US CUBA POLICY CONFUSED, AS USUAL

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MIAMI, Sep 1 2006 (IPS) - On September 15, at the annual Miami Herald Americas conference, US Secretary of Commerce, Cuban-American Carlos Gutierrez, sent up a trial balloon for a referendum for the Cuban people on whether to keep the current government led by Raul Castro, writes Joaquin Roy is Jean Monnet Professor and Director of the European Union Centre at the University of Miami. In this article, Roy writes that Gutierrez\’s idea is interesting because, it satisfies the requirement of making the Bush administration look tough on Cuba, is acceptable for domestic consumption in Florida, but it also implies that the US would accept a government with Raul Castro if the vote went his way. It is important to point out, however, that this scenario would violate Title II of the Helms-Burton Act, which establishes the conditions for normalising relations with Cuba. Lifting the embargo would be barred as long as either of the Castro brothers remained in the government. But most parties agree that Helms-Burton is a nuisance, and many today regret endorsing it in the tragic aftermath of the criminal downing of the Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996. In conclusion, it might be wise to do follow the suggestion of John Kavulich, head of the US-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, an organisation of US companies trying to do business with Cuba: in the event of Castro\’s death, say nothing.

Two official speeches given by high-level members of the Bush administration and statements by a Cuban legislator are perfect examples of the confusion and contradictions that characterise the US attitude towards Cuba. Washington’s basic position is quite clear; but among the Cuban exiles, there is a wide range of opinions. For Washington, the stability of the Caribbean zone is a priority; the positions of the exiles, vary according to their particular interests and circumstances.

On September 15, at the annual Miami Herald Americas conference, US Secretary of Commerce, Cuban-American Carlos Gutierrez, sent up a trial balloon for a referendum for the Cuban people on whether to keep the current government led by Raul Castro. The referendum would be held under the auspices of the Organisation of American States. Thomas Shannon, Assistant Secretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs, kept silent on the question because he was already on record with an offer of cooperation with Cuba, under certain conditions. In other words, he was keeping the door open to deal with Raul Castro.

The referendum idea drew a sharp response from Cuba-American Republican congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart, who flatly rejected it as ”inappropriate and unfortunate”. Moreover, he accused the Bush administration of trying to confuse the Cuban exile community.

The idea of the referendum and the subtle offer of conditional cooperation obscure the need to guarantee national security, address the possibility of convulsion and uncertainty in a country and a zone that are low on Washington’s list of priorities, except as related to the nuisance produced by Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and the potential for a mass exodus from Cuba.

The idea floated by Gutierrez is interesting because, on one hand, it satisfies the requirement of making the Bush administration look tough on Cuba. Plus, it is acceptable for domestic consumption in Florida. But it also implies that the United States would accept a government with Raul Castro if the vote went his way.

It is important to point out, however, that this scenario would violate Title II of the Helms-Burton Act, which establishes the conditions for normalising relations with Cuba. Lifting the embargo would be barred as long as either of the Castro brothers remained in the government.

Naturally, there is no chance that the Cuban government would allow such a referendum to be held. However, if it were, Raul just might win it, if similar situations in history are any guide.

Given all of the above, Diaz-Balart fails in his analysis: the White House and the Department of State are giving clear enough signals of what their priorities are. These do not include an increase of tensions with Cuba. Instead, dealing with whoever is in power is a central part of the current agenda, short-term though it is. It should be remembered that the very same Diaz-Balart, when the crisis caused by Castro’s illness first broke, stated that it would be wise to modify certain conditions set by Helms-Burton, though he neglected to say congressional approval would be necessary to do so.

But most parties agree on one thing: Helms-Burton is a nuisance. Many today regret endorsing it in the tragic aftermath of the criminal downing of the Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996. That is why many insist on ignoring the act. It also explains why the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba does not include Helms-Burton on its webpage on the State Department website. Meanwhile, whenever it needs to boost its standing, the Cuban government blames the embargo for the country’s ills.

In conclusion, it might be wise to heed the advice Thomas Shannon recalled receiving from a teacher of his: when facing serious problems, sit down, shut up, and work. This is exactly what John Kavulich, head of the US-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, an organisation of US companies trying to do business with Cuba, suggested we do in the event of Castro’s death: say nothing. Many will not follow this advice. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)