Saturday, November 21, 2026
Darius Bazargan
- With presidential elections only weeks away Iran’s ruling elite are now less concerned with effectively implementing revolutionary socio-economic and political visions, and more concerned about preserving their political futures.
In the short term this means tackling the twin competing power structures that underpin the Islamic Republic. In the long term this means appealing to Iran’s large young population — nearly half the population was born after the 1979 revolution and the Shah’s overthrow.
The regime never completed the revolution it began in 1979; between the debilitating Iran-Iraq war and the factionalism amongst the ruling clerical revolutionary coalitions, Iran never managed to completely destroy the old institutional structures.
Instead parallel Islamic institutions were created to run alongside the pre-revolutionary bodies. Examples range from the army, which has the revolutionary guards (Pasdaran) breathing down its neck, to the legal system in which civil courts are overshadowed by the revolutionary courts.
Even the formal economy has its shadow; the powerful semi- governmental charitable foundations or ‘bonyads’. The biggest of these, the Bonyad-e-Mostazefin, or ‘Foundation for the Deprived’ has holdings worth up to 12 billion dollars an is second in economic size only to the National Iranian Oil Company.
“Iran’s power structure is like a skeleton made up of asymmetrical parts,” said Hooshang Amirahmadi of Rutgers University in New Jersey.
“It is comprised of many inter-connected and autonomous rings. This decentralised, almost feudal power structure has historical roots in Iran; it existed under the shahs, though not as blatantly as it does today.”
Iran is an Islamic state ruled according to a constitution approved by referendum following the revolution in 1979, and amended in 1989. It provides for executive, legislative and judicial branches.
But the reality is more complex; Iran has a spiritual leadership, a president, an elected parliament and several other bodies designed to serve as checks and balances in an attempt to protect the Islamic character of the state. These include the Council of Guardians, the Assembly of Experts and the increasingly influential Expediency Council.
Supreme authority is given to the Spiritual Leader (Vilyat-e- Faqih), any prospective change to Iran’s system of government, or any political differences between its leaders and dealt with within the framework of this religious guardianship. Society, in theory, is organised according to divine law and the aim of all political action is the execution of God’s will.
The position of Vilyat-e-Faqih was initially held by Ayatollah Khomeini who coined the phrase in a series of lectures on Islamic governance in 1963 until his death on 3 June 1989. Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khameini, Iran’s present Spiritual Leader, was elected to succeed him.
Khameini also wears the mantle of Marja-e-Taqlid (Source of Emulation) which in theory makes him the supreme spiritual guide of all Shi’ite Muslims, although some religious analysts outside Iran dispute his credentials for this position.
In 1982 an 83 member body called the Assembly of Experts was established. It is popularly elected every eight years although turnout in the poll tends to be low, in 1990 a mere 43 percent. It is charged with interpreting the constitution and selecting the Spiritual Leader.
Iran’s president is directly elected every four years. He is the head of the executive and appoints ministers subject to parliamentary approval. This year’s elections are on May 23 and will bring a change at the top; incumbent president Hashemi Rafsanjani, will have served two consecutive terms and is not allowed a third.
Rafsanjani won 63.2 percent of the votes cast in the 1993 presidential election, on a 57.6 percent turnout from an electorate of 29 million.
Candidates for election to both the Assembly of Experts and the 270 member parliament or Majlis, which is also elected on a four year cycle, are subject to the approval of the 12 man Council of Guardians.
This body, half of whom are clerics, vet the potential candidates Islamic credentials. Likewise, all legislation passed in the Majlis must be approved by the Council of Guardians before it becomes law.
Disagreements between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians are frequent. In the mid-1980s so many laws were being rejected by the Council of Guardians that Ayatollah Khomeini established yet another body, the Expediency Council, to arbitrate between the two, but even by the 1996 elections the Council was rejecting more than half the potential parliamentary candidates it saw.
The Expediency Council has since become a law maker in its own right, charged with making political decisions that cannot be solved through the regular channels. Some observers believe that its power is increasing and may supersede the authority of the presidency itself. But the Expediency Council is also a tool of the Vilyat-e-Faqih, who convenes and appoints its members.
“When Khomeini died in 1989 they changed the constitution and made the Expediency Council as a sort of constitutional organ, an advisory council to the leadership,” said Behjan Khajepour- Khouei, Teheran-based editor of Menas Associates’ Iran Focus.
“Now there’s a new decree from Khameini, he is referring to constitution and he’s saying that the expediency council is going to be the main policy making body in Iran.
“He says it will be the high council advising the leadership and in my eyes that will be a higher position than the presidency in the power structure.”
The Expediency Council has 26 members who are appointed by Khameini directly alongside the heads of the Majlis, judiciary and the president, the six clerical members of the Council of Guardians and ‘occasional members’ — ministers handling issues under discussion at the time.
Some argue that the empowerment of the Expediency Council is a ploy by the establishment to buy off the power of Iran’s commercial sector, the ‘bazaar’.
This largely pro-free market group has taken a more and more active role in the country’s politics, and they and their allies have come to dominate the Majlis.
The ‘bazaaris’ had been strongly backing the presidential candidacy of the present Majlis Speaker, Nateq Nouri. But there are those in the establishment who fear that Nouri will be unable to appeal to Iran’s younger population — the youth who are bored by revolutionary rhetoric, too young to remember the abuses of the Shah’s era and feeling the bite of unemployment and economic recession the hardest.
Iran’s population has nearly doubled from 35 million to 60 million between the 1979 revolution and 1995. A vast army of youth born after 1979 will storm the job market in the next few years, with votes with which to express their frustration.
The bazaaris have been offered places on the Expediency Council in the hope that they will cease backing the Nouri campaign, allowing Mohammad Khatame to triumph. A former Minister of Guidance, Khatame is the choice of leftist and centrist factions in the establishment and is seen as the man most likely to capture the imagination of the young.
“You can feel that the bazaari influence is exerting itself in the power structure; it was not enough to have the parliament, it would not have been enough to the presidency, but the Expediency Council is something through which they could basically push through their interests,” said Khajepour-Khouei.
Khajepour-Khouei argues that winning over the country’s youth is the regime’s overriding concern.
“If you try and get hints out of the power structure it seems that their main priority is to somehow appeal to the young population in Iran. We have a very young population and the person who can address the youth more easily, and introduce cultural reforms is Khatame.”