Europe, Headlines, Human Rights

HUMAN RIGHTS: Investigating War Crimes In the Former Yugoslavia

Commentary Vladan Vasilijevic

BELGRADE, Apr 2 1996 (IPS) - In handling of war crimes trials, previous experience has shown that evidence must be gathered quickly and meticulously.

During the Second World War, the systematic collection of information on alleged war crimes began in 1943, with the establishment of the United Nations War Crimes Commission.

Before that, in 1941, U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill publicly declared that punishing war crimes was a principal war aim, a position also adopted by representatives of occupied countries in January 1942.

Two years before the war in Europe ended, Allied ministers met in Moscow and agreed key principles for prosecution and punishment of war crimes. And throughout the fighting, Allied intelligence agencies accumulated a considerable amount of information, much of it from resistance fighters within occupied Europe.

As the Allies advanced through Europe toward the German heartland, special units worked practically on the front line, interviewing internees and prisoners of war to gather and preserve evidence.

Within Nazi Germany itself vast amounts of documentary evidence of wrongdoing was saved. When the Nuremberg prosecutions actually began, there was no shortage of evidence or suspects.

Compare this operation with that conducted in the former Yugoslavia.

On all sides in the Balkans conflict, there were violations of the Geneva Conventions and grave breaches of international humanitarian law. Members of the regular former Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) as well as paramilitary formations from Serbia, violated humanitarian law from the beginning of the conflict.

These paramilitary formations operated under the control of regular army units and the police, even though in many cases they were made up and led by wanted criminals — one reasons why there was no timely investigation into their crimes, even through the authorities had been aware of their existence.

Of course, even in relatively clear-cut military situations, gathering evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity is problematic, given the potential for destruction of evidence before independent investigators can get to it.

Though the armed forces are in large part responsible for ensuring respect for international humanitarian law, even among paramilitary formations operating on their territory, those same armed forces often control the territory where alleged crimes have taken place and can allow or deny access to investigators.

Similar difficulty exists with the Serb military’s overall ban on use of JNA documents, currently seen as the most reliable. To date, military documents have only been obtained after arbitrary (and rare) decisions by the Defence Ministry and the General Staff to disclose them. The Serbian Ministry of the Interior has been just as reluctant to disclose them.

Lack of access to military documents will be an obstacle to clarifying issues of command and control, as well as determining the identity of actual perpetrators of breaches of the Geneva and Hague Conventions.

The denial of military documents could also afford protection to political leaders. State television has similarly destroyed or hidden huge portions of its archive, which could paint a precise picture of events especially in cases of alleged incitement.

During 1991 and 1992, the JNA and associated paramilitary forces allegedly perpetrated mass crimes in eastern Slavonia, west Srijem, Western Slavonia and Krajina, and later in Bosnia- Hercegovina.

As the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) began gathering information on alleged war crimes, Serb lack of cooperation with the Tribunal and the U.N. Experts’ Commission were major impediments to their work.

The Yugoslav Committee for Collecting Evidence on Crimes Against Humanity and International Law still refuses to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal. Serb officials have declared the Tribunal illegitimate, and an infringement upon the rights of sovereign states.

To reinforce that point in November the Committee sent its sixth report on war crimes — covering only those allegedly committed against Serbs — to the U.N. Security Council, instead of the Tribunal, claiming that the Security Council is the competent body.

As for war crimes prosecutions within Serbia, 1993 legislation on documenting war crimes envisages that the State Committee can declare documentation secret. The legislation is also unclear about whether and in what circumstances documents can be made available for actual court proceedings.

It is crucial for the Tribunal’s investigators to be able to work in Yugoslavia or the Serb-held ares of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

They need the first-hand accounts, the witnesses, victims and documentation. In order to indict suspects, the Tribunal’s rules of procedure demand high quality evidence. To get them, there needs to be stricter enforcement of international rules and a clear definition of the obligations of domestic authorities.

Article 29 of the ICTY’s Statute could be a good starting point. It sets out the responsibilities of states in locating, and identifying suspects and witnesses, in the detention of suspects, their transfer to the seat of the Tribunal, as well as the provision of the relevant documents and evidence to the Tribunal.

But what is missing is an effective political lever, such as sanctions, as a punitive measure for non-compliance. In the absence of actual implementation of Article 29, there is a great danger that many war crimes, past, present and future, will go unpunished.

— Vladan Vasilijevic is an expert in criminal law, based in Belgrade. The preceding item comes via the Institute of War and Peace Reporting in London, publishers of WarReport.

 
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