Saturday, November 21, 2026
Monica Jaramillo and Gwendolyn Ledger
- The lack of solidarity with poor contributors is the main shortcoming of the Chilean Private Pension Funds (AFPs), according to local Union leaders.
The workers protested of the low State commitment to national social security since these funds were created 15 years ago, abandonning its role as safeguarder of the welfare of the less well off sectors.
“This system is lacking solidarity because stocks and shares are for the owners of the AFP consortia, and we want a non-profit system which will covers workers risks,” Arturo Martinez, interim leader of Chiles leading union, the United Workers Centre (CUT), told IPS.
Martinez said the CUT rejected the AFP system because it saw the impostion as a “perverse” measure which makes many of the poor even poorer.
“In Chile there is no social security, but forced savings for old age,” he said, referring to the obligatory AFP membership of all employees imposed by the dictator Augusto Pinochet in 1981.
In most of the Latin American nations some form of pension system privatisation is under consideration, if not already imposed, as the traditional systems have gone into crisis, criticised for their high cost to the State, inefficiency and complicated red tape.
The Chilean experience is considered by many experts convincing proof that privatisation is a good idea.
The predecessor of the AFPs in Chile were the Pension Savings Funds, both private and State owned, where the employer paid a contribution and a certain percentage of the worker’s salary went into a common fund.
Under this model the joint resources of each savings fund contributed to improving the pensions paid to those already retired, based on a collective supportive principle unlike the current individual capitalisation system.
The bureaucratic defects in the administration of the old system and the falling real value of the pensions due to resource stagnation helped smear the name of these funds and promote the new system.
The old model also never considered the total quantity of the contributions but fixed the pensions depending only on the amount registered in the last five years, allowing people to evade payment during long periods of their working life.
For Martinez, “at one time the old model played an important role and though it is today obsolete, it was much more communitary than the present one.”
In May 1991 the individual capitalisation system was brought in through the AFPs, private institutions covering everyone except the military who maintained their old funds.
The AFP contributors pay in 20 percent of their salary each month, including their health payment, while the employer pays nothing.
Half the worker contribution goes to welfare savings, with an additional sum of between 2.8 and 3.7 percent for administrative services, invalidity and life insurance.
The remaining seven percent is for health, managed by the State or Institutions of Health Welfare (ISAPRES), a private system nearly as heavily criticised as the AFPs.
When the system changed in 1981, those already working could choose whether or not to change over, but those who opted for the AFPs saw an 11 percent increase in their real salaries as their contribution was lower.
At present, the workers in the AFPs pay in 20.1 percent of their salary while the old Funds discount between 25.8 and 30.9 percent.
The worker who made the change were offered a “recognition bond,” calculated according to how much they had contributed to the old system over what period of time, which increased their individual capitalisation fund.
The unions initially opposed the new regime, however, as the years passed, as the majority of the workers moved over to the new system their criticisms changed.
With the return of democracy in 1990, they suggested removing the absolute control over the AFPs from the powerful economic groups.
The AFP Superintendent’s office, the governmental control mechanism encouraged the creation of more administrators, especially using labour organisations like the Teachers’ Collegiate and the banking unions.
However, these union dependent AFPs only make up 1.8 percent of the total contributions and barely 3.9 percent of resources in the hands of the private welfare institutions.
Jaime Ruiz-Tagle of the Economic Work Programme (PET) said the bad perfomance of the union AFPs was due to tough competition from the large limited companies who invest a large proportion of their resources in attracting new affiliates.
The value of future pensions is determined by various factors, including the development of the (declarable) taxable remuneration, the rate of profitability of the respective fund, the duration and probable future working life and the form of retirement chosen by the worker.
One of the criticisms of the current system alludes to the high costs and information problems faced by affiliates when they come to retirement age.
The Insurance Companies charge a comission to calculate the lifelong income (the expected duration of the affiliate’s time as a pensioner according to age, sex and that of their potential beneficiaries), which business leader Jose Antonio Guzman classed as excessive.
“In the individual capitalisation system, the pensions are fixed at the moment of retirement and never vary in real terms, that way the pensioners cannot benefit from the economic progress achieved by the nation in future years,” explained Ruiz-Tagle.
This will especially affect women who have a longer life expectancy, women are expected to live at least 24 years after they retire at the age of 60.
Ruiz-Tagle said he expected to see an increasing distance between the income of retired people with stagnant pensions, and that of the workforce, which will increase in line with economic development.
Martinez said the AFP system was “no good for nearly a million and a half workers” on low wages, as their pensions will be worth next to nothing by the time they retire.
“The funds of all Chileans who contribute monthly from their salaries, are injected into the market, limiting the buying power of the workers by taking away 20 percent of their income throughout their lives,” he said.
Moreover, he said, most of the workers never use the one percent the AFP discount for invalidity or death, “which is robbery, because the AFPs don’t return this money to the workers, a situation which would not occur if the State was administrating the funds.”
“We want to push for a system which benefits the middle and low bracket salaries, that is mixed, with government commitment, which would allow the workers to participate in an administration council of the AFPs they decide to contribute to,” added Martinez.
Ruiz-Tagle also agreed with this system, saying that if the bulk of workers in a company joined the same AFP then they should be eligible for posts of responsibility in this, handing over greater power to the organisations.