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INDIA-PAKISTAN: Nuke Status Shrinks Room For Independence on Iraq

Analysis - Praful Bidwai

NEW DELHI, Dec 17 1998 (IPS) - The newly acquired nuclear weapons status of India and pakistan has led not to a more independent, assertive, diplomatic posture, but rather to a shrinking of the room for diplomatic manouevre, specially vis-a-vis the U.S.

This is the significance of the remarkably mild, wishy-washy and timid response from New Delhi and Islamabad to the U.S- British armed attack on Iraq.

The response is at odds with popular mood, which sharply and overwhelmingly condemns the unilateral American-British action. it is also a far cry from the initially anti-U.S reaction of the two states during the 1991 Gulf War.

This belies the claim of the Indian and Pakistani bomb lobbies – and the illusion entertained by some elsewhere – that nuclearisation would enable both countries to challenge the world’s hegemonic and skewed security order and pursue a genuinely independent foreign policy.

India only “deplored” the attack on Baghdad and said it was its “considered view” that the crisis should be resolved through diplomacy, not military force. This is far milder than the term “condemn” or “strongly deplore” which would normally have been used in respect of an unprovoked attack by the superpower, which also lacks any U.N sanction. Pakistan too issued a mealy-mouthed statement.

Remarkably, India did not mention the fact that U.N Secretary General Kofi Annan regretted the attack, and that it has attracted criticism from states such as Russia and France. Absent was any reference to the ambivalent nature of UNSCOM chief Richard Butler’s report on Iraq’s attitude to inspections, and the fact that Butler withdrew the inspectors at Washington’s suggestion and behest, without consulting Annan or the Security Council.

Normally, New Delhi – a strong advocate of multilateralism and diplomatic and legal correctness – would have questioned whether Security Council Resolution 687 gives the U.S the mandate to attack Iraq merely because it is not “fully cooperating” with UNSCOM.

The resolution has only been selectively implemented, with an emphasis on its punitive provisions, but with no reference to its call for a Middle Eastern peace settlement and a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the region.

Earlier, India criticised the interpretation of Resolution 687 as an unlimited, omnibus mandate for use of military force against civilian targets, as well as crippling sanctions. Until May, New Delhi repeatedly called for easing the sanctions and for humanitarian aid, especially to children.

Similarly India deplored the indefinite prolongation of the inspection process, which was originally meant to last 40 days but has gone on longer than seven years.

India in 1995 and 1997 also obliquely questioned the promotion of war-related goals (such as change of regime) through coercion in peacetime.

India’s new, pusillanimous post-may posture vis-a-vis the U.S was first revealed at the time of the U.S bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan – also a unilateral act. New Delhi did not condemn that strongly, indeed it welcomed the “fight” against “terrorism”.

By contrast, in 1991, it first expressed support for Saddam Hussain (captured in an embrace with the then foreign minister Inder Kumar Gujral), although it later allowed U.S warplanes to refuel on Indian soil.

Pakistan, once a U.S ally, had then threatened to move to a position of “strategic hostility” towards the U.S for attacking a Muslim nation. This stands in sharp contrast to its present position.

Both India and Pakistan have suffered serious political and diplomatic isolation after their nuclear tests and drawn admonition from numerous regional and multilateral fora. Each is engaged in bilateral discussions with the U.S on the nuclear weapons issue, in which its bargaining power is limited.

India and the U.S have held seven rounds of talks. And Pakistan too has had a series of discussions with the U.S at different levels, including the topmost in early December, when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited Washington.

Both New Delhi and Islamabad are so preoccupied with the fallout of their nuclearisation that they go to great lengths to avoid antagonising the U.S on any issue.

Pakistan’s economy is particularly fragile, indeed on the

brink of collapse if it defaults on its foreign debt. This further severely limits its room for manoeuvre.

The Vajpayee government is bending over backwards on economic policy issues to please Washington. On Wednesday it introduced a legislation in Parliament to modify domestic patent laws to promote the kind of intellectual property regime the U.S advocates. It is also opening up insurance to foreign investors – a long-standing U.S demand.

The U.S is driving a hard bargain with India and Pakistan to get them to agree to restrain on nuclear weapons and missile deployment – in return for a subordinate third-class status within the Nuclear Club.

The very fact that they are negotiating this even as they proclaim their “sovereign” right to decide all matters pertaining to security signifies how vulnerable the two governments have become to external pressure.

India, once a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, campaigned for a balanced, peaceful, non-coercive world order, and a sharp critic of U.S military interventions in the Third World, has now realigned itself.

The process began after the end of the Cold War and involved close military cooperation and joint exercises with the U.S as well as general acceptance of Western economic prescriptions.

However, after the crossing of the nuclear threshold, a further, decisive, shift has occurred. India’s foreign policy horizon has considerably shrunk. Both India and Pakistan have courted hostility and suspicion of their neighbours by going nuclear. Their ability to influence the course of events, whether in the region or globally, has eroded.

 
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