POLITICS: Israel Stronger but Still Shaky

By IPS Correspondents Reprint | | Print |

Ferry Biedermann

JERUSALEM, Oct 2 2003 (IPS) - The war in Iraq and the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime have left Israel in a position of unprecedented strategic strength in the Middle East.

Academics and politicians alike are aware of the overpowering dominance that Israeli arms give it in the current political constellation in the region. This is starting to affect thinking about the future of military spending and the way the country should secure itself.

The recent annual study on the strategic balance in the Middle East by the prestigious Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Tel Aviv found Israel’s strategic edge “at its height” after the war in Iraq. Particularly where conventional armed forces are concerned, the country has little left to fear from its remaining antagonists in the region.

But at the same time, threats are emerging on the nuclear and ballistic missile fronts, particularly from Iran. The Jaffee Centre concludes that these two developments can lead to a shift in priorities in weapons programmes, budgets and deployment.

The combination of a growing budget deficit and the politically ambitious finance minister Benjamin Netanyahu has brought the possibility of defence budget cuts now into the political mainstream.

Netanyahu, former prime minister, has seen his popularity seriously compromised by the poor state of the economy, the ballooning deficit and the accompanying cuts in welfare benefits and programmes that he has pushed through.

After the Iraq war, Netanyahu declared that the disappearance of the Iraqi conventional arms threat meant that the defence budget could be cut. There was even talk of discontinuing production of Israel’s emblematic Merkava tank and buying cheaper off-the-shelf U.S. tanks.

Of more than two billion dollars in budget cuts, over 600 million dollars was to come from defence. Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz protested, as was to be expected. The military cuts were reduced to just over 200 million dollars as a result.

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon used the continuing instability in Iraq to justify reduced cuts. “There are elements of the budget that are downright dangerous to cut,” said Sharon. “We have to see how the security situation develops here and in Iraq.”

Gerald Steinberg, a strategic analyst from the Bar-Ilan University near Tel Aviv says much depends “on the kind of government that emerges in Iraq and on the way the United States handles the situation.” Nevertheless, he estimates that Iraq will not pose a conventional arms threat to Israel for at least the next decade or so.

Steinberg says Iraq’s strength was probably overestimated. “But on the other hand it’s better to overestimate that to underestimate,” he says. “People here are cautious, especially since the Yom Kippur war of 1973 (the October war). Then Israel underestimated the Egyptians, nobody believed they could cross the Suez Canal. We paid a heavy price for that.”

Steinberg expects more money to be spent on defence against non- conventional arms. Israel sees Iran in particular as an emerging threat. Iran recently completed testing its Shihab-3 missile that can reach Israel. The international community is increasingly concerned that Iran is also developing nuclear arms.

Israel has developed its own anti-ballistic missile system, the Arrow, which the army has said can be effective against the Shihab-3. With the disappearance of Iraq’s conventional arms as a threat in the immediate future but with Iran’s non- conventional programme looming ever larger, projects such as the Arrow are likely to become a priority.

The Jaffee Centre suggests that apart from the lessening of the conventional threat, the fall of the regime in Iraq also has other, more psychological implications for the region. Iraq was seen as one of the most virulently anti- Israeli countries in the Middle East. With its defeat, the anti-Israel front will at least temporarily lose something of its strength.

This could be felt particularly by militant Palestinian groups, analysts at the Jaffee Centre say. Iraq was seen as a supporter of radical groups but there is no evidence that it was directly involved in the Palestinian opposition to Israel. Saddam Hussein did distribute money to the families of suicide bombers, but it is hard to gauge if this had an effect on their motivation.

Some progressive analysts argue that apart from reshaping military priorities, Israel’s current strategic position should be used to make peace. They argue that it is much easier to make compromises from a position of strength, especially on territorial issues.

This argument has fallen largely on deaf ears. The Israeli public defines its security in terms of the nearby Palestinians rather than far-away Iraq. As long as they fear suicide bombings in their streets, most Israelis do not feel secure, and are not inclined to compromise on what they regard as their security interests.