VENEZUELA: PUTTING THE BRAKES ON HUGO CHAVEZ

By Jennifer McCoy and - - Reprint | | Print |

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ATLANTA, Dec 10 2007 (IPS) - In a constitutional referendum on December 2, voters in Venezuela sent a clear message to their president: \’\’Slow down,\’\’ writes Jennifer L. McCoy, political science professor at Georgia State University, and director of the Americas Programme at The Carter Centre in Atlanta. In this analysis, McCoy writes that President Hugo Chavez\’ own supporters refused to do what he asked – vote on his constitutional reform proposals as if it were a personal loyalty test to him. Venezuela could profit from this experience if all sides (and the US too) learn the lessons and capitalise on the opportunities it provides. International actors should not underestimate the capacity of the Venezuelan people to provide broad constraints on their government, even when institutional checks and balances are practically non-existent. As long as President Chavez follows the electoral path, the Venezuelan people will determine how far they will support his ideas, and when to put on the brakes.

This was Chavez’ first electoral defeat in his nine years in office. The fact that he accepted the results, and that the electoral authority actually reported a loss, surprised many. That it took nine hours, instead of the promised two, to announce the results should not come as a surprise. In extremely polarised contexts, leaders often need time to adjust to a surprising defeat, and to consider how they and their victors should present the results to their supporters to avoid clashes in the streets.

Venezuela could profit from this experience if all sides (and the US too) learn the lessons and capitalise on the opportunities it provides.

For the president, at least three lessons are crucial. The first is that he needs to broaden his circle of advisors and encourage debate among them. The closed system of information within the presidential palace means that advisors may be afraid to bring bad news to the leader, and that healthy debate is stifled, leading to rigidity, out-of-touchness, and surprise results as on Sunday.

The second lesson for the president is that he has accomplished one of his goals — to bring visibility to ”invisible” citizens. Many previously marginalised Venezuelans now seem to feel empowered and represented by the president, so empowered that many refused to support him. But they also want concrete results — to lower the 18 percent inflation, to end the shortages of basic goods, to control corruption and high levels of crime. Increasing government efficiency and enlisting private sector collaboration to tackle these serious problems seems to be the demand of the average Venezuelan, above the vague concepts of 21st century socialism.

The third lesson is the change in the opposition. Both newly-dissident chavistas and longer-term political opponents acted responsibly after their victory. They did not gloat, but instead asked for dialogue and offered to support some of the president’s more popular proposals such as social security for self-employed workers. The president now has a golden opportunity to test the opposition’s sincerity by accepting their offers, instead of denigrating them.

The ”new” opposition appears to be already learning that participating in the democratic game can pay dividends. The ”fraud” card adopted after the failed 2004 recall referendum hurt them in subsequent elections as their supporters stayed home, and had the most dramatic impact in the boycott of the 2005 legislative elections leaving the national assembly comprised 100 percent of Chavez’ supporters. This time around, the extensive safeguards over the electoral system negotiated over the last several elections led moderate opposition leaders to reject the immoderate charges that the National Electoral Council had padded the results to make Chavez’ defeat less embarrassing to him.

With a huge post-election audit of the paper receipts from 54 percent of the electronic voting machines and a quick count from the domestic observer group Ojo Electoral both confirming the outcome, it is hard for either side to credibly question the results. Granted, the campaign process leaves much to be desired: the inequitable news media coverage in favour of the government’s proposal, the government’s access to extensive petroleum revenues, and a still inadequately-audited voter’s list remain to be fixed.

The way that new actors energised the ”No” vote should also not be lost on the political opposition. A newly-awakened student movement and dissidents from within chavismo itself focused people on the substance of the proposals rather than making it a referendum on the president. Wether this disparate group can capitalise on the moment and forge alternative political messages for those who wish to compete against Chavez will be tested in 2008.

President Chavez’ first electoral loss leaves him far from defeated. The opposition did not gain many new voters; instead, Chavez lost 40 percent of his voters compared with the 2006 presidential election. But he still commands significant popular support as well as control over the main national institutions, extraordinary petroleum revenues, five more years in office, and six more months of legislative-decree power. He will continue to try through all of these routes to implement his agenda, but he will be more successful if he listens more to his citizens.

The final lesson from the December 2 vote is for international actors. We should not underestimate the capacity of the Venezuelan people to provide broad constraints on their government, even when institutional checks and balances are practically non-existent. As long as President Chavez follows the electoral path, the Venezuelan people will determine how far they will support his ideas, and when it is time to put on the brakes.(END/COPYRIGHT IPS)