AFGHANISTAN: Peace Offensive Must Follow Military Campaign

By IPS Correspondents Reprint | | Print |

Analysis by Dad Noorani - The Killid Group*

KABUL, Jul 25 2006 (IPS) - The regrouping of hundreds of Taliban in village after village in the trouble-prone southern provinces seems to coincide with the poppy harvest calendar in Afghanistan.

Many hint at the alleged connections between the drug mafia and the Taliban movement. This year the drug mafia has pledged to defend poppy fields and, at the beginning of the planting season in December, provided farmers with cash, tractors, seeds, and fertiliser to enable them to cultivate large tracts of poppies.

Agriculture-dependent Afghan farmers are grateful for the support. In return they are willing to defend their fields and resist government efforts to eradicate poppies. Drug traffickers process the opium extracted from the poppy plants in illegal factories into heroin, which was valued at a staggering 173 billion US dollars in 2005.

The government stands accused of lack of understanding and sensitivity towards Afghan farmers who are engaged in poppy cultivation. Its counter-narcotics strategy, supported by the international community, is harming the interests of the country’s poverty-stricken farmers, lacks direction and is unlikely to result in much progress.

If Kabul continues to destroy poppy fields without the offer of full compensation, farmers will have little interest in supporting government initiatives and institutions. Instead they will form alliances with the drug mafia and the Taliban in order to ensure the protection of their livelihoods, and sole means of financial support.

In April this year, the U.S.-led coalition and Afghan security forces launched ‘Operation Mountain Lion’ in eastern Afghanistan, in an attempt to root out anti-government forces.

In mid-June, another military campaign dubbed ‘Operation Mountain Thrust’ was launched and is currently in full swing. It is described as the biggest military offensive in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.

More than 11,000 troops from the coalition forces supported by the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police are said to be involved.

The operation’s objective is to clear the strife-ridden region of Kandahar, Helmand, Urozgan and Zabul from Taliban and insurgent elements.

Reports from the region speak of heavy Taliban casualties, while reliable information about losses suffered by the coalition and Afghan security forces are hard to come by.

Could a deliberate attempt to keep this information out of the public space be underway? Some analysts believe that because of frequent battles and the extent of the military operation encompassing a vast area in one of the world’s most difficult terrain, it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of casualties or verify reports.

However, given the recent concentration of Taliban fighters in the mountains of Helmand, Urozgan and Kandahar, and the use of advanced and highly lethal weaponry by coalition forces, casualties sustained by the Taliban are likely to be high.

It is quite likely that Operation Mountain Thrust will minimise, even if temporarily, Taliban activity in the region. But the most relevant question to ask is whether this and similar future operations will be able to root out anti-government activities in the region?

Experience from previous operations has shown that the impact of such operations is limited and transitory. For short-term military gains to have a lasting impact, Afghanistan has to come up with a well thought out stabilisation strategy and then see it properly implemented.

Securing areas will have to be followed by a reconstruction programme that meets the basic needs of the population, security being at the top of the list. Without adequate government protection and social support, ordinary people are an easy prey for the Taliban.

Afghanistan must succeed in its social agenda by delivering real and tangible development and reconstruction, reducing unemployment and poverty, reforming the corrupt and abusive bureaucracy, tackling the drug economy and doing more to bring the population to support government initiatives.

Or else, anti-government forces are likely to return to areas previously cleaned up in such ad hoc and short-term military operations, which will force the government and the international community to again go on the offensive.

If this trend continues, all that would be achieved is the launch and counter-launch of military operations until perpetuity. The financial burden of undertaking such a strategy will be enormous and the coalition does not have unlimited resources for such costly operations.

The Taliban allegedly get enormous support from elements within Pakistan, notably among religious seminaries or madrasas. If each of a hypothetical 20,000 Pakistan-based madrasas provide Mullah Omar with one Taliban fighter a month, he will have at his disposal 20,000 new recruits every month.

In the face of this reality, it is highly unlikely that the Taliban will be defeated by relying solely on military means. Resisting militants can be made possible only if people in rural areas are able to defend their lives and properties and stop the Taliban from breaking into their villages.

The ongoing military campaign is needed. In the aftermath, large scale and impact- oriented reconstruction and development programmes must be devised and delivered. Public resentment stoked by the mis-rule and abusive practices of provincial and district governors and police commanders will further deteriorate government-to- people relations and will drive them into bed with the drug mafia and the Taliban.

As the suffering of ordinary Afghans continue, resentment towards and distrust of the Kabul government will definitely increase.

*Released under agreement with The Killid Group.