POLITICS-INDONESIA: Hopes for Change, Fears About Military

By Farhan Haq and Abid Aslam Reprint | | Print |

WASHINGTON, May 17 1998 (IPS) - President Suharto’s nearly 33-year hold on power is near its end, say activists and Indonesia-watchers here. But as relative calm takes hold in riot-torn Jakarta, they are at odds over what will come next – and how the pivotal military will act.

At the optimistic end of the spectrum is Pius Lustrilanang, coordinator of the People’s Democratic Alliance. Between 200 and 400 people are believed to have died Friday, Jakarta’s fourth straight day of rioting. But Lustrilanang takes heart at news reports of soldiers mingling with demonstrators and members of Suharto’s own Golkar party adding their voices to the chorus for him to step down.

Lustrilanang left Indonesia in April after being held for two months by torturers he believes were members of the military, which has denied involvement. Last week, he met Amien Rais, widely considered Suharto’s leading critic. Their conversation convinced him that – with military backing – a coherent government could be formed to steer the nation of 200 million people through its toughest times in three decades.

Lustrilanang said that Rais, who has since returned to Jakarta, will be willing to work with Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of the late President Sukarno, and Abdurrahman Wahid, another Muslim leader, to form “a presidium to act as a transitional government after Suharto.” The three would have to be included in any credible transition team, he argues.

Suharto has portrayed Rais, a prominent academic and leader of an Islamist organisation claiming 28 million members, as a religious fanatic intent on creating an authoritarian Islamic state. Lustrilanang, a practising Catholic, insists the Muslim leader is committed to democracy.

Sukarnoputri, who has been disparaged by students for distancing herself from their protests, in recent days has “wanted to become more active” with the growing movement, Lustrilanang notes.

Suharto, who cut short a visit to Egypt and returned to his official residence Friday with a military escort of 100 vehicles, has offered at least three times in the past week to make room for a “constitutional” change in leadership. But that offer is not being taken seriously by the public, say observers, because it has been made before.

The military, however, is backing his plan for gradual change. “The armed forces will support reforms that are carried out in line with the constitution and are made peacefully,” Lt. Gen. Susilo Yudoyono, spokesman for socio-political affairs, was quoted as saying in reports Saturday.

Lustrilanang, who has called the military “the most opportunistic force in Indonesia”, is confident the troops will side with populist anti-Suharto groups. Others are less hopeful.

Analysts highlight a potential split between Suharto son-in-law and Army Strategic Reserve Commando (KOSTRAD) chief Lt. Gen. Prabowo, who is described as a hard-liner with presidential ambitions of his own, and defence minister and armed forces chief Gen. Wiranto, regarded as a pragmatic professional. KOSTRAD was Suharto’s own command when he took power in 1965.

Despite some differences, both officers are loyal to Suharto and likely will move to prevent any infringement on the military’s privileges. “Both have been very well taken care of and both want to keep the officer corps in an advantageous position,” says University of Washington political scientist Daniel Lev. “Neither is likely to undertake reforms unless forced…yet both are capable of overthrowing Suharto.”

The 300,000-strong military, through its ‘dual purpose’ role in national affairs, enjoys considerable influence in parliament, the bureaucracy, and several leading businesses in addition to its control over national defence and internal policing.

The balance of power on the ground does not favour reformists within the military, Lev notes. Wiranto has support outside Jakarta, but Prabowo’s elite troops have a dominant presence in the capital. Reform-minded commanders in the provinces have been ‘shadowed’ by underlings loyal to Suharto or moved to prestigious positions – such as head of the army think-tank, Lemhanas – where they command no troops.

“It seems like (Suharto’s) popular support has evaporated, but what will replace him?” asks William Hartung, senior research fellow at the World Policy Institute in New York. “Is it going to be Suhartoism without Suharto, or a more fundamental change?”

Whatever follows, the transition itself likely will be bloody, says Myriam Young, executive director of the Washington-based Asia Pacific Centre for Justice and Peace.

The government Saturday ordered Indonesia’s four private television stations to air only footage of demonstrations provided by the state-run news channel. Some analysts say Indonesian officials may fear dramatic images would fuel further unrest but others say the ban on independent filming could be prelude to a harsher crackdown.

In 1993 alone, the United States sold 30 million dollars in weaponry to Jakarta in direct government-to-government sales, according to Matthew Jardine, author of ‘East Timor: Genocide in Paradise’. Arms sales by U.S. corporations added an estimated 57 million dollars’ worth of weaponry in 1994, Jardine adds.

The crisis in Jakarta, like the fall of Iran’s Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi in 1979, should show once more the failure of U.S. military support to provide stability, says Hartung. “Now that his regime is literally going up in flames, (the United States) is searching for what to do. What they should have done is not arm him in the first place.”

The United States, barred by act of Congress from supplying the Indonesian military with small arms, armoured personnel carriers and training since a 1991 massacre in East Timor, has continued to teach psychological and urban warfare techniques under an obscure military instruction programme.

Washington agreed last week to suspend that training and, for the first time since the troubles began last year, called for political reform, restraint by security forces and demonstrators, and “dialogue” between the government and its citizens.

Washington now should deny Suharto all weapons and spare parts as part of an effort to push free and fair elections, says Hartung. But, he adds, the U.S. government’s credentials as an “arbiter of democracy” already could be damaged in Indonesia.

The U.S. administration could go further, says Lustrilanang, and convince Suharto directly that “now is the best time to step down,” as it did with Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. As for the democratic opposition, he adds wistfully, “Maybe we can buy him a ticket to Hawaii.”