Sunday, November 22, 2026
Dilip Hiro
- An Iraqi Kurdish faction battling rival forces for primacy in Northern Iraq has upped the stakes in their guerrilla war by blasting their foe’s HQ with Russian made rockets.
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has blamed Turkey for the failure of a Western backed peace initiative, accusing Ankara of taking the side of its long time rivals from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).
On Friday an Iraqi opposition group reported that the PUK had used missiles to attack the KDP main base; at the same time the PUK itself faxed Western media to accuse the Turks of allying with the KDP and sending Turkish jet bombers to attack PUK positions.
The sudden outbreak of fighting between the two this week marked the end of a year long truce between the two Iraqi Kurdish factions.
The violence erupted after last minute efforts by British diplomats in London to conciliate the feuding Iraqi Kurdish parties failed.
There are two major points of contention between the warring parties: control of the customs duties on and profits from the sale of Iraqi oil products to Turkish truckers: and the differing relations of the two Iraqi Kurdish groups with the guerrillas Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) from over the border in Turkey.
These issues are intertwined with the policies pursued not only by Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria — whose contiguous, mountainous border areas are inhabited by ethnic Kurds — but also Israel. And in the wider international arena both the United States and the United Kingdom, intent on keeping Iraqi president Saddam Hussein weak and on the defensive, are directly involved.
Before the unsuccessful attempt by British diplomats in early October to settle the differences between the KDP and the PUK, the U.S. state department had held consultations with Jalal Talabani, the PUK leader, in Washington to ensure that the truce that the PUK and the KDP had signed in October 1996 held. It failed, and the PUK withdrew from the Peace Monitoring Force (PMF) that had been set up as part of the ceasefire.
That truce had come about after the KDP leader, Mesoud Barzani, had allied with Saddam Hussein militarily to wrest control of the regional capital of Arbil from the PUK in late August 1996.
By so doing Barzani had undermined the whole basis on which the U.S.-British policy was founded — to isolate and weaken the Iraqi president, and to maintain Kurdish autonomy by excluding Iraq’s aircraft from the Iraqi territory above the 36th parallel by U.S. and British warplanes maintaining round-the-clock air surveillance.
While Washington and London were able, to a certain extent, to repair the damage Barzani had done to their strategy in August 1996, demarcate the territories controlled by the PUK (mainly contiguous with Iran) and the KDP (chiefly adjoining Turkey), and establish a joint Peace Monitoring Force, they could not alter certain economic, geographical and political factors.
There is a great demand in Turkey for Iraqi petroleum products — especially diesel oil — sold cheap by Baghdad and shipped overland through the area controlled by Barzani. So though, pressured by the United States, he severed his military links with Saddam Hussein, he maintained his economic relations with the Iraqi leader.
It is estimated that by purchasing Iraqi diesel oil cheap from Baghdad and selling it dear to the Turkish truckers, the KDP is making a profit of 800,000 dollars a day. And customs duties and service charges bring in another 250,000 dollars daily.
The cash is deposited in the regional bank in Arbil, and is controlled by the Kurdish parliament where the KDP has a majority. As a result the PUK is deprived of cash, and its leader, Talabani, is increasingly bitter about it.
The PUK demands that the funds be controlled by a neutral body or a fresh poll be held for the parliament since the current body was elected in May 1992. The KDP wants to stick with the status quo, arguing that the conditions are not right for free and fair elections.
While maintaining his commercial links with Saddam Hussein, Barzani has been building up cooperation with Turkey in military matters.
For some years now, the PKK partisans, when pressured by the Turkish military, have resorted to withdrawing into the Kurdish area of northern Iraq, and taking shelter there — a comparatively easy task, given the mountainous terrain of the region.
During the two large military incursions into north Iraq that Turkey has staged since March 1996, Ankara sought and secured the active cooperation of the KDP in destroying the PKK bases and stores in the KDP-administered areas.
This created friction between the Turkish PKK and the Iraqi KDP. And as relations between the KDP and the PUK deteriorated, the latter began assisting the PKK by providing it with shelter in the area under its control. The PKK began hitting the KDP targets and then withdrawing into the PUK-administered territory.
Matters came to a head when in mid-September the Turkish military staged a major incursion into northern Iraq with 15,000 soldiers, with an air cover of warplanes and helicopters, to push back the PKK from the frontier area, and destroy its stored supplies of food and ammunition in the mountains to stop it launching raids in winter. The KDP militiamen helped the Turkish soldiers on the ground.
The latest Turkish invasion of Iraqi soil was ordered by the government of prime minister Mesut Yilmaz, who succeeded Islamist premier Necmettin Erbakan in June.
Yilmaz has moved swiftly to strengthen ties with Israel. One of the first acts his government performed was to ratify the Free Trade Bill concerning Israel, passed by parliament in May but denied approval by the Erbakan cabinet.
This would create free economic zone between Israel and Turkey. Soon after the Yilmaz government announced that Turkey’s joint naval exercises, which had been postponed by Erbakan, would be conducted in November.
These moves alarmed both Damascus and Tehran. Syria, widely believed to be aiding the PKK and its leader Abdullah Ocalan, responded by stepping up its backing for the organisation.
The most effective way Iran can react to the growing alliance between Israel and Turkey, with which it shares border, is by assisting the PKK, engaged in an armed struggle with the Turkish military, and by increasing its aid to the PUK, whose leader, Talabani, has been close to Tehran since the end of the 1991 Gulf War.
Now, though each side is accusing the other of having started the fighting, it is most likely that the PUK, encouraged by Iran, started it. The fact that hostilities erupted just as the Turkish army was withdrawing from northern Iraq is one indication of the initiative taken by the PUK. The other is the PUK’s attempt, so far unsuccessful, to capture Shaqlawa, 40 kilometres north of Arbil.
Taking a larger view, it is obvious that the tightening links between Turkey and Israel are adding a further complication to the Kurdish equation — highly complex as it is.