Tuesday, May 5, 2026
Zoltán Dujisin
- In the midst of social and economic hardship, and following a politically turbulent year under a liberal and Western-looking government, Ukrainians prepare to go to the polls this Sunday, in an election to be closely followed by Western countries and Russia alike.
The former Soviet republic of 48 million will decide on the composition of the new parliament, which will subsequently appoint a prime minister with increased powers.
The elections imply a profound constitutional reform, with a shift from presidentialism to parliamentarism. While President Viktor Yushchenko will maintain considerable power, the new system is more suited to quell authoritarian tendencies.
Little is left of the former ‘orange’ team that brought Yushchenko and his prime minister Yulia Timoshenko to power, after the popular revolt that contested then prime minister Viktor Yanukovich’s official victory and forced a new election round.
Bitter disagreements between Timoshenko and Yushchenko, caused by personal political conflicts and corruption scandals, led to the dismissal of Timoshenko by the President. Now they run separately, reviving Yanukovich’s chances.
So far the political campaigning has proceeded in a relatively clean environment, and all candidates have access to media coverage, unlike in previous elections.
Yanukovich’s Party of the Regions, which promotes regional autonomy, close relations to Russia, and opposes membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), is heading opinion polls with projections of 30 percent of the vote.
The other main contenders are of the same orange background. With 20 percent of the vote, Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party is leading the struggle for orange votes.
Not as market-oriented but still looking at Europe is Timoshenko’s bloc. Timoshenko considers herself the only political leader who remains faithful to the values of the ‘revolution’. Her campaign has been high in emotional content, but ideologically poor.. She stands third in opinion polls with close to 13 percent of the projected vote.
As with the 2004 elections, Yanukovich will gather support from the industrialised, Russian-speaking east, while Central and Western Ukraine will be heavily disputed by former allies Our Ukraine and Timoshenko’s bloc..
One thing is clear: no party will be able to govern by itself. This has fuelled speculations on which alliances could materialise. “There is indeed strong public pressure for Yushchenko and Timoshenko to undo ‘the Orange split’,” Alexander Demyanets of the Razumkov Centre for Economic and Political Studies told IPS.
Timoshenko supports an orange reunification while Our Ukraine Party is divided on the issue, but Demyanets says “many influential members of their respective political camps see an alliance with Yanukovich as being more advantageous in the long run.”
Yanukovich is in a privileged position not only since the pro-Western side has failed to deliver on many of the inflated promises of the revolution, but because the economic reality of Ukraine has considerably worsened since the orange team came to power.
Inflation has increased, gross national income (GNI) growth has fallen from 12 percent in 2004 to less than 3 percent in 2005, and gas prices have been doubled by Russia, which is no longer willing to sell subsidised gas to an energetically dependent, unfriendly and Western-minded neighbour.
Yanukovich has promised to end the economic “chaos” caused by the revolution, partly by re-establishing friendly relations with Russia. The current government wants to join NATO by 2010 as a stepping stone to the European Union (EU) and a guarantee of protection against Moscow.
Russia would therefore prefer to see Yanukovich in power, whose Party of the Regions favours a common economic space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and opposes membership of NATO.
Moscow is following the elections carefully, but it seems to have understood that economic leverage is a better weapon than direct political intervention.
Russia is keen on ensuring the monopoly on energy resources and transport systems in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, against the interests of the United States, which is pushing for ‘democratisation’ of post-Soviet countries still under Moscow’s sphere of influence.
While the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions were welcomed warmly by the West, the economic hardships currently suffered by both countries and the recent Belarusian election have dealt a blow to Western hopes of a Russian retreat.
Both the United States and the European Union see the Ukrainian election as a crucial test for the country and the region, but have expressed fears of a political standstill if the new parliament fails to form a government.
The United States, in a timely show of support for the Ukrainian government, has announced an end to trade restrictions between the countries: “Ukraine is committed to economic freedom, democratic progress and open trade,” U.S. President George W. Bush told the press.
The EU has been more cautious in welcoming the present Ukraine, reflecting its internal divisions. While its Eastern members are openly supportive of Ukrainian efforts towards membership, the Franco-German axis wants to remain on friendly terms with Russia, and France is wary of more enlargements following the “no” to the European Constitution in its referendum.
The EU has recently negotiated visa harmonisation procedures with Ukraine, but wants accession out of the agenda, at least for now. On her recent visit to Kiev, EU external relations commissioner Benita Ferrero Waldner told journalists that “of course Ukraine is in Europe”, but said the “European Neighbourhood Policy is not about membership.”