Sunday, November 22, 2026
Analysis Anthony Borden
- The reluctance of the international community to chart a decisive course towards a unified and democratic Bosnia-Hercegovina, is step-by-step, institutionalising the ethnic division of this troubled country.
After ending the fighting and withdrawing troops from front lines, the Sep. 14 elections here are intended — as defined by the Dayton Accord — as the third great step in establishing democracy and rebuilding the country.
But more than halfway through this ‘Dayton Year’, the process appears to headed, not towards the reversal of the devastation of caused by nationalist policies and international complicity, but instead towards a day when these policies can reach their inevitable conclusion.
Beset by countless problems in design, implementation and timing, the vote will have the opposite effect from what was expected.
It will confirm an ethnic-based territorial settlement and re- legitimise the political parties — and in many cases the very individuals — responsible for starting the war in the first place.
And by placing an international seal of approval on a process organised and guaranteed by top multilateral security organisations, the elections will also further degrade the West’s involvement in the region and reduce its positive influence.
Despite the enthusiasm of the international civil implementation army — the countless governmental and non-governmental groups and political tourists — and the commitment of local activists. Bosnia today is as divided and dispirited as ever.
The busy sociological laboratory that Bosnia has become cannot mask the bad faith and downright opposition to Dayton that prevails among official power structures.
The Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croat parties remain determined to complete the process of ethnic homogenisation in their respective mini-states of Republika Srpska and Hercegovina.
Meanwhile the ruling Bosnian Muslim party of President Alija Izetbegovic is torn between two visions: proclaiming a unified and multi-ethnic Bosnia-Hercegovina but preparing the way for a Muslim rump state if the designs of the Croat and Serb counterparts prevail.
And his own party’s links to population transfers and violence against political opponents, as well as the growing calls for an Islamic political programme, shows that it too knows how to play the ethnic game.
The international community is also hedging proclaiming earnest support for ‘Building a Better Bosnia!’ while overlooking violations of both the spirit and the letter of Dayton.
Freedom of movement, a core requirement for an open society, ends at the ‘ethnic’ borders between the Serb, Croat and Muslim areas. While there are many exceptions, minimal professional standards in the media needed for fair elections have not been met.
Despite the removal of Radovan Karadzic as formal leader of the Bosnian Serbs, indicted and un-indicted war criminals remain on the scene. And peacetime ethnic cleansing continues apace, with expulsions, population transfers, political and professional pressures and widespread violations of voting registration procedures — all to ensure compact ethnic voting blocks.
Faced with this, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which in theory has extraordinary political authority as well as the support of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), has made only minimal formal reprimands.
Dayton proclaims democratic ideals but legitimises the present ethnic structures. And the timing for the implementation process — most importantly the election date — is ensuring that the ‘apartheid’ model is winning out.
There is simply no time whatsoever for civil society to secure a foothold in a country where public life has been bred for five years on war psychosis and genocidal politics.
The case for going ahead on Sep. 14 — besides the fact that the date was inscribed as if in stone at Dayton — is that it will force the pace of normalisation and create the needed legitimate political structures to achieve reconstruction and reconciliation.
But dependent on nationalist authorities to organise the vote within such an improbable time scale, the OSCE could not risk punitive measures or bolder steps. In fact the OSCE’s unwillingness to rap the nationalists has led opposition parties have begun openly to accuse Western governments of directly backing the nationalist parties to ease the process of partition.
And even arguably visionary multi-ethnic projects, such as establishing a new independent state-wide TV station, will not be functional in time to have any real relevance in the elections.
Thus after the vote, when the nationalists are confirmed in place with fresh Western legitimacy, and the international presence and pressure only declines, they will become more, not less open to the culture of power-sharing and compromise.
It is important to emphasise the impossible position of the Bosnian voter. Traumatised and probably relocated, she or he is told the elections will determine the future of the country, but they offer no choice.
While there are a plethora of parties, almost none debate policy or programmes. The main parties stress their respective ‘success’ in the war and the supposed dangers from the ‘other’ ethnic groups. Even the civic parties have little substantive policy to offer beyond the view that it is generally a good thing to have a parliamentary opposition.
Of course, even if the political debate were more substantive, the bulk of the Bosnian electorate would be unlikely to have a fair exposure to it through the media.
More subtly, but more profoundly, even if a voter wished to vote for a non-ethnic option, the fear that the ‘others’ will vote for their respective national parties, means it is simply too dangerous for a voter not to support his or her own group.
“If a minimum trust is not established” leading Bosnian commentator Hamza Baksic has written, “the September 1996 election will be merely a rerun of the 1990 elections which brought the nationalist parties to power and led to war.”
The march of nationalism can only be halted by a combination of long-term social reconciliation and unbending international engagement. Justice, the question at core, cannot be negotiable.
The best policy, even at this late date, would be to delay the elections until clear minimal social and political conditions were met — with the OSCE in the meantime exercising the full potential of its administrative authority available under Dayton and IFOR taking steps to arrest indicted war criminals.
A positive step would be to put heavy pressure on Zagreb and Belgrade to abandon plans to annexe Bosnian territory, arresting indicted war criminals.
Above all the world should announce clearly before the election — that the international civilian and the military community is in Bosnia for the long haul. The open question of what international presence will be around by January, much less by the next elections in two years, has only encouraged the parties to play for time.
Any de facto or definitive division of Bosnia-Hercegovina would abandon to their fates, both the Muslims, who have no ‘mother’ country to join and those ‘Yugoslavs’ and ‘Bosniaks’ who will not or cannot declare a firm ethnic identity.
More to the point, the acceptance of partition in any form would amount to concluding and condoning an extraordinarily deliberate, public and slow-motion process of nationalist excess that began in the early 1990s across the former Yugoslavia.
Worse, it would have the effect of declaring the Bosnian genocide to be both practical and legitimate — and after Sep. 14, God help us, democratic.