Monday, November 16, 2026
Commentary - Mushahid Hussain
- One year after the Sep. 11 atrocities, their impact continues to reverberate in the Muslim world and shape its relations with the West.
Since the 19 hijackers that day happened to be Muslim, some have used this tragedy as a pretext for promoting negativism about Islam and Muslims, who make up 1.3 billion of the world’s population.
Contemporary historians will record Sep. 11 as probably the third watershed event affecting relations between the West and the Muslim world in the last 30 years.
The October 1973 Arab-Israeli war was the first event that influenced these ties.
Saudi Arabia’s oil embargo against Western supporters of Israel at the time, particularly the United States, meant that for the first time pro-western Muslim countries were using their precious natural resource, oil, as a political weapon.
That gave rise to a rise in oil prices, the quest for a new international economic order and the emergence of the Palestinian issue as the centrepiece of the Middle East conflict.
The second key event in relations between the Muslim and Western world was the February 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. That overthrow of a pro-Western monarchy was the first time that Islam was perceived as a vehicle for radical change with a distinct anti-Western flavour.
The terms ‘political Islam’, ‘radical Islam’ or ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ then started gaining currency as part of the Western political lexicon.
Sep. 11, 2001 is the third and most far-reaching event that has unleashed a process that could go either way – toward the prophecy of a ‘clash of civilisations’ or toward a joint endeavour between the West and the Muslim world to weed out extremists, who are as much an aberration for Muslims as they are a threat to the West.
However, the initial portents a year down the line after Sep. 11, 2001 provide little room for optimism. Three reasons can be cited for this view.
First, Sep. 11 and its aftermath show that the extremists on both sides are ascendant.
If the purposes of the terrorists and al Qaeda were to spark a confrontation between the West and the Muslim world, then the U.S. response, particularly the preoccupation with the use force, is playing into the hands of the extremists.
The moderates are being marginalised, since the terrorist crimes are being responded to in a manner that could spawn further extremism in the Muslim world.
Second, religion is being injected as a factor in international relations. For instance, so far, terrorism is largely being linked with Islam or identified primarily with Muslims.
Third, within the rubric of the ‘war on terror’, various countries have seen the long-standing violence they have been coping with, become included in the global anti-terror bandwagon.
Israel, India, the Philippines, Russia, Uzbekistan, China, Malaysia and Algeria form part of a growing list of countries that view with satisfaction the U.S. State Department’s official certification of their respective Muslim dissidents as ‘terrorist’ ones.
However, Sep. 11 has also provided an opportunity for introspection, and even course correction within some Muslim countries.
The ouster of the Taliban, for instance, was received with relief by the people of Afghanistan, who felt the repression unleashed by a medieval tribalism that invoked their religion, although their practices had nothing to do with Islam.
Similarly, Pakistan did a course correction, not through regime change as in Afghanistan, but through policy change in key areas.
It ditched the Taliban in a timely U-turn and says it is discarding the ‘jihadist’ political culture, which took inspiration from Afghanistan and influences what for Islamabad is the struggle in Kashmir.
The approximately 10,000 ‘madrasah’ (religious seminaries) are being brought under state regulation both in the content of their curricula and their funding from overseas.
There have been vocal voices among reformists within the Iranian hierarchy, including the government and members of parliament, regarding relations with al Qaeda, and the powers of the president whose wings are being clipped by an increasingly assertive, conservative clerical establishment.
In fact, it is an unwitting offshoot of Sep. 11 that President Mohammad Khatami called a press conference on Aug. 27 in Tehran, seeking the restoration of presidential powers that had been enjoyed by his predecessors but were revoked in his case.
This is despite the fact that he won both his presidential terms, in 1997 and 2002, with a huge plurality.
Reactions among Muslim regimes, masses and the intelligentsia to Sep. 11 have broadly taken various forms.
There is a realisation that extremism degenerating into violence needs to be curbed and combated, since it is internally destabilising and externally damaging for the image of Islam — a faith that preaches peace and tolerance, which are repugnant to extremists.
For example, Pakistan President Gen Pervez Musharraf’s landmark speech of Jan. 12, 2002, announced remedial measures to reverse wrongs regarding extremism, a move that won him accolades at home and abroad.
Then, there is the growing impulse toward democracy and respect for civil liberties and human rights. Even those countries that are American allies in the war on terror are feeling the pressure to promote the rule of law and a better image before their Western friends.
These winds of change are sweeping across several Muslim countries: Pakistan, Qatar, Bahrain, Libya, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and Uzbekistan.
The success of the anti-terror campaign launched after Sep. 11 will depend, in the ultimate analysis, on how the United States is able to delink the war on terrorism and extremism from Islam and the Muslims — and how Muslim countries cope with the fact that extremism is as much their problem as it is a global one.
There is also a growing feeling that the war on terror may become a long-haul campaign, with various twists and turns before terrorism in its various forms is truly curbed, combated and eventually crushed.
It is a unique struggle in the annals of history, since the ‘enemy’ is not clearly identifiable or confined within a state’s boundary. It is faceless, stateless and sometimes nameless.
That is the challenge, which can only be met through cooperation within the international community rather than through a confrontation between cultures or blaming the people of one faith alone for what is a global problem.