Asia-Pacific, Headlines | Analysis

POLITICS-INDIA: Counter-Terrorism As Diplomatic Opportunity

Analysis - Praful Bidwai

NEW DELHI, Sep 30 1999 (IPS) - India, a founder and long-time advocate of non-alignment, is straining to establish closer diplomatic and strategic relations with the United States by using “counter- terrorism” as a tactical plank.

That is the central thrust of New Delhi’s latest diplomatic initiative, and the significance of Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh’s meeting on Tuesday in New York with U.S Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

In its new gambit, India has been projecting itself as “a frontline state in the battle against terrorism and a primary target of terrorist aggression.”

The source of this is a “Talibanised” Pakistan and Afghanistan. This projection, it hopes, will help it isolate Pakistan, and at the same time, win Washington’s sympathy on account of the Osama bin Laden factor.

Recently the Saudi-born millionaire Islamist specifically named the U.S. and India as principal targets of his holy “jehad” or holy war.

Although the reference is rhetorical, and there is little in common between U.S and Indian roles in respect of Islamicist movements or their concerns about “terrorism” New Delhi hopes to capitalise on this coupling with Washington.

It feels encouraged by Washington’s support to it during its recent conflict with Pakistan at Kargil, in disputed Kashmir.

The Kargil war began with Pakistan’s infiltration of a number of troops into Indian territory in the Ladakh region of Kashmir, some of which were falsely claimed to be Kashmiri “freedom- fighters” struggling against India’s “oppressive” policy.

This created enormous tension between the two recently nuclearised rivals. Many powers, especially the U.S, counselled restraint and asked Pakistan to roll back the intrusion. Eventually, the U.S. indirectly mediated an end to the conflict.

New Delhi quickly seized upon the new atmosphere of cordiality with Washington to offer itself as an ally in the ‘global’ struggle against “cross-border terrorism,” especially of the variety inspired by religion-driven fundamentalism.

Its campaign acquired momentum especially after the spate of terrorist bombings in Russia by suspected Dagestan separatists.

Even the Pakistan government has not remained unaffected by the new ‘counter-terrorism’ rhetoric. It sent the head of the military Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency to Washington to seek advice and help on containing religious fundamentalism.

This might sound viciously ironical because the ISI has been deeply implicated in supporting fundamentalists in Afghanistan, Kashmir and in Pakistan itself.

But this testifies to the attractiveness of the “terrorism” slogan. There is more to the Indo-U.S ‘common platform’ against terrorism than ideological commitment or overlapping self- interest.

India has reportedly agreed to allow the U.S Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to open a permanent office in New Delhi and train Indian security forces and police officers in “counter- terrorist” operations.

The U.S has tried to obtain such a facility in India for decades. Weakening Indian resistance suddenly cracked with the visit to New Delhi of a State Department official (Michael A. Sheehan) late last month.

Earlier, India used to reject such joint “operations” and training as a form of interference with its sovereignty.

This development comes in conjunction with President Clinton’s plans to visit India early next year, possibly as chief guest for the January 26 Republic Day celebrations.

Albright on Tuesday described Clinton’s likely India visit as a “missing piece” in his life.

Although a Clinton visit to South Asia won’t be exclusive to India and will probably include Pakistan on its itinerary, Indian officials see it as signifying an end to India’s diplomatic isolation following the nuclear tests of May 1998.

Already, most of the economic sanctions imposed by the U.S in their wake have been lifted. And there have been eight rounds of talks between India and the U.S. (and also Pakistan and the U.S.) on the nuclear weapons issue.

As part of the preparations for the visit, the U.S. is seeking

India’s signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty–which New Delhi had opposed tooth and nail in 1996.

India in turn would like the U.S. to fully remove sanctions and export control restrictions and give some endorsement to its own “counter-terrorist” campaign.

Concretely this last step could mean New Delhi pushing a strong- arm policy against “azadi” (autonomy) militants in Kashmir.

India’s signature of the CTBT is very much on the agenda. The outgoing government, led by the right-wing Hindu-chauvinist Bharatiya Janata Party, made an all but formal commitment to adhere to the Treaty last year.

It dropped the move in view of changed international circumstances–in particular the non-ratification of the CTBT in the U.S. Senate–and likely domestic opposition.

After the government lost Parliament’s confidence in April, 13 months after being installed, the pressure to sign the CTBT abated.

As of now, there are many indications that the next Indian government will leverage the CTBT to extract minor concessions out of the U.S along with the recognition that, for all practical purposes, India is a nuclear weapons state and will not roll back its nuclear programme.

This would be a shift from Security Council Resolution 1172 and the stated position of the G-8 that India must sign not only the CTBT, but the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty-i.e. effectively give up its nuclear weapons.

Of course, such recognition, however informal, would involve some “understanding” of nuclear restraint on India’s part, especially as regards open deployment of nuclear weapons in the short run, and support for a fissile materials cut-off agreement.

Such an understanding would only have temporary and limited value. Indian policy-makers are under pressure to build a large- scale triadic (land, sea and air-based) nuclear arsenal following publication of a Draft Nuclear Doctrine document by the so-called advisory board of the recently constituted (but, functionally, poorly defined) National Security Council.

The Indian government is trying to manoeuvre its way into a bargain with the U.S so that it can build and keep a large stock of nuclear weapons by offering to realign its policy and becoming Washington’s ally. “Counter-terrorism” is part of this strategy.

Whether, and to what extent, it succeeds remains unclear. But what is abundantly clear is that India has come a long, long way away from non-alignment. It does seek a strategic relationship with the U.S to the exclusion of Pakistan.

Washington is unlikely to drop a long-standing friend, Pakistan, but is not averse to finding areas of influence and military leverage in this part of the world through a newly pliant, pro-Western, investor-friendly, India – however hostile this India may be to regional and global peace and to its own people’s welfare.

 
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