LOVE THY NEIGHBOUR, OR THYSELF: THE LOGIC OF TURKEY-IRAN RELATIONS

By Ilter Turan Reprint | | Print |

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ISTANBUL, Jun 8 2010 (IPS) - A major difference has emerged recently between the United States and Turkey regarding alleged Iranian aspirations to develop nuclear capability. By continuing to enrich uranium that could eventually be used for building nuclear weapons, Iran had continually defied the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which is responsible for monitoring nuclear activities of member states to insure that they are complying with provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Although the Iranians have argued that their activities are intended for peaceful uses, the cloud of secrecy under which they have operated, their reluctance to cooperate with the UN, and remarks by the Iranian leadership that they have a right to nuclear weapons have reduced the credibility of such explanations, prompting the US and its major European allies to ask the Security Council (UNSC) to adopt sanctions against Iran to secure its compliance to the NPT. The Americans have also striven to persuade China and Russia, permanent members of UNSC, to join the US, France, and Britain in the effort to bring Iran into the NPT mould. Iran’s defiant approach, combined with American arm-twisting, eventually proved critical in getting all permanent members of the UNSC to agree on imposing sanctions on Iran.

Turkey, with a temporary seat in the UNSC, has insisted on negotiating with Iran, arguing that this is in full compliance with President Obama’s stated position that Iran should be engaged. Countering judgments that Iran had been given sufficient time and opportunity to accommodate to the IAEA expectations, it has emphasised that diplomatic efforts still have a chance of success and should be continued. In efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution, Turkey has been joined by Brazil, another non-permanent member of the UNSC that was has recently been assuming a more active role in world politics.

As the meeting of the UNSC approached, Turkish foreign minister Davutoglu and his Brazilian counterpart Amorim spent days in Tehran trying to persuade the Iranians to accept the conditions outlined by IAEA. Finally the Iranians agreed to deposit 1200 kilograms of low grade uranium in Turkey to be exchanged for 120 kilograms of higher grade uranium in nuclear fuel rods used for, among other applications, medical treatment. Presumably, President Obama had confirmed in a letter to the Turkish government that the acceptance of IAEA conditions by Iran would be considered sufficient to rescind the consideration of sanctions. The optimistic statement of Minister Davutoglu that the need for a UNSC Resolution had disappeared reflected his conviction that Turkey and Brazil had delivered to the US and friends the previously accepted conditions.

The reaction of the US and its partners has been cool. Politely acknowledging their appreciation of Turkey’s efforts, the US has made it clear that it does not consider the agreement sufficient to change its position. So far Russia and China have not changed their commitment to support sanctions. The Turkish prime and foreign ministers are talking to their counterparts among the permanent members of the UNSC to persuade them that the agreement meets the conditions that the IAEA had stipulated and that it should be honoured. If the Council proceeds with the American plan, Turkey and Brazil will certainly vote against. It will indeed be unusual for Turkey to be on the opposing side of the US on a major UN decision.

What motivates Turkey to pursue a gentler approach with Iran? Many Turkish observers note that Turkey and Iran have not fought each other since 1638, that there is a tradition of friendship and peace. The stabilisation of Turco-Iranian relations in mid-17th century owes much to the mutual recognition that given the impediments of nature and the sectarian religious differences, it was impossible for either to dominate the other. Otherwise, barring brief intervals, the relations between them cannot be characterised as being close. They have often competed for regional leadership. The Iranian regime’s earlier efforts to export their revolution to Turkey have aroused Turkey’s anger.

The suggestion that there is a shift toward Islam in Turkish foreign policy also fails the empirical test. Turkey has been promoting close relations with Russia, the Balkan countries, Africa, and Latin America as well. Other considerations play a greater role in Turkey’s Iran policy. First, Turkey’s growing economy mandates expanding economic relations with all countries. Iran, a growing market, a source of energy for Turkey and a potential supplier of gas and oil to Europe with transit pipelines through Turkey, is an important economic partner with whom good relations must be maintained. Second, Turkey feels that UN sanctions have not proven to be effective in eliciting compliance with international agreements. The burdens they cause do not fall equitably on all; rather, neighbouring countries suffer more with no compensation. Third, adversarial behaviour toward neighbours creates wounds that take a long time to heal. And finally, like Brazil, Turkey, as an emerging power, wants a greater say in world affairs whereas the current world order is run by institutions and actors that reflect the power relationships of the immediate post-World War II era.

It seems that Turkey’s policies regarding Iran can be explained better by “love yourself” than by “love thy neighbour”. Such is the logic of realpolitik. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)

(*) Ilter Turan is professor of political science and the former president of Istanbul Bilgi University.