KOSOVO REQUIRES A UNITED EUROPE… AND SO DOES EUROPE

By Martti Ahtisaari and - - Reprint | | Print |

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HELSINKI, Apr 7 2008 (IPS) - In November 2005, the UN Secretary-General, acting on the basis of the conclusions of the Security Council that the situation in Kosovo is no longer sustainable, asked me to lead the political process to determine Kosovo\’s future status, writes Martti Ahtisaari, ex-President of Finland and UN Secretary-General Special Envoy to Kosovo. In this article, the author writes that almost a year after he initially submitted his proposal, it became clear that the Security Council would not pass a new resolution. Therefore, since everybody, even the Russian Federation, agreed that the status quo in Kosovo was not sustainable, a solution outside of the Security Council needed to be found. The result we all know: many important countries, including the US and the majority of the EU, have recognized or committed themselves to recognize Kosovo\’s independence. Kosovo is primarily a European issue and the EU cannot afford to let Kosovo become just another \’frozen conflict\’. Doing nothing was not an option and my Settlement proposal provides an organized methodology for a UN exit and EU takeover. This requires a strong, consistent, and united European position in the coming months if we want Europe and Balkans to be stable.

I made my first trip to the region at the end of November 2005 and told the leadership in Belgrade that I interpreted the mentioned principle that Kosovo will not return to the pre-1999 situation as meaning that Kosovo will not return to Serbia. My hosts, particularly the Prime Minister, did not share this interpretation. Furthermore, during these initial visits to Belgrade and Pristina, it became apparent that the positions and perceptions on status were entrenched and so mutually opposed that any immediate attempt to narrow the differences would lead nowhere.

During the Contact Group ministerial meeting in London on 31 January 2006, it was suggested that the Contact Group members individually deliver private messages to the Kosovo Status Process parties. The key messages were that the unconstitutional abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 and the ensuing tragic events resulting in the international administration of Kosovo have led to a situation in which a return of Kosovo to Belgrade’s rule was not a viable option.

All but the Russian Federation delivered private messages in the course of February and March 2006 to Belgrade, Pristina, and Kosovo Serbs. All members of the Contract Group, including the Russian Federation, agreed in the Ministerial Statement of 31 January 2006 that the settlement needs to be acceptable to the people of Kosovo.

My team and I therefore commenced work in early 2006 with an understanding that we should try to at least close the gap between Belgrade and Pristina on ‘technical aspects’ of status: rights of communities and their members; decentralization; religious and cultural heritage; economic provisions and property. Technical agreements or at least rapprochements were thought to then serve as building blocks for the resolution of status.

However, after a year of gruelling talks, on 10 March 2007 I chaired in Vienna a high-level meeting concluding the negotiations on the future status process for Kosovo, during which my team has engaged both parties in 17 rounds of direct talks and 26 expert missions to Belgrade and Pristina.

I had hoped, and very much preferred, that this process would lead to a negotiated agreement; however, after all efforts invested in the negotiation by my team and me, I felt that no amount of additional negotiations would change that. It was my firm conclusion that the potential of negotiations was exhausted. Bearing in mind the Guiding Principles of the Contact Group and the private messages, it was obvious that neither a return of Kosovo to Serbian rule, which the overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo would not accept, nor a continuation of Kosovo’s current political and legal limbo under international administration, are viable options.

Therefore, I sent my settlement proposal, which is the best compromise as I see it, to the UN Secretary-General at the end of March 2007. I envisaged that the supervisory role of the international community will come to an end only once Kosovo has implemented the measures set forth in the proposal.

The UN Secretary-General endorsed my settlement proposal and forwarded it to the UN Security Council. The suggested solution enjoyed wide international support, not least within the EU. But this was not enough to produce a resolution that could be adopted by the Security Council. As a compromise solution, an agreement was reached that a Troika, comprised by representatives of the US, Russia, and the EU, was to be established by the Contact Group to lead an additional attempt to negotiate a settlement, with my office in Vienna continuing to be involved in the process and providing support as necessary. While the Troika managed to facilitate high-level, intense, and substantive discussions between Belgrade and Pristina on a wide range of options, the parties nevertheless were unable to reach an agreement on the final status of Kosovo. Neither party was willing to cede its position on the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo, as I had expected.

The Security Council remained divided and Russia blocked the passing of a new resolution that would de-facto give Kosovo independence. I find it regrettable that the Security Council could not reach agreement on this issue. In my view, if this body of the UN cannot make decisions on important issues, then it is likely that these issues will be resolved somewhere else. If such tendency were to become dominant, the relevance of the Security Council would be diminished, which in turn would change the system of international relations as we know it.

What happened with Kosovo proves this point. Almost a year after I initially submitted my proposal, it became clear that the Security Council would not pass a new resolution. Therefore, since everybody, even the Russian Federation, agreed that the status quo in Kosovo was not sustainable, a solution outside of the Security Council needed to be found. The result we all know: many important countries, including the US and the majority of the EU, have recognized or committed themselves to recognize Kosovo’s independence. In the given circumstances, independence was the only option that could lead to stability in the Balkans and signal the end of the era that saw one of the worst atrocities committed on European soil in recent times.

It should be remembered that Belgrade leadership knew already in early 2006 what would be the outcome of the negotiations. They could have chosen to make a real difference for Kosovo Serbs and meaningfully engage in the talks. Instead, they decided to promote a nationalistic cause pursued by Milosevic that had forced the International Community to intervene in 1999 in the first place. In the course of the negotiations Belgrade has not publicly acknowledged any wrongdoing in Kosovo in the recent past. Even now its leaders act as if nothing happened in 1998 and 1999, when terrible injustices were suffered by the Kosovo Albanian population. During the negotiations the Kosovo Albanian delegation presented facts about these years with little remorse or understanding demonstrated from Belgrade.

Let me say a few words about the position of the Russian Federation. It was aware of the outcome of the negotiating process all along. Russia accepted the CG Guiding Principles, adopted in 2005, which are heavily tilted towards independence. In early 2006, my understanding was that Moscow would not block the inevitable from happening, but since then there has obviously been a change of mind. The diverging positions of Russia on the one hand and the EU and US on the other have made the world question the authority of the UN Security Council. Who would need a body that is not able to make a decision? Can a dictator – like Milosevic – succeed and get away with no repercussions for the sovereignty of the country where terrible acts were committed? In other words, a dictator could use the worst forms of discrimination based on ethnic principles, yet those that were the targets of this discrimination should idly accept the status quo and pretend to live together peacefully ever after?

I feel proud that the international community ended this conflict by closing a chapter where history was manipulated and used to fuel violence and hatred. I firmly believe that Kosovo is primarily a European issue and that the EU cannot afford to let Kosovo become just another ‘frozen conflict’. Doing nothing was not an option and my Settlement proposal provides an organized methodology for a UN exit and EU takeover. This requires a strong, consistent, and united European position in the coming months. I am encouraged by the results of the Steering Group meeting in Vienna in late February. I hope the process will continue in the same fashion in the future. It has to if we want Europe and Balkans to be stable. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)