THAILAND: A New Political Mask in a Pantomime?

By Marwaan Macan-Markar Reprint | | Print |

Analysis - By Marwaan Macan-Markar

BANGKOK, Aug 12 2004 (IPS) - It is becoming an act of courage in Thailand to fire a volley of criticism at Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, or the wealthy empire that his family presides over.

Some who have dared to do so since Thaksin’s party swept into power in 2001 have ended up facing the brunt of a government that enjoys unprecedented political power and, to a large extent, popularity.

The victims who have fallen by the roadside in the belief they were doing their bit as citizens of a democracy are an eclectic mix. They included academics, bureaucrats, journalists and grassroots activists. Some were fired from their jobs; some were bullied into silence; some were quietened by other means, such as money.

So is Thai democracy a pantomime? Is the country’s democracy just as fake as the counterfeit products found in abundance near Patpong, the famed red-light strip here?

These troubling questions are what Thais, at least in Bangkok, appear to be grappling with seven years after a new constitution was unveiled with much promise that it was written to deepen and spread the spirit of democracy.

And a new book, ‘Thaksin – The Business of Politics in Thailand,’ seeks to unravel some of the reasons why this sense of angst is spreading among sections of Thailand’s intelligentsia and the political cognoscenti.

For Thaksin has come to symbolise the new face of politics that has emerged in Thailand since the 1997 Constitution, the 16th such document since the country got rid of absolute monarchy in 1932.

What is more, the authors, Pasuk Phongpaichit, an economist at Bangkok’s Chulalongkorn University, and Chris Baker, a Cambridge-educated scholar, are a perfect team to offer such insight about a man who is unique among South-east Asian leaders – a business tycoon named among the world’s billionaires by ‘Forbes’ magazine.

They have teamed up for three previous books before, all providing a critical assessment of Thailand’s political and economic landscape.

Their research brings to the fore aspects of Thaksin’s past that explains the reasons behind some of his strong views – such as development is more important than democracy – and why the language he speak resonates with a large section of Thais.

In the process, of course, some of the myths Thaksin created for greater appeal, such as he comes from humble origins, were exposed. His Chinese migrant ancestors had done him a favour by laying the groundwork through a range of businesses (including silk) for him to build on.

But while his early years may have not marked him out, Thailand’s future prime minister had demonstrated that he wanted to pursue a different path from his family as a young adult. He chose to join the police than the army, as his other relatives had done.

Yet the authors point out in one of the numerous gems studded through this book, Thaksin had ”little expectation of a future in government service.” He was more interested in a career as a businessmen.

And in one of the most captivating sections, the book offers streak that prevailed in Thaksin at the time that still continues – to persevere, to take risks, to never take no for an answer.

That he went about his work as a businessmen while still being a police officer was of little worry to him. It included him opening a silk shop, distributing films and building an apartment block, all of which ended in failure and leaving him in debt.

By the time he turned his attention to telecommunications, Thaksin had acquired skills that helped him on the road to wealth. He had learnt how government officials and the business community struck deals for mutual benefit and about the key to success in Thailand, knowing ”a lot of people.”

”Between 1988 and 1991, Thaksin had been transformed from owner of a struggling computer leasing business into a major entrepreneur in government concession (namely telecommunications),” the book states.

The billion dollar empire he built, including a huge chunk of the mobile phone market, also helped shape another trait that Thaksin has become known for – his obsession with economic growth as a priority even at the expense of democracy.

That aspect of the narrative helps explain why when he launched his own political party Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thai) in July 1998, he was a hit among a class of businessmen who wanted to take control of Thailand’s politics. Bankers, property developers, industrialists and entertainment moguls signed on.

Furthermore, the language Thaksin was speaking appeared a perfect antidote to business community that had taken a heavy beating during the 1997 financial crisis.

And by then, the ”new politics” that he was advocating also made inroads into a sector that had often been ignored or marginalised by the Thai political establishment till then – the rural poor.

Phasuk and Baker do credit Thaksin for breaking new ground here by not only offering policies to alleviate the suffering of the poor villages but delivered on his promises soon after his party won the largest parliamentary majority in Thai history.

What followed, however, reveals why disenchantment in Thaksin began to surface, although not immediately. The authors elaborate with, at times, forensic precision how the Thaksin administration went about mixing businesses and politics as if the expression ‘conflict-of-interest’ was non-existent.

As disturbing for Thais who had hoped that they were on the road to a new democracy were the measures Thaksin began to pursue to limit the space available for dissent, a disregard for human rights and to mould the society with an appeal to nationalism.

Some of Thaksin’s arguments, the authors point out, hark back to the views echoed by the military dictators who rule Thailand for decades.

”Thaksin constructed a mix of Western social contract theory and modernist Buddhism to argue that ‘good’ disinterested leadership justified itself, and that all opposition was by definition illegitimate,” the book states

Sadly, what the book lacks is a chapter explaining why the majority of Thais appear to be happy with their leader, despite what his critics say.

By not stepping back and trying to locate Thaksin within the big picture, the authors have avoided examining how Thai traits such as its patron-client system, an unhealthy reverence for rich people over the poor and acceptance of corruption have to shoulder blame for aiding the Thaksin phenomenon.

Nevertheless, that is a minor flaw in a book that is helping to pioneer a new political literature dealing with the man who deserves to be watched in South-east Asia, since he has announced his intentions of staying in power for years to come.