AFGHANISTAN: Pakistan Learns Some Hard Lessons

By IPS Correspondents Reprint | | Print |

Analysis - Nasim Zehra

ISLAMABAD, Oct 8 1997 (IPS) - Six months ago, when the Taleban swept into Mazar-e-Sharif, the northern stronghold of its opponents, Pakistan was euphoric.

Islamabad became the first to recognise the Taleban as the new rulers of the war-torn country. With 24 of the 32 provinces under their control, they seemed unstoppable.

But within a week the student-led Islamist force was ejected from the newly conquered corner of Afghanistan, on the fringes of Central Asia, by an ally whose support had made their victory possible.

For Pakistan, the dramatic retreat was a shock. Islamabad felt particularly vulnerable because it has openly sided with the Taleban, Pushtun-speaking Sunni warriors who emerged from seminaries in Pakistan in late-1994 to stun the world by their fighting prowess.

Last month, the Taleban retook Mazar-e-Sharif, but the reaction in Islamabad was subdued. The changing military fortunes of the Taleban have brought home to Pakistan’s policy-makers the complexity of the Afghan situation.

With the battle for control of the north still on — the anti- Taleban Northern Alliance is trying to consolidate its control — the mirage of military ascendancy of one group over another has proved to be short-lived, says an Afghan watcher in Islamabad.

Pakistan had thought there was a simple and straightforward political solution to the power struggle. At a meeting on Jun. 24, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was optimistic that peace could be restored within a week.

In his eagerness to see military and political peace in Afghanistan and also prompted by former Afghan president Rabbani’s urgings that something needs to be done, Sharif directed the foreign office to undertake shuttle diplomacy.

It was decided that Pakistan should seek to build a triangle of confidence between the Taleban, the Northern Alliance and Iran, an important stake-holder in Afghanistan.

The Taleban was advised against “going it alone” and encouraged to engage in genuine dialogue with members of the opposition Northern Alliance, and to work on mending fences with Tehran and Moscow.

Islamabad’s shuttle diplomacy has not yielded substantive dividends on any of the three fronts, says a political commentator here. All efforts at constructing a triangle of confidence have essentially been stillborn.

The Taleban are not willing to enter into a dialogue with the Northern Alliance. They remain at loggerheads with the three major Alliance partners: Ahmad Shah Massoud’s Jamiat, General Abdul Malik’s Junmbish-i-Milli and the Hizb-i-Wahdat.

The Taleban leadership remains dogged about talking to the Alliance, insisting first on the release of Taleban prisoners taken by General Malik during the withdrawal from Mazar-e-Sharif in May, said Moulvi Shahbuddin Dilawer, Taleban ambassador in Islamabad.

The Northern Alliance, with less than 30 percent of Afghanistan in its control, has shown staying power. It shows no signs of buckling under the military pressure, stating its own preconditions for talks.

Principally they demand the de-militarisation of Kabul and the immediate setting up of a broad-based government in Kabul. Within the Northern Alliance reportedly power games continue to divide and unite leaders and commanders of the three main groups — issues like the return of general Rashid Dostum, Uzbek general who controlled Mazar-e-Sharif till Malik’s revolt, the ouster of Malik, tension between the pro-Iran and the nationalist Hizb- i-Wahdat leadership.

However, the internal strains have not led to Alliance partners making collaboration overture towards the Taleban. Tehran’s decision to stop the Taleban’s advance into areas along its border, has bolstered the Alliance.

Tehran has demonstrated time and again that along with Moscow’s support, it is determined to prevent the take-over of Mazar-e-Sharif and Hazara by the Talibaan force, which they see as Saudi and Washington-financed, Pakistan-trained and rabidly anti-Iran.

Pakistani officials say the Iranians view the Taleban with suspicion like they did warlord Gulbudeen Hekmatyar, who was militarily very influential in Afghanistan until the arrival of the Taleban. Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami was once a protege of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence.

They say plane-loads of armaments, cash and frequent interaction between Iranian officials and the Northern Alliance men is all aimed at aiding the Alliance against the Taleban’s military adventures.

Only last week General Malik visited Tehran. In addition to Tehran, Moscow and Tashkent are also opposed to the Taleban. While Islamabad-Moscow dialogue over the Afghanistan situation has become candid the Uzbek officials have, like Tehran mostly accused Islamabad of militarily supporting the Talibaan.

Events in recent months have merely reinforced one critical fact about the Afghan situation — without a break in the Tehran- Islamabad logjam over Afghanistan no real peace initiative can be of any consequence.