MOLDOVA: Waiting for Kosovo and the EU

By Zoltán Dujisin Reprint | | Print |

Zoltán Dujisin

BRUSSELS, Feb 21 2007 (IPS) - Wishing to emulate Kosovo’s example, the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria is increasingly rejecting the prospect of a unified state, just as the European Union (EU) begins to step in.

Following Moldovan independence in 1991, a short-lived civil war in this former Soviet republic of 4.5 million ended with a fringe of land east of the river Dniester declaring independence. Moldova borders Ukraine to the east and south, and Romania to its west.

Transnistria, bearing the social and institutional characteristics of a Soviet state, has never enjoyed international recognition, and the region is seen in the West as a hub for arms, drugs and human trafficking.

The differences between the slightly Western-oriented Moldova and the Russia-leaning Transnistria have for years prevented an agreement. The breakaway region of half a million demands a co-federation whereas Moldova will only grant autonomy.

But now powerful voices in the Transnistrian capital Tiraspol are giving up the idea of a reunification, stating talks should only serve the purpose of normalising relations between the two “states”.

On Jan. 31 the Transnistrian parliament even passed a resolution canceling a 1993 decision which left the possibility of a confederation with Moldova open, and official statements indicate authorities are hoping to gain advantage from a possible international recognition of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia.

Dniester’s parliamentary chairman Yevgeniy Shevchuk declared the region will “seek to achieve the status and conditions that should not be worse than those the international community will grant to Kosovo.” Kosovo is the Albanian-dominated southern region of Serbia that seems headed for independence.

Transnistria is composed of equal thirds of ethnic Moldovans, Ukrainians and Russians, whereas in Moldovan-controlled territory ethnic Moldovans predominate. But the conflict never assumed an ethnic dimension.

Nevertheless, even Moldovan and Romanian officials have admitted the Kosovo settlement might indirectly affect the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict.

Popular support for Transnistrian independence was confirmed in a referendum held last September. The vote also hinted at the possibility of an eventual merger with Russia, pushed hard by President Igor Smirnov.

Tiraspol is aligning the country’s power structures, legislation, education system and financial policy to that of Russia in order to facilitate a future annexation.

Heightened diplomatic pressure from the EU and the United States resulted in calls for the resumption of talks under the official 5 + 2 format, which includes the EU, United States, Russia, Ukraine, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on the one hand and Transnistria and Moldova on the other.

The talks, in a state of limbo since February 2006, were scheduled to resume mid- February, but the Transnistrian side failed to appear at the negotiating table after its conditions were not met.

Transnistria claims to be victim of an economic blockade affecting mostly ordinary people, and is accusing Moldova and Western powers of putting pressure on it ahead of negotiations.

Tiraspol also claimed not to have received a comprehensive settlement plan announced by the OSCE last autumn.

A March 2006 agreement between Moldova and Ukraine stipulated all Transnistrian goods must receive customs clearance in Moldova, thus hampering Tiraspol’s efforts to pursue an independent foreign economic policy.

The move was justified with combating widespread smuggling, but was also the result of Moldova losing several million dollars yearly in revenue from taxes and duties. Transnistrian authorities claim to have suffered heavy economic losses as a result.

The EU is also against a separate customs authority, but Transnistria mostly survives by trading with Ukraine and Russia through the Ukrainian border.

Ukraine and Russia are seen as the main stumbling blocks to a conflict resolution. Moreover, Moscow keeps a variety of military and political interests in the region, even at the expense of possible economic loss.

“Russia is not a fully rational player, for them the battle of worldviews is important, and it is trying to establish satellites rather than allies,” Nicu Popescu, a political analyst from the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels told IPS.

“More than recreating the Soviet Union, what they want is a new Warsaw Treaty,” Popescu said. “Russia uses Transnistria to exert leverage against Moldova, and the region shapes Moldova’s foreign policy. Moldova behaves as a hostage to Transnistria.”

But January saw the resumption of talks between Moldova and Russia and an improvement in relations. Russia agrees to Moldovan territorial integrity and wants assurances Moldova will remain neutral, but there was no breakthrough due to divergences over the level of autonomy for Transnistria.

Popescu argues Moldova should stop aiming at a breakthrough “before, let’s say, ten years.” He claims policy towards the breakaway region should rather focus on “undercutting smuggling and investing in civil society.”

Moldovans’ hopes are now on the EU’s “increasingly visible role”, as it becomes aware “stakes are also high for the EU, having to prove it can be a useful international player,” Popescu told IPS.

The EU has been playing a positive role with the establishment of its Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), successfully decreasing smuggling on Moldova’s borders and contributing to an atmosphere of legality.

“Moldova should de-prioritise Transnistria and focus instead on cooperating with the EU,” says Popescu. “It is through political and economic reforms that it will become an attractive, functioning state Transnistrians will want to join.”