Sunday, November 22, 2026
Analysis - Dilip Hiro
- Wednesday marks the 10th anniversary of the United Nations-brokered permanent ceasefire between Iran and Iraq after an eight-year war – the longest conventional armed conflict of the century, often called the First Gulf War.
During the truce Baghdad-Tehran relations have improved considerably. On Saturday, after a break of 18 years, the first batch of Iranians crossed into Iraq for a pilgrimage to the Shi’a holy shrines in Karla and Najaf.
The process of rapprochement began in the wake of Iraq’s August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwai when, making a sudden U-turn, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein accepted the fluvial border between Iran and Iraq, as set by the 1975 Algiers Accord. This was the very accord he unilaterally renounced in 1980 before invading Iran.
After what became known as the Second Gulf War in 1991 and Iraq’s defeat by the United States-led coalition, Saddam was further encouraged to mend relations with Iran, which shares all of Iraq’s 1,100 kilometre eastern frontier.
Baghdad’s international ostracism following the 1991 conflict compelled Saddam to explore all ways of lessening Iraq’s isolation. Tehran’s growing realisation that there was no chance of Saddam’s overthrow by military coup or popular uprising, meanwhile led it to once more consider doing serious business with the Iraqi ruler.
Then there has been Washington’s ‘dual containment’ policy. The U.S. treats Iran and Iraq as pariah states but this shared status has provided the two with enough common ground to justify rapprochement.
Finally both capitals see a grave danger in the emerging alliance between Israel and Turkey — with which they share common borders.
President Hafez Assad of Syria, the country most threatened by the Turkish-Israeli axis, has been urging Iran, its long-term ally, to seek rapprochement with Baghdad. Yet Iran and Iraq have not reached a point where a peace treaty is in the offing. There are several obstacles.
– There is the still unresolved dispute about the number and fate of prisoners of war (POWs) from the war.
– There is also the issue of war reparations to Iran by Iraq. Connected to that matter is the fate of the 140 Iraqi aircraft that were flown to Iran to escape the U.S. led bombing raids during the 1991 Gulf War. Iraq claims that its aircraft have been absorbed into Iran’s air force and civilian airline, a claim denied by Tehran.
The most contentious issue is the harbouring of armed opposition groups by each side: the Baghdad-based Mujahedin-e Khalq (People’s Combatants), headed by Masoud Rajavi; and the Tehran-based Supreme Assembly of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), led by Ayatollah Baqir Hakim, an Iraqi cleric.
SAIRI was formed in 1982 in Tehran following the amalgamation of three Iraqi Islamic organisations committed to establishing an Islamist state in Iraq. It soon set up an armed force called al- Mujahedin, whose troops joined the fighting against Iraqi forc es.
On the other side, Saddam gave refuge to Rajavi, vehemently opposed to the Iranian regime, after he was expelled from France in 1986. Assisted by Iraq, Rajavi formed the armed wing of the Mujahedin-e Khalq, called it the National Liberation Army (NLA) an d sent it to fight in Iran.
Today, both SAIRI and the Mujahedin-e Khalq remain intact. The NLA launches periodic cross-frontier raids into Iran from its camps near the Iran-Iraq border.
Tehran retaliates to these pinpricks with retaliatory air attacks on the NLA camps inside Iraq. It is aided by the fact that due to the no-fly zones imposed on Iraq by the United States, Britain and France, Baghdad is unable to respond with its airpower. However, the last such raid occurred about a year ago.
On the other hand, periodic small-scale bombings and shootings between SAIRI and Mujahedin-e Khalq activists continue. Every so often the Khalq partisans manage to detonate bombs in Tehran.
The main efefct of this is to trigger reciprocal attacks on themselves and their premises in Baghdad but all this has not stopped the two governments from improving their relations.
During the Iraqi-United Nations crisis in February, Saddam dispatched his foreign minister to Tehran, where he and his Iranian counterpart set up two committees to tackle th e problems stemming from the 1980-88 War and examine ways of strengthening mutual ties. These top officials first met in a blaze of publicity at the U.N. headquarters in New York in September – an event that allowed the Iraq foreign minister to demonstrate that his country was emerging from its long isolation.
When Iran invited Iraq to the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) summit in December in Tehran, it sent its vice-president, Taha Yassin Ramadan. He was received by Iranian President Muhammad Khatami, who pointed out that both Iran and Iraq had been at the receiving end of Washington’s ‘dual containment’ policy.
In February, during the Iraq-U.N. crisis, when the U.S. assembled an armada in the Gulf to compel Saddam to comply unconditionally with U.N. inspectors charged with disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, Iran opposed Washington’s threatened airst rikes against Iraq.
Two months later there was the first of a series of POW exchanges between Baghdad and Tehran, involving 5,600 Iraqis and 400 Iranians. Most startlingly, Saddam then went on TV to announce his acceptance of the Algiers Accord and the border line down the middle of the Shatt al-Arab waterway.
It was as dramatic a reversal as his original TV declaration on Sep. 17, 1980, in which he rejected the Algiers Accord and the border line. Five days after that he ordered his troops to invade Iran.
In September 1980 Saddam foresaw victory in three weeks. In the event the fighting went on for 411 weeks. Yet inevitably the public’s memory of the war is fading, despite its scale and the devastating effect it had.
The war claimed around 1.1 million casualties – including about 200,000 Iranian deaths (an official figure) and an estimated 160,00 to 240,000 Iraqi lives. Its monetary cost was as ruinous, estimated at between 168 to 203 billion dollars.
There is one other matter that still divides the two former combatants. According to U.N. officials and historians worldwide, hostilities began on Sep. 22, 1980, when Iraq invaded Iran at eight points, and ended on Aug. 20, 1988. But Saddam insists that the war started on Sep. 4, when there was cross-border shelling, and ended on Aug. 8, when Iraq accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 598, calling a hlat to the fighting — and not on Aug. 20 when the truce went into effect.
And while the world regards the First Gulf War as a draw, which left the borders of the two countries unchanged and their respective regimes intact, Saddam continues to claim that Iraq won.
That is why Baghdad celebrated Victory Day on Aug. 8 – out of line with the rest of the world, which marks Aug. 20 as the end one of the century’s most cruel and ultimately pointless conflicts.