Thursday, November 19, 2026
Drago Buvac
- Sir Arthur Watts is as inscrutable as the Sphinx. The West’s chosen chief of Bosnian civil affairs Carl Bildt has entrusted him with the herculean task of dividing the property of the former Yugoslavia between its former constituent republics.
Accordingly Sir Arthur has been careful to avoid public comment on the issue. An expert in international law and an experienced negotiator, he knows only too well that the subject is complicated enough in its own right.
Simplistic interpretations of it only make his work more difficult, not least since the successors have only just finished killing each other, and can barely bear to sit at the same table.
The details are sketchy, but the successor states, especially Serbia-Montenegro, still linked as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and Slovenia, were clearly far from happy. Meanwhile the media in some of these countries have been inflaming passions over the inheritance for months.
The inconclusive wrangling continued this month with delegations from all five states in Brussels meeting from Nov. 12 to continue the discussion in plenary.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) insists that the inheritance should be divided as follows: Bosnia to receive 13.2 percent; Croatia, 28.49 percent; Macedonia, 5.4 percent; Slovenia, 16.39 percent; and FRY, 36.52 percent.
But international law offers no simple formula. Even the amount to be divided is disputed. It is not easy to find a common measure for foreign exchange and gold reserves, financial liabilities and debts, fixed and movable assets, holiday centres, the vast arsenal of arms and munitions of the former Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), the embassies, the archives and the cultural treasures, let alone to divide it all equitably.
In an interview in the Macedonian weekly Puls, the Croat negotiator, well-known economist Bozo Marendic, has claimed that the property of the former Yugoslavia amounts to 94 billion dollars.
Such a figure creates the illusion throughout the new states that there are huge amounts of cash to be won which others want to steal, and that it is imperative they get their own hands on it first.
Is this figure correct? No one has so far drawn up a reliable accounting, and the available data is open to justified and unjustified criticism.
A working group of the U.N. conference for the former Yugoslavia attempted to draw up a balance sheet in 1992. The information, ‘strictly confidential’, leaked to the press, and forms the basis for Marendic’s 94 billion dollar figure. Yet even accepting that number, liabilities and debts of 34 billion dollars have to be subtracted, leaving net assets of about 60 billion.
That, with reservations, is the approximate figure the U.N. working group came to, based on an estimate of the balance on Dec. 31, 1990, the last year of peace before the country disintegrated.
This figure also requires closer examination. About 75 percent of the 94 billion dollars worth, were accounted for by the assets of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) — its offices, stores, recreation centres, weaponry and munitions — a measure of the scale of the old federation’s ‘military-industrial complex’.
And what of this is left to divide? During the war, the real estate — the buildings and recreation camps, and some weaponry — passed to the states where it was located, was taken away by local territorial defence forces, squandered or used to kill people.
Much of the weaponry is obsolete. Some of it could still be shared out to help realise the West’s plan to establish a military balance of forces in the post-Yugoslav Balkans. But from an economic point of view, it is worthless, without realisable value.
When these deadly assets are subtracted, little more than 23 billion dollars remain. Considering the liabilities of 34 billion dollars, the balance sheet of the inheritance is in the red.
Even this calculation has a catch. The assets, after all, include realisable value which can be put to immediate use, while debts can be discussed, rescheduled, deferred or possibly even written off.
That is why arguments over the former Yugoslavia’s estate have focused mainly on ready cash, on the foreign exchange and gold reserves of the former National Bank — another mystery number.
Ante Markovic, the last premier of the pre-Balkan war Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, used to assert that the stabilisation programme he introduced before events forced him out of office had left about 5.5 billion dollars behind in the “common treasury.”
Although this oft-quoted figure is difficult to verify, it is even harder to establish how much of that sum is left. Some of the funds may have gone to finance the war waged by the FRY; some may have been stashed in foreign banks.
According to the British daily Financial Times, 684 million dollars of the former Yugoslavia’s debt papers have already been bought up by Belgrade. Suspicions regarding the true, realisable value of these debt papers linger — their value fell to a reported 12 cents to each original dollar of debt shortly after the Belgrade buy-up.
These suspicions were heightened when Belgrade opposed the agreement Slovenia and Croatia reached with the London Club of international banks to reschedule their own commercial banks’ debts of about 4.4 billion dollars, dating from 1988.
Furthermore, citing a theory of ‘redistribution of income’, the chief Yugoslav negotiator, Kosta Mihajlovic, has proposed that the final reckoning should include investments made by joint, federal funds in republics other than Serbia and Montenegro, before 1974, when a new constitution established social ownership.
If this were taken into account, Slovenia would end up in debt to Serbia. Slovenia has responded by trying to get all the foreign assets of the former Yugoslavia and the present FRY frozen — a highly complicated prospect — pending a resolution of the inheritance.
And the chief negotiator for Bosnia-Hercegovina, Milos Trifkovic, has responded with demands going back even further into history. He maintains that the insufficient compensation paid to large-scale landowners in northern Bosnia for the agrarian reform carried out by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia before 1945 should be taken into account.
While the treasure hunt continues, so does the legal dispute about ‘succession’ and ‘continuity’. Supposedly the matter was settled by the European Union’s Badinter commission, which concluded in 1991 that the former Yugoslavia had “disintegrated” and that all the countries emerging from it were “equal successors”.
This position has been confirmed in subsequent U.N. resolutions. Yet the other former Yugoslav states have not accepted the pledge by Yugoslav negotiator Mihajlovic that the FRY completely accepts the equality of the successor states.
Yet Belgrade does have a ploy in mind. By asserting “continuity,” the FRY hopes to avoid the membership procedures which the other new states of the former Yugoslavia underwent to become members of international institutions, like the U.N. and its agencies such as the IMF and World Bank.
It hopes this will also make it easier to establish bilateral and multilateral relations with other associations of countries, particularly the EU and its institutions, and with individual states.
Moreover, if the continuity of the FRY with the former Yugoslavia were recognised, this would mean that the other states had seceded — with the implication that FRY could not be charged with aggression or asked to pay war reparations. Further complicating the matter, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia have accepted language in their agreements with FRY which include a ‘continuity’ clause.
The four — of Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia — have formed a common front against the FRY, even while they have several issues of dispute among themselves. What is clear is that by protracting the inheritance quarrel, it harms all the new states of the former Yugoslavia.
Such an approach to the division of the war-devastated pyrrhic inheritance, based on a desire to see others suffer, means that all these states, by delaying their prospects of integration into world capital markets and the renewal of their regional market, are doing most harm to themselves.
— Drago Buvac is a New York based economic analyst. This item comes to IPS with the assistance of the Institute of War and Peace Reporting in London.