Tuesday, November 17, 2026
Analysis - María Isabel García
- The resignation of Vice President Humberto De la Calle, aimed at forcing President Ernesto Samper to stand down, has deepened the crisis in Colombia’s political leadership – clearly separated from the national reality.
“The deterioration of the national situation makes it appear that what is really at stake is the viability of the nation itself … the public has lost even an ability to be shocked,” De la Calle said in his resignation speech before Congress earlier this week. “The country finally appears to be breaking into pieces,”
The unusual sight of a vice-president on the point of break-up with his running partner in the second round of the 1994 presidential campaign affected many leaders but had litle effect on voters.
Likewise this week, a TV survey revealed 70 percent of people interviewed in major cities were more concerned with the guerrilla offensive, while a further 25 percent said the coca growers in the southern departments were the most worrying issue.
Only five percent of those interviewed believed De la Calle’s resignation was the leading national problem
This could be linked to the fact that the Samper-De la Calle alliance, in the first place, had been viewed politically as a desperate move by the Liberal Party trying to cling to a fourth term in power and to keep the advancing Conservative candidate, Andres Pastrana, at bay.
The election ticket duet had always been at loggerheads within Liberal ranks and De la Calle had to retract a public statement that he would never support Samper, before they could run together.
De la Calle has been a constant thorn in the side of Samper during his last two years of government, even from his distant position in agreed exile as ambassador to Spain.
The dissolution of the “indissoluble marriage,” referred to frequently by Samper during the repeated crises of his term in office, came too late for De La Calle, political observers opined. He now had little chance of leading any government of national unity, being called to replace Samper, and his prospects for the presidency in 1998 were dim.
Conservative senator, Juan Camilo Restrepo, recognised leader of the parliamentary opposition to Samper, confirmed that with his resignation “De la Calle has lost, because his gesture is useless.”
Another Conservative, Alvaro Valencia Cossio said that De la Calle’s move had actually been planned to achieve the opposite effect, “allowing a friend of Samper to be named as his replacement.”
Emilio Lebolo, leader of the National Liberal Leadership – the most important body of the party in power – supported this view, saying Samper’s replacement would have to be “loyal to the president, agreeing with his government’s programmes.”
There were still some, however, who believed that although he had started late De la Calle was planning to pull together the economic sectors, factions in the Conservative Party, parliamentary minorities and non parliamentary opposition which have been acting in a disarticulated manner up to now.
This group includes Andres Pastrana, the candidate defeated by the Samper-De la Calle formula in 1994.
“Those of us who are responsible, who have opted to be servants of the republic, we must unite,” wrote Pastrana in a letter agreeing with De la Calle.
“The situation in the country is reaching a critical danger level. It is time to close ranks without exceptions. We will build a common agenda,” he continued, proposing something remarkably similar to the former vice-president’s government of national unity.
The two also agree that there was definitely drug money infiltration from the Cali drug Cartel into Samper’s election campaign. Pastrana made a declaration to this effect following his defeat in 1994 and, minutes after resigning this week, De la Calle agreed saying; “I am convinced there was narcotraffic money in Ernesto Samper’s presidential election campaign.”
This was no big suprise to the majority of Colombians, however, who have seen the big, middle-sized and small mafia groups allied with political leaders for the past 20 to 30 years. Also the narco-traffic, as an economic phenomenon, has been less exclusive than the formal economy – which has also been fed by massive money- laundering operations.
In recent years, the forested half of the nation, in the southern Amazon and Orinoco river valleys, have seen coca plantations swallowing up the cassava and banana areas – a process made easier as the drug barons distributed free seed, paid for the farming and bought the product in situ, in cash.
With two harvests per year, each hectare of coca was up to 500 times more profitable than the previous crops, while being free of the problems of credit, the lack of roads, and the chains of commerce. In Congress, Tuesday, Interior Minister Horacio Serpa said that US data reported 56,000 hectares of coca plantations in Colombia today.
Most of the coca growers are colonisers pushed out from the centre of the nation during the period known as “the violence,” when battles raged between the Liberals and Conservatives in the fifties, leaving 300,000 dead.
The process has continued more recently with 60,000 people displaced by the counterinsurgents, dirty war tactics and the paramilitary groups in the last decade.
In recent months, these coca cultivators have been protesting against coca eradication programmes and fumigations of the crops adopted under pressure from Washington, leading to confrontations between soldiers and civilians prepared to “risk their lives” to protect their livelihoods.
The present uproar in the nation has also allowed for the guerrilla groups to reestablish themselves.
Between them, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) have around 10,000 members holding out on 105 fronts and present in 600 municipal areas – or half the country – according to government studies.
“We are at war, no one can be mistaken about that,” said army commander Harold Bedoya, discussing the deaths of 46 government troops in military bases in Guaviare and Putumayo so far this month.
The FARC Communists have also been holding 60 soldiers hostage since their attack on the Las Delicias army post in Putumayo, while the government decide whether the International Red Cross will be allowed to mediate their release.
The insurgents want the conflict to become internationalised, and the government is resisting. The military have repeatedly stated the guerrilla have financed the coca planters’ protests and has insisted on using the term narcoguerrilla in order to show the alliance between the rebels and the drug cartels.
The map of insurgent attacks shows towns which have been taken, roads blocked, buses burnt, kidnappings and encounters with military and police patrols in 16 of the 32 national departments. Around a hundred troops and police officers have been killed and an imprecise “very high” number of guerrillas have also died.
As a result, discussions in Bogota are centred on who will be the vice-president Congress could designate, whose autonomy in the procedure will not be an obstacle to agreeing criteria with the Executive Power. More than ten candidates have been proposed for the job, though only one, former foreign minister and current ambassador in London, Carlos Lemos, can add Samper’s goodwill and US approval to the required parliamentary consensus.
Lemos, an intellectual who represents the right-wing of the PL, has always taken a strong anti-guerrilla stance and approves the idea of the extradition for narcotraffickers – unlike Samper’s nearest supporters.
These conflicting situations wil;l confont the restricted meetings of all party leaders in coming weeks, and could consolidate democratic groups with a real social base, according to political observers..