Monday, November 16, 2026
Mirko Klarin
- The worst thing that could befall the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at the moment would be for NATO to suddenly round up more of the wanted indictees still at large — or, worse, all of them.
If only those who are publicly indicted were brought to justice, it would add another 31 candidates for trial. In order to process them and those who are already at The Hague, the Tribunal would have to stage 21 trials over the coming year.
The mechanism of international justice, which in the past 12 months has accelerated to the point of overheating, would become completely blocked. The Tribunal would become a victim of its own success.
This time last year, the United Nations Detention Unit had only eight tenants, and only two trials were under way in the Tribunal’s one courtroom — that of Bosnian Croat General Tihomir Blaskic, accused of crimes that troops under his command allegedly committed in the Lasva Valley in Central Bosnia, and that of the four accused of alleged crimes at a camp in Celebici run by ‘Bosniak’ supporters of the Muslim led government.
Today, all the detention unit’s 24 comfortable, single-bed cells are filled. In addition, four indictees are temporarily detained at the Dutch prison in Scheveningen — within whose 19th-century walls the U.N. Detention Unit is located — while one of the accused has been provisionally released on medical grounds to await the beginning of his trial at home.
At the same time, four trials are currently unfolding at the Tribunal: besides the two inherited from last year, Blaskic and the Celebici four, which still have no end in sight, two more are in process: that of Zlatko Aleksovski, for alleged crimes against Bosniaks in the Lasva Valley and Anto Furundzija, accused of command responsibility for sexual violence, whose sentence after a high speed eight day trial last month, is due any day now.
A fifth trial was brought to a sudden end on Jun. 29, when the indictee, former mayor of Vukovar Slavko Dokmanovic, committed suicide. He faced charges for his alleged part in a massacre of patients at Ovcara Hospital in 1991; the case has now been closed and the verdict, due this month, will not now be delivered.
The tribunal began its seventh trial Monday, that of Milan Kovacevic, accused of orchestrating atrocities against Muslims and Croats at three prison camps. It is the first trial so far held here to include a genocide indictment. Another six Bosnian Croats accused of direct participation in the massacre against the Bosniak inhabitants of the Ahmici village in the Lasva Valley could soon find themselves in court as well this month.
The Tribunal does have two more new courtrooms, and the U.N. Security Council has approved the election of new judges who will form one more trial chamber. But even with the third courtroom and the third trial chamber, 12 current detainees will remain on the waiting list for at least six separate trials.
Thus, each new arrest would make the waiting list even longer, especially if the current pattern of piecemeal, sporadic arrests and surrenders persists, which would force the Tribunal to continue to organise several trials for one indictment.
A case in point is that of four Bosnian Croat political and military leaders named in the Lasva Valley indictment, whose irregular arrival at The Hague has forced the Tribunal to stage three separate trials — one each for Blaskic and Aleksovski, and the third for Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez.
The latter two are still on the waiting list, despite the U.S. government’s reassurances given on the eve of their surrender on Oct. 6 last year that their trial would begin within three to five months.
To make things worse, the judges recently gave a cold shoulder to the prosecutor’s attempts to join certain related cases for the purpose of witness protection, “judicial economy,” and greater efficiency of the legal proceedings.
Concluding that this “may endanger the rights of the accused to a fair trial, because it may lead to conflict of interest between the accused in conducting their defense,” Trial Chamber II-bis denied the prosecution’s motion for a joint presentation of evidence against four accused in three separate but related indictments for crimes committed at Prijedor, Omarska, and Keraterm.
The prosecutor’s claim that the witnesses are the same — Bosniak and Croat victims of ethnic cleansing in the Prijedor region — in all three cases also failed to impress the judges. Those victims will have to testify about their tragic and traumatic experiences in two or even three trials.
In such a situation, it would be very difficult for the Tribunal to cope with a new, more substantial influx of the accused.
As in the case with vacancies at the detention unit, the starting dates of trials are set on a first-come-first-served basis. But unlike the surplus of detainees, the surplus of cases awaiting trial cannot be handed over to the host country.
Put simply, in the event of a large-scale arrival of accused war criminals, the judges would have to grant provisional release to some of them, or the prosecutor would be forced to drop charges against certain indictees.
This has already been done. In May, anticipating the danger of judicial gridlock, Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour persuaded the court to approved her request that charges be dropped against 14 persons accused of crimes in Omarska and Keraterm.
The Tribunal concluded that the 14 did not have a higher level of authority at the time of the alleged crimes — that is, that they were neither military commanders nor civilian leaders — nor did they take part in “exceptionally brutal or otherwise extremely serious offenses.”
Charges were dropped against the accused who participated in individual incidents of killing, beating, and maltreatment of detainees as common camp guards or so-called “freelance visitors” who visited the camps to join the killers on odd days.
Since she took over on Oct.1 1996, Arbour publicly announced only two indictments, and only after the accused — Milan Kovacevic and Milorad Krnojelac — had been arrested in two separate operations of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR).
An unknown number are named in so-called ‘sealed indictments’, charges laid by the prosecutor and warrants issued in secret, to avoid ‘tipping off’ the wanted men — and, say critics, without further adding to the pressure on SFOR to arrest them.
The prosecutors claim that no change in strategy has occurred. Rather, they argue, the original policy of giving priority to “the investigation of the most serious violations of international humanitarian law and those who may be ultimately responsible for them,” outlined in the Tribunal’s Second Annual Report to the U.N. in 1995, is simply being implemented more consistently.
The problem, however, is that few of the 60 publicly indicted individuals fall into the category of those who might be ultimately responsible for these “most serious violations”.
Even including known indictees such as the wartime Bosnian Serb political and military leaders Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic; Milan Martic, the Croatian Serb leader accused of missile attacks on Croatia’s capital; Dario Kordic and Tihomir Blaskic, Croat political and military leaders in central Bosnia; three former officers of the now-defunct Yugoslav People’s Army linked to the 1991 Ovcara massacre; the commanders of five camps run by Bosnian Serbs and Kovacevic.
Even though all of them undoubtedly fall into the big-fish category, it is arguable whether even those people — not excluding Karadzic and Mladic — can be held ultimately responsible.
They were, it has been widely argued, only following the orders of still higher authorities, who were pulling the major strings in the wars of Yugoslav succession. Step forward Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia…
— Mirko Klarin is a contributing editor at Transitions Magazine and is based in the Hague. This item comes to IPS via the Institute of Journalism in Transition (IJT) and its Tribunal Monitoring project.