Asia-Pacific, Headlines, Human Rights

U.S. ELECTION: Under Bush II, South Asia Could Be Worse Off

Commentary - By Praful Bidwai

NEW DELHI, Nov 5 2004 (IPS) - President George W Bush’s victory in a wrenchingly polarised and ideologically charged election will have a big negative impact on South Asia, one of the world’s most volatile regions.

Strong evidence of divisiveness has already appeared in India, where the business class and the power elite have generally welcomed Bush’s victory – and the stock market rose 1.5 percent on announcement of the results Thursday morning – while a majority of the population probably feels disappointed with the outcome.

Under Bush’s second term, the United States’ relations with India and Pakistan, South Asia’s largest states, are likely to undergo significant change. Some of the smaller states, especially Nepal and Sri Lanka, will be affected too.

Ironically, the result could be radically different from the myopic calculus of many conservative and right-wing Indian commentators. This calculus, propagated through numerous articles speculating over the U.S. election outcome holds that a Democratic administration would be bad for India, while Bush’s would be good: John Kerry would have preached the non-proliferation gospel and opposed outsourcing, affecting India’s booming call centres.

The reality could be far more complex.

Similarly, analysts in Pakistan, who are pleased at the Republican administration’s initiative to upgrade relations with Islamabad after September 2001, and the warm personal relations between Bush and General Pervez Musharraf, might find that their celebration of Bush’s victory is premature.

Washington might mount more pressure on Pakistan both on dismantling the ‘jihadi’ support structure, and for more disclosures about the nuclear black market run by Dr. A.Q. Khan – the so-called father of Pakistan’s atomic programme.

The impact of a new Bush administration on South Asia will be transmitted through ”external” factors such as changes in the international order, weakening of multilateral institutions and aggravation of the Middle East crisis. Also, more directly, the impact will be felt through changes in Washington’s relations with individual countries.

Precisely because Bush’s foreign policy platform is heavily influenced by the neo-conservatives, there is likely to be a hardening of the U.S, posture on ”pre – emptive” wars, campaigns against terrorism, and ”rogue states”, including North Korea and Iran.

The United States’ increased belligerence and its pursuit of Empire will tend to legitimise the use of military force as the preferred method of dealing with conflicts. In the long run, this spells a radical right-wing restructuring of the post-World War II global order, in which multilateral institutions, in particular the United Nations, could be the greatest loser.

And most South Asian states will be harmed by this.

A weakening of multilateral institutions will shrink the space for diplomatic manoeuvre available to the region’s governments. India will find it hard to keep its commitment, made explicit by the Manmohan Singh government, to return to its ”traditional” foreign policy, in departure from the recent obsession with the U.S., and with an emphasis on multi-polarity, non-alignment, and a balanced, peaceful global order.

No amount of fancy footwork may reconcile that commitment with the imperatives of building a ”strategic partnership” with an increasingly unilateralist and imperious United States.

Similarly, Pakistan – whose utility to Washington as an ally against al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden has lost its immediacy now that the election is over – might come under renewed pressure to decisively end its patronage of ‘jihadi’ groups. The intensity of pressure will depend to an extent on the emerging India-U.S. relationship and on the situation in Kashmir. To that extent, an India-Pakistan peace offers the best protection against an overweening Washington.

Now however, a new actor has now emerged in the US-India-Pakistan triangle. This is the 1.9 million-strong Non-Resident Indian (NRI) community in the U.S. These Indian-Americans, America’s richest ethnic group, are more prosperous than the average American, with a 46 per cent higher median family income.

They are largely comprised of successful professionals like computer engineers, doctors and business executives, concentrated in big cities. These NRIs are also social conservatives, and have increasing sympathy for Bush’s religious agenda and opposition to abortion, gay rights and gun control.

Ironically, NRIs have traditionally been Democratic supporters and many have raised funds for the Clinton and Gore campaigns.

But, in recent years, social conservatism, and upward mobility, combined with a rightward shift in U.S. society, have driven a sizeable minority of NRIs towards the Republicans. (One Republican NRI has just been elected to Congress from Louisiana.)

This group will want to give U.S.-India relations a strong military and business footing, and thus magnify pressures for right-wing economic policies. The NRI lobby has strong sympathies for the Hindu right and is viscerally hostile to Pakistan. This, too, will influence U.S. policy decisions and how Washington relates to South Asia.

Under the triumphalist Republicans, the Iraq conflict is likely to get bloodier and more intractable. This could generate renewed pressure on India and Pakistan to send troops to Iraq. In the past, both states resisted U.S. pressure, citing adverse domestic opinion. They will now find it harder to do so.

Iran, too, could confront India and Pakistan with new problems if Bush decides to adopt an aggressive posture with regard to Tehran’s uranium enrichment programme, which it claims, is solely meant for peaceful purposes. A U.S. confrontation with Iran will highlight the global issue of nuclear proliferation and India and Pakistan’s vulnerability to pressure for nuclear restraint.

This could more than compensate for the gains the Indian (and Pakistani) elite sees from the Republican administration’s relaxed or indulgent attitude towards their nuclear weapons and missile programmes.

India has excellent relations with Iran and has not criticised its nuclear programme. The two have worked closely in Afghanistan, where they both backed the largely non-Pashtun Northern Alliance. An adversarial relationship or outright hostility between Washington and Tehran will make it hard for New Delhi to follow an independent policy for the Middle East – in particular Iran.

Sunni Pakistan is not exactly a close ally of Shia Iran. But a military confrontation between the U.S. (or Israel) and Iran will provoke popular protests in Pakistan: Iran is a neighbour, as well as Islamic.

Bush’s victory may have military implications too, especially in Nepal, affected by a Maoist insurgency, and in Sri Lanka, where there is a fragile peace process between the government and the Tamil minority. In Nepal, the U.S. has encouraged a heavy hand to deal with the Maoists as if they were just a terrorist group. Washington has recently sold arms to the government.

The U.S. has again put the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eeelam on the ”terrorist” list. This may have long-term implications for the peace process in Sri Lanka.

 
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