Europe, Headlines

HUNGARY: Pragmatism with Russia Troubles U.S.

Zoltán Dujisin

PRAGUE, May 21 2008 (IPS) - The last year has seen an attack on Hungary’s foreign policy by many conservative sectors in the U.S. and Hungary who think Hungarian-Russian economic cooperation betrays Western interests.

In the last two years socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány and former Russian president Vladimir Putin met four times, upsetting Washington and the suddenly anti-Russian opposition in Hungary.

While Hungarian socialists regard their Euro-Atlantic orientation as self-evident, for many Atlanticists in Eastern Europe and the U.S. good relations between Moscow and a former communist like Gyurcsány are always alarming.

“We don’t deserve so much attention, what we do with Russia is largely overstated. There is much interest in energy but cooperation is highly pragmatic,” Pal Dunay, international relations expert at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy told IPS.

There are many signs of a positive relationship. Hungary has signed a profitable deal with the Russian giant gas monopoly Gazprom to help build the South Stream pipeline, which will bring gas through the Balkans and Hungary to Europe, bypassing problematic transit countries.

This has caused much international uproar. Critics warn that European over-reliance on Russian gas can be politically dangerous, and instead propose supporting the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline.

Gyurcsány continues to say the two projects are compatible, though he is aware that Nabucco, which is supposed to transport non-Russian natural gas to Europe via Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, has nowhere to pump gas from as of yet.

Unlike the U.S. and the opposition, big Western European countries have shown understanding of Hungary’s position as one of the European countries most dependent on Russian gas. In all 92 percent of gas consumed in Hungary originates in Russia.

On a visit to Hungary last year German Chancellor Angela Merkel stood by Gyurcsány in defending the right to maintain good economic relations with Moscow while occasionally being able to criticise its democratic shortcomings.

In spite of some international criticism, Paris, Berlin and other capitals committed to further European integration see in Hungary a valuable ally in an occasionally Euro-sceptic and traditionally Atlanticist Eastern European region. Unlike other post-communist EU states where Russia is perceived as a threat and the U.S. as the most reliable ally, Hungary seems to be treading the path of Germany.

“Hungary is closer to Germany in this sense: it is not willing to use anti-Russian rhetoric, and feels that without engagement and cooperation we can’t influence it,” Dunay told IPS.

A booming and underdeveloped economy, Russia has moreover provided a lucrative market for Hungarian businesses. Hungarian exports have quadrupled in the last four years, and this year they are expected to grow 70 percent.

Russia and Hungary have also set up an inter-governmental forum, making Hungary the first Central Eastern European state to cooperate with Moscow on such a level.

While these developments are not to Washington’s liking, U.S.-Hungarian relations became strained under the tenure of former prime minister and Fidesz head Viktor Orbán through the period of his government 1998-2002.

In 2001 former U.S. ambassador to Hungary Nancy Goodman Brinker pointed to the existence of anti-Semitism in Hungary, prompting angry responses from Fidesz politicians who deny the relevance of the phenomenon due to what many believe is their reliance on extreme-right votes.

Hungary’s policy towards its region was also seen critically by Washington back then. Budapest’s aggressive style in calling for greater rights for the more than two million ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries was not perceived as conducive to regional stability.

But recently the right-wing opposition Fidesz has taken advantage of Washington’s dissatisfaction with the socialist government to mend ties with the U.S. and present itself as the pro-Western political force in Hungary.

Last year Orbán visited the U.S. and met with various officials and experts on Eastern Europe, insisting on the dangers of Gyurcsány’s alleged pro-Russian orientation.

“The opposition is trying to sideline the Hungarian government by saying it pursues a short-sighted pro-Russian policy which is undermining ‘Western cohesion’, though one could write a long list of western politicians who undermine ‘Western cohesion’,” Dunay told IPS. “But when the opposition returns to power, it will find it important to have equally good relations with Russia.”

More moderate critics of Hungarian foreign policy have not denied the importance of economic cooperation, but ask for more stress to be placed on human rights issues in talks with Russian, Chinese and other partners they perceive as not fully democratic.

Budapest has consistently argued it is only being pragmatic by leaving human rights issues to multilateral frameworks within the EU.

A recent policy change towards Cuba, indicated by Budapest’s willingness to take in some refugees from the country, was an exceptional move that some speculate could have been motivated by a wish to please Washington.

Many more criticise Budapest for its overly passive approach to international relations.

With 500,000 ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring Serbia, the recent independence of Kosovo affected Hungary as no other EU member, but only vague and conciliatory rhetoric could be heard from Budapest’s side.

Budapest’s position on the possible extension of the U.S. missile defence system to Eastern Europe also remains unknown.