Sunday, November 22, 2026
IPS Correspondents
- Despite Madeleine Albright’s assiduous efforts to ensure that her first visit to the Middle East as U.S. secretary of state rolls into the region on a positive wave Tuesday, it takes place in an atmosphere of bleak foreboding.
Israel finds itself bracketed by setbacks on two different fronts in two different confrontaions, both military and political.
Early Friday morning the Israeli army suffered its worst defeat since it set up its so-called ‘security zone’ in occupied Lebanese territory in 1985. At least 11 Israeli troops died, four wounded and one missing presumed dead, in a failed commando attack on a beach south of the Lebanese city of Sidon.
The day before three suicide bombers killed seven people and injured more than 190 more, in an attack in Jerusalem claimed by sources claiming in turn to represent the Palestinian Islamic militants of Hamas.
“The state of Israel is confronted on two fronts with a bitter and difficult struggle against lowly terrorist whose only intention is to destroy the state of Israel and murder its citizens,” said prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Friday.
These twin setbacks have buried Albright’s already faint hopes of reviving the moribund peace talks covering both fronts.
Syria sets the agenda in Lebanon, and the Syrian-Israeli track of the peace process was frozen unilaterally in March 1996 by then Israeli premier Shimon Peres. Meanwhile the Israeli-Palestinian track remains frozen because of what the U.S. state department calls ‘the crisis of confidence’ between the two sides.
Israel has said its troops will not vacate the areas in the West Bank it had promised by Sep. 7 so long as the Palestinian Authority fails to repress Islamic militants living in its territory and ensure the security of Israel and Israelis.
It is a far cry from the mood of optimism and hope of four years ago — Sep. 13, 1993, to be exact — when, nudged by U.S. president Bill Clinton, Palestinian president Yasser Arafat and Israeli premier Yitzhak Rabin shook hands on the White House lawn after the signing of the Oslo I Accord.
So long as the Labour Party architects of the Oslo I Accord, Rabin and/or Peres, were in power in Israel, the peace process progressed, with the two sides seeking the assistance of Egypt to surmount any hurdles. Washington was content to stay on the sidelines.
The assassination of Rabin in November 1995 by a Jewish radical, and the defeat of Peres by Netanyahu in the prime ministerial contest six months later, altered the situation.
Netanyahu showed scant interest in co-opting Egypt or Jordan to overcome his differences with Arafat and it soon became obvious to observers that only the U.S. could be an active mediator.
But when its special envoy, Dennis Ross, mediated in the renegotiating of the protocol on Hebron in late 1996-early 1997 it was primarily to pressure Arafat to compromise and renegotiate the terms of the follow-up Oslo II Accord signed in September 1995.
Unlike his predecessors, Peres and Rabin, Netanyahu has shown singular lack of goodwill towards the Palestinian Authority and Arafat. After the two explosions in West Jerusalem on Jul. 30, Netanyahu forced the line — yet to be proved — that the bombers came from areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority.
Refusing to take a condolence call from Arafat, he publicly and repeatedly instructed Arafat to ‘wage war’ against the Palestinian Islamists, represented by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Within hours, the U.S. state department began echoing the Netanyahu line.
In the hours since Thursday’s bomb Albright and Clinton have made it understood that the agenda of her visit will not be about using the peace talks process to end the violence, but about Israel’s demands that the violence be halted, by force if necessary.
“We cannot give in to terror and it is with this in mind that I will be going to the Middle East,” Albright said in Prague, Thursday.
But Arafat in particular will be disinclined to take the drastic and politically dangerous step of going to war with Hamas at Israeli behest — especially when the months when Hamas held its fire had been so poorly rewarded by Tel Aviv.
For a year, from March 1996 to the following March, no terrorist bombs exploded in Israel. Netanyahu’s response was to open a controversial tunnel in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem, triggering a mini-intifada from the Palestinians.
He rewrote the Oslo II Accord of September 1995, altering the arrangements in Hebron to the detriment of the Palestinians, and acquiring for himself the right to decide unilaterally the areas of the West Bank from where the army were to withdraw.
Finally he gave the go-ahead for the building of the massive Har Homa Jewish settlement at Jabal Abu Ghneim in occupied East Jerusalem.
Netanyahu, ever eager to punish Arafat for any failing of his, has shown himself to be totally incapable of rewarding the Palestinian leader for his good performance. This one-sidedness has extinguished any life left in the Oslo I Accord.
On the Syrian front Netanyahu has ruled out full Israeli evacuation of the Golan Heights under any circumstances.
On Jul. 28 the Israeli parliament, gave the first reading to a bill which requires two-thirds parliamentary majority for any change in the status of the Golan Heights.
Since such an outcome is almost impossible, the Israeli parliament has effectively barred resumption of peace talks with Damascus and by extension, Beirut.
It also appears to have changed the rules of conflict in occupied Lebanon, usually limited to Israel’s proxy South Lebanon Army and the Lebanese Islamic militants of Hezbollah. This time the battle with Israeli troops in Lebanon was joined by regular Lebanese army units as well.
The occupied zone was braced for Israeli retaliation Friday. Clashes in the zone in April 1996 claimed more than 200 lives, mostly Lebanese civilains.
Earlier negotiations between the two parties, conducted during the premierships of Rabin and Peres, were based on the principle of total peace for Israel for total Israeli withdrawal from the Syrian Golan Heights, accepted by Syria’s president, Hafez Assad.
Now Assad wants Netanyahu to pick up the threads of the negotiations where they stood in March 1996 before Peres, his predecessor, suspended the talks in eastern Maryland in the eastern United States. This is unlikely to happen.
The change in the tactical situation in Israel leaves Netanyahu unable to guarantee security for his people. He remains reliant on Arafat and Assad to do this for him, but remains adamant that he will not reward them for their cooperation.
Both Clinton and Albright seem even more reluctant to pressure Netanyahu back into the peace process, fearing that he will turn even more hardline, but have no strategy to offer as an alternative bar automatic support for Israel’s hard line. Thus Albright’s visit to the Middle East is unlikely to yield results.
IPS Correspondents
- Despite Madeleine Albright’s assiduous efforts to ensure that her first visit to the Middle East as U.S. secretary of state rolls into the region on a positive wave Tuesday, it takes place in an atmosphere of bleak foreboding.
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