POLAND: Slowly Coming to Terms with Russia

By Zoltán Dujisin Reprint | | Print |

Zoltán Dujisin

PRAGUE, Jan 31 2008 (IPS) - The upcoming visit of newly elected Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk to Russia signals a new sense of pragmatism in Poland’s policies.

On Feb. 8 Tusk will become the first Polish prime minister to visit Moscow in six years, following a series of diplomatic gestures between the two countries.

The first gesture came from Poland, which unblocked Russia’s negotiations to join the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in what the opposition Law and Justice (PiS) called “a disastrous mistake”.

Then on Dec. 20 Russia responded by lifting its November 2005 embargo on Polish meat, widely believed to be politically motivated, after Poland allowed Russian veterinary inspectors to visit Polish firms.

Now Russia is hoping to see Warsaw lift its 2006 veto on a new agreement between Russia and the European Union (EU), something wished by most EU member states.

The Polish government in place since October says it at least wants to try to improve ties with Russia to avoid being blamed for their deterioration, and has already called the latest developments a “new chapter” in Polish-Russian relations.

Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, shortly before meeting with his Polish counterpart, commented that “a lot of positive events have taken place lately in Russian-Polish relations.”

For years no Russian leader has made a positive remark on Poland, considered by many Russians a Russophobic satellite of the U.S.

But Poland’s opposition sees these as worrying signs that Poland is becoming a guarantor of Kremlin policy. Pawel Kowal, the PiS’s former deputy foreign minister, said Tusk should be ashamed of receiving Russian praise.

Contrary to the confrontational approach of the previous government, Tusk’s cabinet will try to focus on non-conflictive issues in its dealings with Moscow, and will use a more realistic, managerial tone which is preferred by Russia.

“What our authorities can do is to avoid an open crisis and decrease tension in our relations, which is important,” Adam Eberhardt, head of research at the Polish Institute of International Affairs told IPS.

Yet Eberhardt is among those who recommend a dose of scepticism, arguing that there is a fundamental conflict of interest between Poland and Russia, especially regarding the geo-strategic orientation of countries such as Belarus and Ukraine, and energy cooperation.

Ukraine’s 2004 ‘orange revolution’ was the most telling example of how differently the interests of the common neighbours are perceived.

“I’m not very optimistic when discussing the prospects of Polish-Russian relations in the long run, because they are very competition-based,” Eberhardt told IPS.

“We have arguments on some of the most important topics in foreign policy: our common neighbours and energy dependence,” Eberhardt said. “And we would like to see Russia more engaged in an energy dialogue with Europe.”

Russia’s intention to build a gas pipeline linking it directly to Germany through the Baltic Sea has stirred controversy in Poland. For Russia the project would limit complications posed by transit countries such as Belarus, Ukraine and Poland.

Warsaw fears a loss of influence and transit revenues, and its officials hope the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom will be discouraged by the extremely costly nature of the original project, and opt for an overland solution instead.

The rapprochement will also take an economic dimension, as the new leadership intends to drop the previous government’s prejudiced attitude towards Russian capital.

The exception might be Poland’s sensitive energy field. Russian giants such as Gazprom and Lukoil are keen to enter the Polish energy market, but it is unlikely that Poland State Treasury, which has a final say on investments in key sectors, will allow Russian capital to get any share of the energy industry.

Many in Poland fear that Russian capital is subordinated to the Kremlin leadership, though there are experts who have suggested the opposite. Nevertheless, the climate for Russian investment looks bound to improve.

While Tusk has been criticised for accumulating too many kind gestures towards Russia, media have speculated that the Prime Minister is keen on solving outstanding bilateral issues before transferring Warsaw’s diplomacy to the European Union (EU).

“Poland does not have the means to influence Russian policy, and some goals cannot be achieved through bilateral relations, therefore the EU is an important tool to achieve them,” Eberhardt notes.

Optimists believe that entangling Polish diplomacy with that of the EU will strengthen Warsaw’s position towards Moscow, and delegate responsibility for future sources of conflict to Brussels.

Yet one outstanding issue to be discussed by the Russian and Polish leadership could show the limitations of Warsaw’s goodwill: U.S. plans to enlarge its missile defence system to Poland and the Czech Republic, inherited from Poland’s previous conservative cabinet, are angering Moscow.

As a first retaliatory measure, Russia withdrew from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which means Moscow will be free to redeploy its troops within its territory without informing the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NATO).

Unlike Poland’s previous leadership, the present government concedes that Russia’s concerns over an increasing military presence in its neighbourhood are understandable, and its officials have shown willingness to listen to Moscow’s objections to the system.