in 1974.