POLAND-RUSSIA: Once an Enemy, Always an Enemy

By Zoltán Dujisin Reprint | | Print |

Zoltán Dujisin

PRAGUE, Oct 11 2007 (IPS) - Poland remains Russia’s most staunch enemy in the Central European region. But besides history, ideology and energy are playing a key role in the diplomatic impasse.

That impasse now necessarily involves the European Union.

Last May Warsaw vetoed the start of EU-Russian talks on reaching a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement as a response to a Russian embargo on its food products.

Brussels was especially interested in reaching an agreement that would set up the framework for energy cooperation with Moscow. The existing 1994 agreement is considered outdated.

More than 50 percent of Russia’s foreign trade is with the EU, whereas Russia is Brussels’ third largest economic partner.

Russia imposed the Polish ban in November 2005 citing illegal re-export of low-quality and non-European meat by Poland. Moscow claims the issue should not be politicised, and experts ought to handle it.

But similar moves have been made by Moscow when staunchly anti-Russian governments came to power in countries such as Latvia, Moldova or Georgia.

Polish officials have refused invitations by the Kremlin to pay working visits, claiming the ban is drastic and politically motivated.

During an EU-Russia meeting in May, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso told Russian President Vladimir Putin the meat ban was an issue for the entire EU, not just Poland, and condemned the Russian embargo in a show of solidarity with Warsaw.

The Central and Eastern European press, while often not condoning Warsaw’s behaviour in the international arena, praised the EU for “finally” showing signs of applying the principle of solidarity ahead of taking Moscow’s sensitivities into account.

But Moscow criticised the EU decision as capitulation to Polish blackmail, and prefers to solve the standoff directly with Poland.

Russia has recently announced it intends to carry out food inspections in Poland before November, but Warsaw wants Russia to first lift its embargo.

Kremlin officials have complained about difficulties in talking to a more “complex” EU where agreements are more difficult to reach due to the 2004 accession of former socialist states that harbour resentment towards Russia.

After 20 years of chaos and incapacity to articulate its interests, Europe is rather worried about Moscow’s increasing strength and determination, Russian pundits have often argued.

Russia’s plans to build a Northern Stream pipeline connecting its gas with Germany through the Baltic Sea have scared some Europeans who fear excessive dependency on Russian energy sources. The plans have especially irritated Warsaw.

Polish foreign minister Anna Fotyga has claimed the pipeline project represents another German-Russian conspiracy aimed at weakening Warsaw’s position in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EU.

The EU expects the pipeline to increase its energy security, whereas Poland, one of the countries in the region with the smallest degree of dependence on Russian gas, is wary of losses in transit benefits.

During the first trimester of 2007, high-ranking Polish officials made several diplomatic attempts at securing energy cooperation with countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia, but were eventually outmanoeuvred by the Russian giant Gazprom, which has ensured most gas supplies in the region.

Again citing solidarity, the Poles have asked the EU to reject the northern pipeline project altogether and to give institutional support to the idea of energy solidarity, a call unlikely to be heeded.

András Deák, Russia and energy expert at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs in Budapest sees considerable differences between the meat dispute, which he agrees is “political”, and the pipeline dispute. “We have to show solidarity towards the Poles, but it must be clear they cannot always refer to it; this way they are losing credibility,” he told IPS.

Deák doesn’t think the pipeline is an anti-Polish project, and feels Poland is over-reacting. “What’s surprising is that they really don’t depend on Russian gas, although the pipeline will lessen the importance of Central European transit.”

The pundit sees the EU as being stuck between an “ugly” Russia and a “difficult” Poland. “Europe needs that kind of capacity, it needs a pipeline, and it wants to bring more Russian gas to the European market,” says Deák.

“If Europe ask for more, Russia has the right to decide the way to do it, including avoiding the political leverage of transit countries such as Ukraine and Belarus,” Deák says.

Before joining the EU Poland enjoyed considerable elite consensus regarding the goals of its foreign policy: integration into European and transatlantic structures together with the assertion of Polish national interests, perceived as being limited under state socialism.

Warsaw’s desire to join NATO strained relations with the former Russian ally, which eventually came to terms with Poland’s membership in 1998.

Another negative chapter came during Ukraine’s “orange revolution” in 2004, when a popular uprising against vote-rigging forced pro-Russian authorities to repeat the vote with the backing of Western countries and the vociferous support of Polish officials.

Poland is also the main cheerleader for Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership aspirations.

The election of staunchly anti-Russian Jaroslaw Kaczynski to the post of Polish Prime Minister added fuel to the controversial relationship.

Under Kaczynski, U.S. plans to build a missile defence system on Polish territory have gained momentum. Russia sees the U.S. base as altering the strategic balance of forces in Europe.

Poland’s post-19th century history has been characterised by a weak statehood, seen as constantly threatened by powerful neighbours, namely Germany and Russia.

Whereas few international relations experts would argue that Poland’s security dilemmas remain unsolved, the relative disillusionment with the results of EU accession has reinforced the isolationist and historically minded foreign policy trend inspired by Poland’s Catholic-nationalist sectors.

In contrast with Kaczynski’s harshly anti-Russian rhetoric, previous Polish cabinets had been slightly more cautious towards the Kremlin, and opposition parties are promising to return to the previous approach if they win the early parliamentary elections to be held Oct. 21.

The opposition accuses Kaczynski’s ultra-conservative government of exacerbating relations with Russia to reap domestic political dividends.

Polls consistently show that Polish popular attitudes towards Russians are among the most negative, and historians generally agree that Polish national identity relies on Russophobia.