Friday, November 20, 2026
Dilip Hiro
- As the second anniversary of the Oslo II Accord between Israel and the Palestinians approaches on Sep. 28, contrary to the pact’s aims and expectations, it is clear that the extremists on both sides steer the politics of implementation.
The 314-page long Comprehensive Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, containing 31 Articles, seven Annexes and nine maps — popularly known as the Oslo II Accord — gave flesh and blood to the skeletal Oslo I Accord concluded two years earlier.
It was signed by Israeli premier Yitzhak Rabin and PLO chairman Yasser Arafat at the White House in Washington in the presence of U.S. president Bill Clinton, president Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan.
The first setback to Oslo II Accord came on Nov. 4 1995, when Yigal Amir, an ultranationalist Jewish fanatic who believed in the indivisibility of Greater Israel, assassinated Rabin in Tel Aviv. After his arrest Amir argued publicly that since Rabin had given away parts of the ‘Eretz’ Israel, Land of (Old Testament) Israel, to the Arabs, it was a mitzvah (positive obligation) of a pious Jew to kill him.
Nearly two years later Israel, and therefore also the Palestinians, have not recovered from Amir’s terroristic action. He had indeed planned to assassinate both Rabin and his foreign minister, Shimon Peres. But Peres left the Peace Now rally early.
Rabin’s assassination shook the top officials of Israel’s internal security service, Shin Beth. They were keen to restore the prestige of their organisation.
Their main target was Yahya Ayyash, the Palestinian master- bomber, whom they held responsible for assembling explosives for suicide bombers since October 1994, who in turn were inspired to avenge the deaths of 29 Palestinians killed by a Jewish settler, Baruch Goldstein, at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron in February.
But the Shin Beth operatives could only carry out the assassination of their Palestinian target after it was sanctioned by the prime minister, who personally supervises the Shin Beth. It was only after Peres, now his country’s premier, authorised the operation, was Yahya Ayyash, blown up on Jan. 5, 1996 by a booby- trapped mobile telephone in the Gazan village of Beit Lahiya.
However, the jubilation expressed by Shin Beth officials and their supreme boss, Peres, was to prove transient. Indeed, going by the events that followed, Ayyash’s assassination came to determine the outcome of Israel’s prime ministerial poll in May, to the detriment of Peres and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as encapsulated in the Oslo II Accord.
The ultra-militants of the al-Qassam Brigade, military wing of Hamas, calling themselves The Students of Ayyash, struck — first in Jerusalem on Feb. 25, 1996 — second anniversary of the Palestinian massacre in Hebron — and again a week later.
Together they caused the deaths of 42 people and eroded the electoral lead that Peres had over his rival, Benjamin Netanyahu. Peres failed to reclaim the lost ground, and lost, albeit by a margin of one percent, in late May 1996.
Had Netanyahu contested against Rabin, a veteran senior soldier and father figure, he would never have defeated his rival. So it can be argued, credibly, that in the final analysis Yigal Amir, the Jewish assassin of Rabin, won.
By placing Netanyahu, who went on to form the most right-wing government in Israeli history, in the driving seat, Amir left an ineradicable imprint on the politics of Israelis and Palestinians, and he achieved this through violent means.
Since then extremist actions taken either by Netanyahu or by Irving Moskovitz, one of the leading financial backers of Netanyahu’s election campaign, have shaped relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, headed by Arafat.
On Sep. 23 Netanyahu authorised the opening of an ancient, blind tunnel after it had been extended to a point lying at the heart of the Muslim Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem. This led to violent disturbances in which 60 Palestinians and 15 Israelis were lost their lives.
On Mar. 18 1997, Netanyahu gave the go-ahead for the construction of the Har Homa Jewish settlement at Jabal Abu Ghneim in occupied East Jerusalem. Three days later, two suicide bombs exploded in Tel Aviv, killing four Jewish Israelis. The explosions were later claimed by the al-Qassam Brigade.
On Jul. 25, Moskovitz, an extremist Jewish American millionaire, announced plans to build a Jewish colony in Ras al-Amoud, the heart of the Palestinian community in East Jerusalem. Five days later two suicide bombs exploded in West Jerusalem, resulting in 13 Israeli deaths.
Through their lethal action the Palestinian terrorists demonstrated that, contrary to his election promise of security with peace, Netanyahu had failed to deliver either to Israelis.
During her visit to Israel on Sep. 10-12, Madeleine Albright, the American secretary of state, said: “There is no moral equivalent between killing people and building houses”.
Such a statement confuses cause and effect: ‘Killing people’ follows ‘building houses’ in occupied land in violation of the numerous resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council, based in turn on a clause in the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, entitled ‘Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War’, which applies to Israel and the Occupied Arab Territories in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
Overall, though, there is an almost universal disapproval of the use of violence by individuals or groups, or the state, in the realm of politics.
But certain historical facts cannot be overlooked. The person to point out the crucial role played by political violence in the founding by Zionist Jews in 1948 of Israel — now a sworn enemy of ‘terrorism’ — was none less than the widow of Yitzhak Rabin, Leah.
In an interview on Sep. 11 to Israel Defence Forces Radio, Leah Rabin said: ‘I have doubts about how much terrorism can be uprooted. We (Zionists) were also terrorists once, and they (the British army) didn’t uproot us, and we went on dealing in terrorist activities. Despite all the efforts of the British army in the land we went on with terrorism.’
Unlike Albright, Leah Rabin did not confuse the symptom with the root cause. She also implied that the most effective way to end terrorism was to address the injustice which bred the fanaticism which led to political violence.
Significantly, following her interview, Leah Rabin went on to meet Albright, and then accompany her to a wreath-laying ceremony at the spot where Yitzhak Rabin had been gunned down.
The shots that killed Yitzhak Rabin also severely weakened the Oslo II Accord. It remains to be seen if the recent efforts of Albright to revive this agreement by arranging the current meetings of Israeli and Palestinian delegations in Washington will bear fruit.