UKRAINE: Holding Hands with East and West

By Zoltán Dujisin Reprint | | Print |

Zoltán Dujisin

BUDAPEST, Nov 23 2006 (IPS) - Memories of the ‘orange revolution’ that brought western-minded Viktor Yushchenko to the presidency are slowly fading away as Ukraine returns to a more Russian friendly foreign policy, without neglecting its western aspirations.

Two short-lived ‘orange’ cabinets did not manage to overcome internal disputes, and the more pro-Russian Party of the Regions made an impressive comeback by winning parliamentary elections last March ahead of the orange parties, including Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine. Orange has come to be associated with parties in support of Western democracy.

It took several months of negotiations to form a cabinet, but Viktor Yanukovich, head of the Party of the Regions and prime minister before the 2004 ‘orange revolution’, returned to his old post heading a “coalition of national unity” with Socialists, Communists and surprisingly, Our Ukraine.

Yanukovich is now even more powerful than in his previous term, as the latest constitutional reform boosted the prime minister’s powers at the expense of presidential ones.

The prime minister’s new position has allowed him to shape foreign policy in accordance to his party’s prerogatives, managing so far to balance expectations from both Western partners and Russia in this post-soviet Republic of 50 million.

Relations with Russia have been revived in several sectors, with mutual visits by officials attesting to the new state of affairs, but Ukraine’s re-found friendliness towards Moscow angers most Ukrainian atlanticists and liberals who would like to see a break with a history of dependence from Moscow.

Orange voters “consider that the new government gives up Ukraine’s national interests in favour of Russia, blockading Ukraine’s European integration”, Natalya Shapovalova, foreign policy analyst for the Kiev-based International Centre for Policy Studies told IPS.

Prime Minister Yanukovich has insisted he is still committed to joining the European Union (EU) as soon as it becomes feasible, but he has put a brake on the previous government’s efforts to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

“Ukraine is delaying its membership in NATO, and we could even expect that the government will force a referendum,” says Shapovalova. NATO is unpopular among the majority of Ukrainians and a referendum would certainly kill membership.

While granting Ukraine will be “less active in issues which could annoy Russia,” Shapovalova denies that a Ukraine-Russia rapprochement will damage Ukraine-EU relations and Kiev’s willingness to reform.

“Ukraine will remain a democratic country and will continue with internal reforms, though maybe not as fast as we would like,” she said.

President Yushchenko has been insistently seeking EU recognition of Ukraine as a potential candidate, but Brussels has adopted a cautious stance as it monitors developments in Ukraine.

In the meantime, the EU announced late October it was planning to start negotiations on establishing a free economic area with Ukraine. The negotiations have been delayed due to Ukraine’s failure to pass necessary legislation for joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

The EU has also offered a simplified visa regime for Ukrainian citizens, a first step towards the visa-free regime that Ukraine strives for.

But with no clear prospects for membership, the new status quo has given Ukraine the opportunity to address some of the outstanding and delicate issues in its relationship with Russia.

Ukrainian officials have already managed to secure the lowest prices for Russian natural gas in Europe, set at 130 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres, an agreement welcomed by the EU which is, like Ukraine, highly dependent on Russian gas.

This is in sharp contrast with the previous two years of hostilities between the two neighbours over trade and energy questions, which were close to leaving Ukraine without gas last winter.

But critics insist that under the new agreement Ukraine will continue transferring control of its gas market to Russian hands, while fees for Russian gas transiting Ukraine are fixed and remarkably low.

A few neighbouring countries, including Ukraine, have in the past accused Russia of putting economic pressure on them to influence their foreign policy.

The new price is higher than the 95 dollars per 1,000 cu m charged in 2006, but the rise is rather insignificant compared to price hikes seen elsewhere in the region, especially in countries that have clashed with Russia over foreign policy.

Russia insists it is only bringing gas prices up to their market value.

In the military field Ukraine’s distancing from Western institutions has been coupled with closer cooperation with Russia, as the current government is showing willingness to extend the agreement on the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea.

According to an existing bilateral agreement between Moscow and Kiev, Russia is allowed to keep its naval fleet in Ukrainian territory until 2017.

Ukraine is entitled to 98 million dollars for each year the Russian fleet is stationed in Crimea, but several voices in Ukraine suggest that Kiev’s sovereignty should have no price.

Those behind President Yushchenko maintain the base is not as economically profitable as claimed, insisting that Russia should depart in 2017, whereas Yanukovich seems keener on extending the agreement.

In the meantime, the Ukrainian government’s friendliness was reciprocated by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who pledged the Russian Fleet would always be ready to “defend” Ukraine from possible foreign interference.