Headlines, North America

CANADA: Racism and Cold War dog Peacekeepers

Stephen Dale

OTTAWA, Feb 13 1996 (IPS) - As Canada prepares to expand its role as peacekeeper in Haiti, analysts say future Canadian peacekeeping may be undermined by events in Somalia three years ago and lingering Cold War spending priorities.

Newly appointed foreign affairs minister Lloyd Axworthy has indicated that Ottawa will likely accept a request that Canadian soldiers take over the lead role in Haitian peacekeeping once U.S. troops begin their withdrawal.

Axworthy told reporters that Canada’s formal acceptance depends on whether the U.N. Security Council endorses a pledge by secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali that the peacekeepers will receive adequate levels of support from the United Nations.

“It’s an important responsibility and we want to make sure we do it right,” Axworthy told the Globe and Mail newspaper, adding that Canadian soldiers need to be prepared for the mission.

But observers here say Canada’s participation in peacekeeping is threatened by turmoil among senior officers, highlighted by a public inquiry into the behaviour of Canadian troops in Somalia in 1993.

The lack of a clear direction for Canada’s military in the post- Cold War world is also causing uncertainty. And observers say not enough of Canada’s military budget goes to peacekeeping.

“It’s getting harder to respond to peacekeeping requests with the limited number of soldiers that are available,” says Timothy Donais, spokesperson for the United Nations Association in Canada (UNAC).

Scott Taylor, editor of Esprit de Corps, a magazine aimed at lower-ranking military personnel, complains while there is barely enough money for helmets and flak-jackets for peacekeepers, Canada’s military continues to spend lavishly on expensive weapons systems drawn up during the Cold War.

The announcement in January that Defence Minister David Collenette plans to arrange the purchase of new submarines from Britain has increased fears that peacekeeping operations will come up short.

While the purchase may have made sense in the Cold War, it might mean now that “we have to wipe out two surface battalions,” the editor told IPS. “We have a finite pot of money. At some point, you have to start asking yourself, ‘what is important to us’.”

Arguing that military contracts are primarily intended as patronage payments for big business, Taylor notes that the 450 million U.S. dollars it cost to cancel the contracts for just one mega-project — the EH-101 anti-submarine helicopter — amounted to six times the amount Canada spends each year to send its peacekeepers to the field.

“Six years of peacekeeping funding was wiped out with the cancellation of that contract, and they didn’t buy one quart of oil,” said Taylor, who calculates that the overall annual military budget is about 120 times higher than the amount directly allotted to peacekeeping.

Canadian peacekeepers are also living with the fallout from a public inquiry into the murder of a Somali teenager in Mar. 1993.

A handful of Canadian soldiers were charged with torture and murder, even as the killing opened up a cell of white, neo-Nazi supremacists within the Canadian Airborne Regiment that went to Somalia in Dec. 1992 as part of a U.N. famine relief mission.

There are also suspicions related to two other deaths as well as allegations that a Somali citizen was murdered execution-style by Canadian soldiers.

“The consequence is that Canadian peacekeepers are being kept on a short leash” by their superiors, said Donais of the U.N. Association in Canada. One example is that Canadian peacekeepers in Bosnia are not allowed to have liquor in their camp, he said.

Observers say the behaviour by the Airborne soldiers is not representative of other branches of the Canadian Armed Forces. But events from the public inquiry have fuelled suspicions that high- ranking officers allowed the crisis to grow.

Former Airborne Regiment commander, Lt.-Col. Paul Moreneault, accused his superior, Brig.-Gen. Ernest Beno, of undermining his efforts to weed out troublemakers before the unit went to Somalia.

Disciplinary problems were well known since some soldiers had burned an officer’s car at the unit base in Canada and had fired weapons in a public park.

Military police officer Maj. Vince Buonomici filed an affidavit at the inquiry alleging that two generals had interfered with his attempts to investigate events involving the Airborne in Somalia. The two generals took unexpected retirement from the mioitary before they could be questioned.

Critics say the failure of senior officers to manage the Airborne or to take responsibility for the Somalia crisis has undermined the confidence of peacekeepers in the field.

“A lot of the ranks have lost faith in the leadership of the Canadian Forces because they now know the leaders will point the finger downward,” said Peter Langille, author of ‘Changing the Guard’, a book about Canadian military policy.

“Normal military protocol is for the leadership to take responsibility for the actions of those under their command,” Langille told IPS. “The Somalia experience reversed that.”

Langille argues that the Somalia scandal reveals a “systemic problem”, including the lack of a clear mandate for the Canadian military and the lack of specialised training for peacekeepers.

Donais agrees that specialised peacekeeping training remains a problem, despite the advent of the Pearson Centre on Canada’s Atlantic coast where peacekeepers are now trained.

There remains “a break between the military attitude that the best training for peacekeeping is a generalised training as a soldier,” Donais said. “Personnel working for international relief agencies would see the need for training in cultural sensitivity, mediation and negotiation.”

The fact that soldiers with extreme racist views were sent on a peacekeeping mission in Somalia also indicates a need for better psychological screening, Donais adds.

 
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