Thursday, November 19, 2026
Commentary - By M B Naqvi
- The Pakistani government and the country’s hardy tribesmen, the two sides in the saga of military operations against Taliban members suspected to be in Pakistan, are again back to square one.
This is after the expiration of the May 7 extended deadline given to the rebellious tribesmen in Southern Waziristan who are said to be sheltering them.
The expected registration of all foreign Islamic fanatics under the tribe’s protection was a condition to get the Pakistan government’s amnesty and obtain permission to go on living in their tribal hideouts in this South Asian country.
The only other condition was their promise – to be guaranteed by tribal leaders – of not using Pakistani soil to attack another country (read Afghanistan).
That was a long time ago: Apr. 25, when the modalities of availing of Pakistan’s offer of clemency were agreed between the two sides after military operations to go after Taliban fighters began in March.
This offer of clemency was undertaken through local members of parliament, with the alliance of six religious parties – Muttaheda Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) – that controls over a third of Pakistan’s Parliament.
A deadline was fixed for when the non-Pakistanis hiding in the tribal areas were to register. That date was Apr. 30 – but the date duly came and went.
The outstanding leader of the ‘other side’, an Afghan warlord still professing loyalty to the Taliban supremo Mullah Umar, Nek Mohammad, came with the mediators, negotiated some more with the Pakistan Army and got another deadline by which time registration would take place.
That was May 7, which also came and passed. Yet another deadline has been set: May 14.
The deadlock persists. The pro-Taliban foreign fighters, some of whom are said to be al-Qaeda operatives, dread giving their details, especially their photographs. They are said to be Uzbeks, Chechens, Uighurs from China’s Xinjiang region, and from other Central Asian or Middle East countries.
They fear that Pakistan will hand over this information to the U.S. government, which will then share this information with the authorities of their mother countries.
It is a grave situation. These fugitives do have a point. But this is not likely to wash with the U.S. government or their proconsuls in Afghanistan. Islamabad, needless to say, is under intense pressure from those who now control Afghanistan.
Kabul authorities, from President Hamid Karzai and U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzade to the local U.S. army commander, insist that Pakistan should take larger-scale military action against all those who use Pakistan’s tribal areas as a base to attack targets in Afghanistan.
There are thinly veiled threats that if Islamabad fails to act decisively, the U.S. army will have to come in and do that. Words from the top in Washington imply the hope that Pakistan “will do more”.
On Pakistan’s side, things are fearfully complex. The scarcely hidden authoritarian regime of President Gen Pervez Musharraf and his civilian subordinates are committed to the U.S. cause since Sep. 11.
He is also committed to build ‘real’ democracy home. He credibly preaches a modernist and moderate Islam at home and abroad, and that is sweet music to the U.S. government. He is on the hit list of al-Qaeda, having survived three failed attempts on his life.
But, all said and done, it is an army-created government and its real sanction is the army underpinning it through its undercover agents.
For 30 years this army, supreme in politics, has been sponsoring and favouring hardline Islamicists. Its motto is ‘(Islamic) Faith, Piety and Jihad (in God’s way)’. Earlier, thanks to the 1980s Afghan war, this emphasis on hardline Islam ran the risk of infecting its officers and men, who had until 1970s been trained on the British Army model.
Now, no one knows how many of its officers and personnel actually sympathise with Islamic zealots: Taliban, al-Qaeda and other nondescript fanatics.
That is factor X of Pakistan politics, though everyone goes on emphasising that this army is a fine and highly disciplined force.
For 30 years the politics it has favoured, before Sep. 11, was that of the religious parties’, especially Jamaat-i-Islami’s. The successive regimes, all underpinned by the army since 1977, have pursued a policy in Kashmir that it called ‘jihad’.
Religious parties, especially Jamaat-I-Islami, have been of great help to the army in sustaining the over 10-year long insurgency in Indian-controlled Kashmir. A close relationship has subsisted between the army and religious parties, which were a team.
Some think they still are – even when, since January this year, there is so much ballyhoo about Pakistan-India friendship, which was largely grandstanding to please the U.S. government. Pakistan is actually known as the most anti-U.S. country. Some of it is largely a reaction to the vicissitudes of its 50-year-old friendship with the U.S. government.
It used to be the most Allied Ally of America, though Henry Kissinger himself is known to have diagnosed its troubles as ‘Pactitis’ (with the U.S.) government. Ordinary Pakistanis were largely influenced by the marginalised left that worked insidiously, making U.S. nationals the most hated foreigners.
The latest ‘war on terror’ and Iraq have only made the U.S. government more unpopular.
Meantime, the Pakistan military’s campaign against the Taliban can only be regarded as a failure. Why? First, because the government suffered too many casualties – 60 dead – against rebels’ 40. It felt it had to stop the operation. Otherwise, there was the risk of fuelling a general uprising of all tribes that would be all but impossible to quell.
Second, the rebels could not be forced to do what the U.S. government wanted. Indeed, the government got only the verbal promise from the tribesmen that the Taliban, al-Qaeda and others would not attack inside Afghanistan by using Pakistani territory.
Today, two deadlines later, those recalcitrants still have not implemented any condition under which Islamabad had granted them amnesty.