Sunday, November 15, 2026
News and Views from the Global South
POLITICS-INDIA: U.S Brokers Kargil Peace But Problems Remain
Analysis - Praful Bidwai
- The hurriedly organised meeting between President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has yielded results that favour defusion of the two-month-old crisis at Kargil. But it leaves some problems and creates new ones.
The situation on the ground along the Line of Control (LoC), as the disputed border in Kashmir is known, may remain muddled for some time although India has claimed significant military success in recapturing Tiger Hill, a 5,000 metre high feature overlooking a major supply line.
The Clinton-Sharif meeting follows more than three weeks of triangular diplomatic manoeuvres by Washington, many of them low- profile to defuse the Kargil crisis which has every potential to escalate with horrendous consequences for the two newly nuclearised South Asian rivals.
The communique issued at the end of a three-hour meeting organised at extremely short notice on America’s Independence Day, commits Pakistan to take “concrete steps” to restore the LoC which India claims, the Pakistan army working with a small number of mujahideen violated.
The communique does not expressly involve a cease-fire obligation but merely notes that Clinton ‘urged immediate cessation of hostilities.’
In some ways this formalises what Washington and the G-8 have been asking Pakistan to do : unconditionally withdraw forces from the Indian side of the LoC which encroached on over 200 sq. km of territory.
Islamabad has been stoutly resisting unconditional withdrawal claiming at different times that it is not involved with the ‘freedom fighters’ battling Indian troops, that the LoC is itself disputed (its actual position being unclear and ambiguous) and that withdrawal must be linked to a resolution of the larger, 52-year-old thorny Kashmir dispute.
The Paksitan government had publicly stated that one principal objective of the Sharif visit to the U.S was to seek international mediation over Kashmir as a quid-pro-quo for withdrawing forces from the LoC.
India opposes such ‘mediation’ insisting that all outstanding issued between New Delhi and Islamabad must be resolved bilaterally under the Shimla opposition to overt mediation, Prime Minister Vajpayee politely declined Clinton’s invitation to Washington.
In the event, both Pakistan and India had to retreat from their stated positions.
Sharif has not quite obtained a quid-pro-quo for taking ‘concrete steps’ to restore the sanctity of the LoC certainly no U.S endorsement of his position that the Kashmir issue must be ‘internationalise’ and resolved through overt third-party or multilateral mediation.
All he got is a statement that Clinton would take a ‘personal’ interest in ‘encouraging’ quick ‘resumption and intensification’ of India-Pakistan bilateral talks after the LoC status quo ant is fully restored.
India, on its part, has had to increasingly depend on external mediation to get Pakistan to agree to respect the LoC and withdraw forces.
However much New Delhi may quibble over words like ‘mediation,’ ‘intervention,’ ‘facilitation,’ or ‘encouragement,’ the truth is that its diplomatic thrust for the past one month consisted in pleading with the major powers, the U.S in particular, to exert pressure on Pakistan.
This amounts to seeking their intervention, however subtle and indirect. India may not want a visible high-profile Camp David but it has certainly not been averse to a Washinton-centred, low-profile, three-way process.
Vajpayee and his colleagues have not only participated in this process, they have actually sought U.S support for their position that Pakistan should withdraw from the LoC.
Just prior to the June 19, G-8 summit at Cologne, Vajpayee wrote a personal letter to Clinton, stressing that he is under pressure to permit the Indian army to cross theLoC so as to encircle the ‘intruders’ cut off their supply lines and vanquish them.
This letter combined entreaty and subtle pressure comparable to the tactic Islamabad employed following last year’s nuclear tests of converting its economic weakness into bargaining strength to extract concessions from multi-lateral agencies – in
the absence of which it could collapse into a ‘nuclear Somalia.’
Despite the compromises they have made, neither Pakistan’s nor India’s government will find it easy to arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution to the present crisis. Sharif in particular is likely to experience serious difficulties in both ‘selling’ the Washington deal domestically and in implementing it.
The link between troop withdrawal and Clinton’s offer of a ‘personal’ interest in promoting India-Pakistan dialogue is at best a tenuous one. This can come only after the ‘sanctity of the LoC is fully restored.’
Sharif has also had to accept that bilateral dialogue with India remains the ‘best forum’ for resolution of disputes.’
The Pakistan opposition is certain to interpret the communique as a virtual ‘sellout’ a unilateral commitment to withdraw forces and liquidate ‘precious’ strategic gains.
Indeed, not only non-parliamentary extremists such as the Jamaat-i-Islami, but even former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, have warned of a ‘civil war’ in case of a withdrawal.
The ‘mujahideen’ forces involved in the Kargil operation also say they are not answerable to Islamabad and can only consider its ‘appeal’ once it is made. Such groups, helped by their past links with organisations like the Inter Services Intelligence have strong supporters in the Establishment, especially the army.
It is far from clear that they will withdraw readily and without stiff resistance.
More ominously, if a significant section of the army translates its reluctance to give up the ‘Kargil card’ into active resistance, Sharif could find himself beleaguered.
Sharif may have emerged as one of Pakistan’s most powerful civilian Prime Ministers but he cannot challenge the authroity of the army, the final arbiter of Pakistan’s politics.
How he works out the ‘cessation of hostilities,’ and withdrawal of troops and mujahideen is an open question. Given that the Washington communique is silent on the time-frame, there is a serious possibility of delay and complication on the ground.
In India too, the process of reaching a cease-fire and peace is unlikely to be smooth. The political Opposition, which barely two months ago defeated the BJP-led coalition in a confidence vote is deeply suspicious of the BJP’s growing dependence on Washington as regards Kargil.
It has criticised efforts at clandestine diplomacy, the BJP’s attempt to ‘politicise’ Kargil and court Washington by citing the ‘common’ threat of ‘Islamic fundamentalism.’
The BJP, a Hindu-communal and right-wing party with a history of pro-U.S orientation during the cold war, has been trying to whip up national-chauvinistic hysteria over Kargil. Its bellicose anti-Pakistan, anti-Islam rhetoric mimics the sectarian campaigns of Pakistan’s ‘jehadists.’
The danger is that India’s and Pakistan’s policy makers could become victims of their own propaganda and get trapped in the militant rhetoric they have unleashed.
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POLITICS-INDIA: U.S Brokers Kargil Peace But Problems Remain
Analysis - Praful Bidwai
- The hurriedly organised meeting between President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has yielded results that favour defusion of the two-month-old crisis at Kargil. But it leaves some problems and creates new ones.
(more…)
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