Friday, November 20, 2026
Analysis - Rahul Bedi
- Even before it has time to settle in, India’s incoming United Front coalition government will be confronted with crucial security, foreign policy and nuclear issues needing immediate attention.
New Delhi’s relations with Pakistan, with whom it has fought three wars since independence, have deteriorated rapidly over the past two years over the northern state of Kashmir where the six- year old civil war being waged by armed separatists for an Islamic homeland has claimed over 15,000 lives.
India accuses Pakistan, which occupied a third of Kashmir in 1947 and lays claim to the rest, of “sponsoring” the insurgents, an allegation it denies.
This, in turn, has led to a missile race between the two nuclear-capable neighbours and refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) currently under negotiation at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva.
India has told the Conference that it would be compelled to keep its nuclear options open if the CTBT does not commit itself to the elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework.
Consequently, Pakistan will not sign the CTBT unless India does so besides being under tremendous local pressure to reveal its nuclear arsenal.
India’s nuclear experts and strategists have reacted aggressively to the “alliance” of five nuclear-weapon states at the Disarmament Conference led by the United States and including Britain, Russia, China and France.
They say this “coterie” wants to perpetuate nuclear hegemony over the rest of the world through the CTBT and do not want any other country to emerge as a potential military threat.
According to a cross-section of nuclear experts, the indefinite extension of the NPT last year was the first step by these five towards legitimising the possession of nuclear weapons while the forthcoming CTBT was merely a follow-up “ploy” to cement this monopoly.
Senior Indian nuclear officials also said the CTBT and FMCT are aimed exclusively at containing India’s nuclear capability.
India, they say formed the “lynch pin” to the entire agreement as its reaction would determine Pakistan’s, also a nuclear “threshold state”.
But, according to recent reports from the Disarmament Conference, the Indian delegation there has received neither guidance nor direction from New Delhi due to the political turbulence at home.
Meanwhile, the five nuclear weapon states under pressure from the United States are keen to wrap up the Conference over the next few weeks and if the Indian negotiators are not sufficiently briefed, India’s nuclear status could once again be left in limbo.
India exploded a nuclear device in 1974 but, ever since, has maintained it did so to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and had no intentions of building weapons of mass destruction. Thereafter, India has achieved nuclear self- sufficiency including the expertise in creating weapons grade fissionable material.
It has 10 commercial nuclear power stations, seven others are under construction while another 10 are planned. It also has four research reactors and several related facilities.
India is also building a nuclear-powered submarine and officials said a land-based prototype testing facility for the submarine reactor has been completed.
Meanwhile, no talks to reduce tension between Pakistan and India have been held for over two years and both sides remain dangerously intransigent.
Pakistan insists on predicating all bilateral talks on the Kashmir issue where it wants India to hold the U.N-sponsored plebiscite it promised to hold 48 years ago to determine the principality’s future.
India, however, wants first to reduce tension over various other contentious issues before veering around to Kashmir, a thesis which finds no takers in Islamabad, leading to a stalemate.
The United Front will also have to clear several crucial military purchases which have been negotiated but were awaiting the installation of the new government.
These include the purchase of around 15/20 desperately needed SU-30 frontline combat fighter aircraft, some 120 152mm self-propelled gun systems as well as naval frigates and probably even an aircraft carrier, all from Russia.
Prime Minister Deve Gowda’s government will also have to swiftly clear the upgradation of the Mig-21 bis fighter by Russia, delayed by almost a year due principally to official vacillation.
This delay has not only resulted in enhancing the cost of the upgradation by several million rupees but also pushed back the entire force re-organisation of the Indian Air Force (IAF).
The upgradation of around 100 MiG 21s is being jointly executed by Russia and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited at a cost of around 150 million rupees each. The first two aircraft will be retrofitted in Russia and the remainder at HAL in Bangalore, south India.
Gowda will also be under pressure to constitute the long- awaited National Security Council (NSC) to replace the defunct Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA), meant to deal with security-related and defence issues.
A recent parliamentary report said that the “absence of clearly defined national security objectives/military aims leads to proposals being examined on a general basis”.
Senior military officials said the absence of a security doctrine affects operational planning, establishing a credible deterrence and pursuing an organised equipping policy for the military.
India has no tradition of any NSC-type body. After independence in 1947, a Defence Committee of the Cabinet, presided over by the premier, which included the three service chiefs, was replaced in the mid-Sixties by the CCPA with a wider, albeit diffused, role. Military officers no longer formed an essential core of CCPA committees and ever since, never have.
Meanwhile, bureaucratic control over security issues progressively isolated the military from defence matters, leaving novices to deal with delicate security matters.
Senior defence officers said they had to operate in a system where the military and the government were invariably at variance, unable to execute or initiate any long term planning.
In 1986 prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, however, tried to initiate change by constituting a Policy Advisory Committee which included junior ministers from the foreign, defence and home ministries, the cabinet secretary, head of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s external intelligence gathering agency and director of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Analyses (IDSA) at New Delhi.
The three service chiefs, however, were again excluded from this Committee but within three years the Committee was wound up with the failure of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka as its biggest blunder.
But in 1990, the National Front coalition front government of prime minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh announced the establishment of a NSC.
But the Front government collapsed after 11 months and the experiment remained untested till in 1993 prime minister Rao told parliament that a NSC would soon be established. A year later, he reiterated that the NSC was still in the process of being set up but nothing has been heard of it since.