Development & Aid, Europe, Headlines, Human Rights | Analysis

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA: Rebuilding From The Ground Up

Analysis Zlatko Lagumdzija (*)

SARAJEVO, Jan 5 1996 (IPS) - Even before the start of the Dayton talks, representatives of the major international financial institutions were meeting in Sarajevo to discuss reconstruction aid for Bosnia- Hercegovina.

By underscoring the concrete benefits of peace, the visit was widely seen in Sarajevo as a sign that the U.S. was serious about ending the war. Yet on both the local and international level, uncertainty if not outright confusion about nearly all aspects of any reconstruction package remains great.

Although the present ceasefire has brought back electricity, running water, gas and food supplies to Sarajevo, few people here trust that this happy quiet is based on any kind of goodwill. But the triumvirate of ‘peacemaker’ presidents of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina who signed up for Dayton in Paris last month need peace here more than ever before.

For it is no longer possible in the Balkans to win elections merely on promises for independence, national liberation and ethnic superiority.

As shown in the recent vote in Croatia, such platforms are being pushed aside by people’s more concrete interests in peace, economic development and European integration. In such circumstances, reconstruction aid is one of the most important questions for any future settlement.

Yet innumerable practical and political questions must be answered. First, what is the amount of direct damage caused by war? Spurious ‘exact’ estimates abound. Some observers inflate the figure to sky-high levels.

Others minimise it. Others argue that a total in the middle is somehow more scientific. None of the estimates is necessarily made by disinterested parties, and none attempt to account for all aspects of the war.

Several Bosnian government ministers have cited a highly imprecise figure of 50 billion dollars for direct war damage. The government has called for between eight billion and 12 billion in urgent aid from the European Union (EU) and the World Bank.

This request is divided among humanitarian aid, urgent infrastructural repair, and funds to stabilise financial institutions and boost critical industrial sectors. Various western diplomats have discussed aid packages of between three billion and six billion. The World Bank has put the immediate total needed at 5.1 billion dollars for the next three to four years.

Some 500 million dollars were promised for the initial reconstruction operations at an international conference held in Brussels on Dec. 21 led by the World Bank. The EU has discussed an aid package of one billion, starting with an interim payment of 60 million ECUs (78 million dollars) announced Thursday to be paid later this month.

A new donors’ conference is to be held in March, probably in Brussels, to try to round up the financing. There the U.S., Islamic countries and Japan are also expected to contribute substantially. But whatever aid is raised, it will obviously not be sufficient to cover the full amount of damage from the war.

However these questions are resolved, Sarajevans, after bitter experience, will reserve their right to be sceptical. The long- running fiasco of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) does not need to be recounted. NATO’s action came only when the destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina posed a threat to the Alliance’s own existence.

And the U.S. administration’s hyper-diplomacy, positive as it may prove to be, has been orchestrated for soon-to-visit president Bill Clinton’s domestic political needs, rather than humanitarian or other concerns for Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Even the aid programmes, the international community’s most positive contribution, have been designed to supply forms of assistance that the donors do not want anyway and that the recipients do not need.

Anti-malaria pills are no longer being sent to Sarajevo, but many city pharmacies are stocked with plenty of medicines past the use- by date. If all these international institutions failed so miserably, what can be expected from those now poised to reconstruct Bosnia-Hercegovina?

The experiences of the European Union’s local administration to reconstruct Mostar, as well as the Sarajevo reconstruction programmes under the United Nations, are instructive. Without political consensus, and effective administrative mechanisms, reconstruction aid may be able to rebuild roads and buildings.

But it cannot establish peace and stability, market reform and democracy. It cannot ensure re-integration. Without political and economic change, the future of Bosnia-Hercegovina is untenable. For this reason, aid must be explicitly targeted at, and limited to, those parts of the country where basic elements of reform are being encouraged.

The removal of war criminals, as stipulated in the Dayton agreement, is a prerequisite, as is respect for human rights, acceptance of a united Bosnian state and capital, and the right of refugees to return. Reconstruction aid is the critical lever towards bringing the country’s atomised districts, cities, cantons and entities into the fold of integral state.

Indeed, before any foreign capital arrives into the country, the Bosnian government must institute its own reform, namely a Law of Privatisation.

This debate points up the absurd position of Bosnian politics: in order to remain in charge of the economy, the ruling ‘national’ (conservative) political parties are strongly opposed to privatisation.

The primary explanation is that the majority of former communist apparatchiks have found their natural habitat within the apparatus of new ethnic parties; to no surprise, they wish to retain the economic system inherited from communist times.

Meantime, the Social Democrats and Liberals — themselves descendants from former League of Communists — insist that all enterprises except utilities and infrastructure companies be privatised.

At the same time, the Bosnian government has failed to develop any clear plans for reconstruction. The problem of calculating more meaningful estimates of the necessary aid suggests that Sarajevo lacks a sufficient structure of experts and administrators to handle such a large project.

But the government has also taken no political decisions, over who will take part in reconstruction projects, and who will control them.

Officially, government sources claim that such decisions cannot be made until more precise international reconstruction projects are put forward.

But this excuse is inadequate. It suggests that the international players may have some justification for their lack of a firm commitment to reconstruction if the government has not managed to consider how to spend the money it is requesting.

Unfortunately, the majority of Bosnian civil servants acquired their administrative experience in the old school of a one-party political system and during the erratic war campaigns.

Thus the lack of a plan to date to educate future Bosnian administrators risks placing a heavy drag on the implementation of the peace process. Aside from the question of the global political settlement, the campaign for reconstruction aid has become the most important political issue in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The reconstruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina, first and foremost, means economic aid to educate Bosnian people, in order to help them help to themselves — and to rebuild Bosnia-Hercegovina.

(*) Zlatko Lagumdzija is a professor of management at Sarajevo University and former vice-president of the government of Bosnia- Hercegovina. This item comes via the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) in London, publishers of WarReport magazine.

 
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Development & Aid, Europe, Headlines, Human Rights | Analysis

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA: Rebuilding From The Ground Up

Analysis Zlatko Lagumdzija (*)

SARAJEVO, Jan 5 1996 (IPS) - Even before the start of the Dayton talks, representatives of the major international financial institutions were meeting in Sarajevo to discuss reconstruction aid for Bosnia- Hercegovina.
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