CUBA: NOW WHAT?

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MIAMI, Aug 1 2006 (IPS) - The moment may have come for the moderate sectors of the Cuban exile community to convince the rest of them, and the US Congress, to suspend the trade embargo against Cuba and wisely bring about those conditions necessary for a transition, writes Joaquin Roy, the Jean Monnet Professor and Director of the Centre for the European Union at the University of Miami. In this article, Roy writes that it is not clear whether the Bush administration is capable of an intelligent response to the current situation or what movement the various exile groups might be able to generate. Washington might take advantage of an extension of Castro\’s absence beyond what is reasonable given the medical emergency to make Raul a spectacular offer: unconditionally lifting the embargo. Raul Castro would have to choose between two alternatives: reject all offers, or collaborate pragmatically. The advantage that Raul has at the moment is that he controls the armed forces and the state companies, which are managed by recycled military personnel. The question is whether this group actually has the energy and the means to fill the vacuum. At present, therefore, Washington\’s strategy is to place more trust in the \’\’known evil\’\’ (the military) than in an as-yet unknown good, especially because it cannot be ruled out that Cuba will be swept by social upheaval and conflict as it begins to make the transition into a \’\’normal\’\’ country.

The mysteries surrounding Cuba’s near future lie first of all in the temporary period for which Castro has delegated authority to his brother Raul. Much depends on how long this period lasts and in turn how the various elements within Cuba will act.

One real possibility is an increase of prudence on the part of the domestic opposition given the uncertainty of this period. It is likely that the international players, from Argentina to Canada, and the entire European Union, lead more than ever by Spain at this point, will wisely act with similar caution.

In the longer term, it is not clear whether the Bush administration is capable of an intelligent response to the current situation or what movement the various exile groups might be able to generate. History has vividly demonstrated the disastrous failure of the US embargo, which ended up handsomely benefitting the Castro regime. The opportunity that now presents itself is extremely important. Washington might take advantage of an extension of Castro’s absence beyond what is reasonable given the medical emergency to make Raul a spectacular offer: unconditionally lifting the embargo.

Such a move would not only have the endorsement of tens of weighty studies; it has also been pushed by food-producing states and sectors in the US long hungry to trade with Cuba. This may be the time for the moderate sectors of the exile community to take the initiative and make it their priority to convince the rest of them, and the US Congress, to suspend the Helms-Burton Act and wisely bring about those conditions necessary for a transition. Raul would have to choose between two alternatives: reject all offers, or collaborate pragmatically.

In this scenario, the moment might have come to see how much the thinking has changed on both sides of the Florida strait. In the exile community of Miami, the inertia caused by the survival of the Cuban dictatorship for almost four decades has shaped not only the strategy of the US towards Cuba (especially since the election of certain Cuban-Americans to the Congress) but also everyday life. Opposing Castro became a profitable industry, above all in the media.

Both the Cuban regime and the hardline exiles, sensing that the US government or the international political climate was ripe for a truce or a deal, formed a perverse coalition, with both irreconcilable factions apparently agreeing to bury the hatchet. The most notorious instance of this came at the point when the Helms-Burton Act seemed unlikely to pass the US Congress. To ensure that it did, Castro decided to shoot down the airplanes of the exile operation ”Brothers to the Rescue”, after which then-president Bill Clinton gave in to pressure and signed the bill.

What the domestic opposition, the hardline exiles, and, naturally, the intolerant elements of the American government have feared, and still fear, particularly in the current circumstances, is that a significantly broad sector of the Cuban population might one day claim that ”with Castro life was better”, or if not ”better” at least free of the uncertainties that would come with a crash-landing into sheer, unfettered capitalism (like that found in the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, or Mexico) following a sudden change in regime.

This is the possibility that now presents itself — how possible we cannot know until Castro really disappears, Raul is neutralised or miraculously (very doubtful) transformed, or — in what may be the most likely outcome in the case of Castro’s permanent incapacitation or death — certain intermediary figures take over administration of the country.

The advantage that Raul Castro has at the moment is that he controls the armed forces, which are crucial in a transition because they are the only sufficiently coherent institution in Cuba, as well as the state companies, which are managed by recycled military personnel. However, all of this influence could evaporate altogether if the regime collapses totally and the necessary substitutes were found to take over management of the country in a real transition.

The question is whether this sector (building on the foundations laid by the dissidents) actually has the energy and the means to fill the vacuum. At present, therefore, Washington’s strategy is to place more trust in the ”known evil” (the military) than in an as-yet unknown good, especially because it cannot be ruled out that Cuba will be swept by social upheaval and conflict as it begins to make the transition into a ”normal” country. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)