BLAMING AL QAEDA FOR SPANISH ELECTION NOT IN US INTEREST

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MIAMI, Mar 1 2004 (IPS) - The right\’s diagnosis of the defeat of Spain\’s Popular Party as capitulation of Spanish voters to terrorism may console the outgoing prime minister and Mariano Rajoy but it badly serves the true interests of the United States, writes Joaquin Roy, Jean Monnet Professor and Director of the European Union Centre of the University of Miami. In this analysis, the author writes that the US government, before and after November, can be reassured by what the new Spanish administration will offer: unlimited cooperation, on equal footing, in the fight against terrorism, domestic and international, in coordination with Spain\’s natural partners in the European Union. Spain\’s place in the world will continue to be the same it has occupied since the 80s: it is a member of NATO, contributed to UN peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Central America, and participated in the Gulf War. Spain will stay (why not?) in Iraq, but only under a UN mandate, which will be implemented with the requisite backing of a stronger and more integrated European Union, anchored in a \’\’new\’\’ Old Europe.

To the ideological right, the defeat of the governing Popular Party (PP) in Spain was a capitulation of Spanish voters to terrorism. This over-simplistic diagnosis may serve as a consolation for outgoing Prime Minister Aznar and his handpicked successor Mariano Rajoy, but it badly serves the true interests of the United States.

To reduce the outcome of the Spanish elections to the Madrid train bombings and to accuse those who voted for the victorious Socialdemocrats (PSOE) of giving a blank check to the terrorists is inexact, unfair, and patronising. The vote on Sunday was not a referendum on terrorism but a choice between two very different political parties and two approaches to policy on Iraq. The Spanish political scene is far more complex than the ”election by terror” scenario takes into account:

– The stubborn economic arguments made by the PP on why they deserved reelection were counterbalanced by the heavy social toll their policies took on many labour sectors, unprotected in a highly liberalised market. Ironically, the opening of the economy the PP took credit for was not the handiwork of the PP but rather was set in motion by the PSOE more than a decade ago. The resulting high cost of housing and temporary jobs hurt mostly young people, who were voting for the first time.

– The social and political climate was exacerbated in the last four years of an absolute majority of the PP by the fact that the public media, especially the state TV network, were perceived as a branch not of the government but of the governing party.

– The political consensus was in shambles. Any suggestion of reforming the Constitution to make it more federalist was met with disdain and accusations of unpatriotic disloyalty by the PP. In response to a Basque project to call for a referendum on independence, the PP-dominated parliament passed a law giving courts the right to jail the Basque premier if he proceeded with such plans, a violation of political rights and freedom of expression which has been contested by an overwhelming number of jurists in Spain.

– When a political crisis exploded in Catalonia over the interview held by Josep Lluis Carod Rovira, the leader of the independence party Esquerra Republicana, with representatives of the Basque ETA terrorist organisation, the PP treated all Catalans as accomplices of terror and accused the local socialist party of dealing with assassins. As apparent fallout from this, all Catalan parties, with the exception of the PP branch in Catalonia, have since doubled the number of seats they hold in the Spanish congress.

– The arrogance displayed by the PP during the campaign contributed greatly to its fall. Its strategy consisted of using Aznar and certain of his current ministers to do the dirty work and wield harsh language against the socialists, while allowing the candidate Rajoy to comfortably visit safe electoral sites and appear at the last minute in spectacular campaign gatherings. The selection of such a boring personality as successor was fatal for Aznar, who did not want to be upstaged even in retirement.

However, the deadly mistake of the government was its handling of the crisis that developed when its initial assertion that the terrorist attacks were the work of ETA collapsed under considerable evidence that they were perpetrated by a branch of Islamic fundamentalists. In a frantic campaign that was perceived as a cover-up, the Spanish government lobbied foreign correspondents in Madrid until the last minute, forced a declaration of the UN Security Council targeting ETA, and issued instructions to ambassadors and the state news agency supporting its position even as the Spanish intelligence services were confirming Islamic authorship.

What the electorate perceived at first as good faith efforts by the government soon began to seem like sheer manipulation and, worse for Spaniards, lies. That was the icing on the cake for citizens who have been waiting for evidence about the only solid reason why Aznar committed Spain to its alliance with President Bush — weapons of mass destruction.

The United States government, before and after November, can be reassured by what the new Spanish administration will offer: unlimited cooperation, on equal footing, in the fight against terrorism, domestic and international, in coordination with Spain’s natural partners in the European Union. Spain’s place in the world will continue to be the same it has occupied since the 80s: it is a member of NATO, contributed to UN peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Central America, and participated in the Gulf War. Spain will stay (why not?) in Iraq, but only under a UN mandate, which will be implemented with the requisite backing of a stronger and more integrated European Union, anchored in a ”new” Old Europe. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)