Sunday, November 22, 2026
Judith Perera
- The Western world’s desire to prevent ‘enemy’ states like Iraq from developing biological weapons has resulted in a dangerous preoccupation with the fine detail of verification, one that undermines efforts to confront a greater threat, say experts.
The use of biological weapons has been outlawed since 1925 under the Geneva Protocol and their development, production and stockpiling is banned by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.
Last Friday’s inconclusive end to a review conference on the 1972 Convention followed several days of debate dominated by the problems of verification and inspection, during with the example of Iraq was frequently raised.
Iraq was corralled after the 1991 Gulf War by a U.N. mandated team tasked to identify and remove Baghdad’s weapons of mass destruction and granted unprecedented rights of inspection to do so.
But some experts, including those who served on the U.N. disarmament team in Iraq, warn that concentration on stringent inspection systems, divert attention from the threat of a biological weapons attack by terrorist groups.
Even more so, they believe that even the most stringent verification inspections would be ineffective, as the technology to produce biological weapons is more ordinary, physically smaller and easier to hide, compared to that needed to produce nuclear or chemical weapons.
As a result some now argue that a biological weapons attack is inevitable. “It is really a matter of time,” says microbiologist Raymond Zilinskas of the University of Maryland Biotechnology Institute, and a member of the U.N. team that sought out Iraq mass destruction weapons after 1991. “I don’t understand why it hasn’t happened already,” he adds.
The Convention on Biological Weapons was readily signed in the 1970s, at a time when military commanders on both sides of the Cold War divide considered biological weapons too unpredictable and slow- acting to be useful.
They were also considered an unlikely choice of weapon for terrorists as at the time the technology could not be practicably adopted. It was further thought that most ‘terror’ groups in the 1970s were primarily interested in winning political legitimacy internationally and would thus consider use of such an indiscriminate weapon as politically counterproductive.
But things have changed since then, says Brad Roberts, a biological weapons expert at the U.S. Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia.
“There are new actors appearing, individuals and small organisations that don’t seem to care about establishing legitimacy but just want to strike a blow in anger and kill as many people as possible.”
Recent years have seen the development of so-called ‘doomsday cults’ — communities who are preparing for various forms of ‘armageddon’ — and a few who are confident enough in their ability to survive the ‘day of judgement’ to want to speed that final day along.
In the United States, the so-called ‘survivalists’ evolved into the mass murderers of the ‘militias’, one of which was responsible for the Oklahoma City bombing. One doomsday cult, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo, used nerve gas on innocent commuters on the Tokyo subway. Some of its devotees reportedly travelled to Africa in a bid to collect samples of the Ebola virus for use as a weapon.
Zilinskas says that biological weapons are easy to make, undetected, as biotechnology, once regarded as esoteric knowledge, is now a commonplace.
“Advanced biological technologies have spread all over the world,” he says. “There are many more people who are technically trained, and the methods for culturing large quantities of bacteria are well worked out and commonly employed.”
A quarter tonne of a properly prepared bacterial agent, dried and milled to a particle size, could wipe out the inhabitants of a large city in one attack.
“Nuclear weapons can be hard to get, but biological agents can be easily purchased, made in a laboratory or may even occur in nature,” says Barbara Seiders, leader of the biological threat- reduction programme at the U.S. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Richland, Washington.
In 1993 the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) published a report on weapons of mass destruction which listed the diseases that could be employed as biological weapons.
These included plague; tularaemia (similar to plague), botulism (caused by a toxin from the common food-poisoning bacterium Clostridium botulinum) and anthrax, the original biological warfare agent which was developed by the United States, Britain and Russia during the Cold War years.
The Scottish island of Gruinard where Britain tested its own anthrax weapon was infected for decades after the experiments took place.
Anthrax is primarily a disease of cattle and sheep caused by Bacillus anthracis. It can kill humans in its conventional form, but normally it affects people who handle infected sheep fleeces, and causes unpleasant sores.
However, carried as an airborne infection — pneumonic anthrax — it can kill 90 percent of those infected if left untreated. Symptoms include vomiting, fever, a cough, and difficulty in breathing. In the early stages antibiotics can help. Otherwise victims die from haemorrhage, respiratory failure, or toxic shock within a few days.
The 1993 OTA report estimated that just 100 kilogrammes anthrax spores sprayed from a light plane flying over Washington D.C. could kill over three million people.
Iraq’s biological weapons programme was largely based on anthrax weapons and was well developed before 1990, according to Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman of the U.N. Special Commission founded to deal with the disposal of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.
The programme had matured after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The process of filling weapons with agents had taken place in December 1990, just before the outbreak of war. Iraq eventually admitted having produced 10 times more anthrax than it had previously declared. Three different types of biological warfare agents had been put into a total of 191 bombs and missiles.
The process of manufacturing anthrax as a weapon appears complex at first, as it involves the creation of anthrax spore-containing particles of the right size to be carried in the air, inhaled and then retained in the lungs.
But according to the 1993 OTA report, making anthrax into a weapons a low-tech procedure. Zilinskas says techniques used by college undergraduates would be enough to isolate B. anthracis from a cattle pasture for use as a starter culture.
It would then take a few days to produce several pounds of crude slurry containing billions of spores in a small culture vessel. It is more difficult to dry the slurry and grind it down into the proper sized particles for an efficient weapon.
But even if this proved too complicated a determined terrorist could just use the slurry. Zilinskas notes that a crude slurry of anthrax spores could be left in the tunnels of a city underground railway system. The wind created by passing trains would dry them out and blow them around, possibly killing thousands.
With this threat in mind, the U.S. Department of Defense is developing an anthrax vaccination programme and vaccinations against other potential biological agents could follow. But this will only protect troops in combat situations. Protection for the population at large is much more difficult as large-scale immunisation against these obscure diseases would not be practical.
Seiders and her colleague, senior researcher Matthew Freund, recommend what they call a “proactive mitigation” strategy including threat awareness, vulnerability assessment, improved intelligence and stockpiling of chemical counteragents.
U.S. companies are developing counteragents that might be released into an airport air-conditioning system to neutralise a biological or chemical attack. Research is also under way into lightweight gas masks that could be distributed quickly at an airport or on a plane in the event of threat.
Houston-based Air Security international has already demonstrated its QuickMask, which it is marketing as “a Respiratory Protective Escape Device (that) affords business travellers the extra time needed to safely exit a contaminated area, whether they are in a hotel room, in flight, at the office or home.”