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RIGHTS: Uzbekistan’s Islamists Prove Hard To Repress

Analysis Dilip Hiro

LONDON, Jan 26 1998 (IPS) - The end of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan this week brings relief of a different kind to the government of Uzbekistan, embarrassed during the holy days by a string of demonstrations in support of jailed Islamists.

Much to its embarrassment, during Ramadan — when religious feelings run high — the Uzbek government had to watch repeated demonstrations by pious Muslim women protesting at the arrest of their husbands or brothers jailed by the Central Asian state.

The women demonstrators, quickly whisked away to police stations and refused permission to meet the president as they demanded, wore Islamic garb, their heads, arms and legs covered. It was hardly the image that the government of president Islam Karimov, wedded firmly to secularism and modernism, wants the world to see associated with Uzbekistan.

Their main complaint centred around a confrontation in mid- December in Namangan, a city in the south-eastern Fergana Valley, home to a third of Uzbekistan’s 22 million people, 90 percent of them Muslim.

The trigger was the decapitation by masked men of a police officer, much hated for his brutality. In the subsequent governmental action, involving a gun battle, three more policemen were killed as well as a suspect, who was described by the authorities a s a Wahhabi, follower of the puritanical sect of Wahhabism within the Hanbali school of Islam.

This breakdown of law and order came as a shock to the government, which prides itself for having maintained stability through the hazardous transitional period of the early 1990s and later.

It acted swiftly and harshly, imposing curfews in Namangan and other Fergana Valley cities (which continue), and arresting scores of residents as extremist Islamists, while maintaining total silence about the events on the state-run radio and television.

Whereas the authorities hold the Muslim militants responsible for the deaths of policemen, Islamist activists contend that the government is using the incident as an excuse to suppress their movement, which functions semi-clandestinely.

The Fergana Valley has a long tradition of Islamic piety. Once the iron grip of the atheist Soviet system began to loosen in the mid-1980s, its inhabitants started to show their religious colours. Between 1986 and 1991, the number of mosques in Namangan, with a population of 360,000, rose from two to 26, including one run by Wahhabis.

By then the all-Union Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), a socio- political organisation, had established itself in the Fergana Valley, as had a local socio-religious body, called Adalat (‘justice’). Also there was a wide network of Wahhabis, who, often fin anced by affluent Saudi nationals, functioned as an Islamic sect, with their own mosques and theological schools.

Though these organisations had differing priorities, they were all opposed to Karimov’s insistence on keeping the state and the mosque apart.

On his part Karimov stressed that he had no objection to nurturing Islam as religion. He took the oath of his office on the Koran, and went on to allow a weekly programme on Islam on the state-run television.

But his commitment to maintaining strict division between religion and government remained firm, and was incorporated into the new constitution adopted in December 1992. It banned organisations based on religious or nationalist grounds.

Indeed, at Karimov’s behest, the parliament went on to outlaw the Birlik Popular Front, a secular political movement, on the basis that the members of the banned IRP had penetrated it, and were using it as a stalking horse.

The outbreak of war between the neo-Communist government and the Islamist-led opposition in neighbouring Tajikistan in May 1992 reinforced Karimov’s resolve to suppress domestic Islamists, who regard Islam as a self-contained socio-political system.

A month earlier Karimov had also noted with alarm the defeat of the leftist regime of Muhammad Najibullah by the Islamist Mujahedin in Afghanistan, which has a common border with Uzbekistan.

Much to Karimov’s disappointment, the neo-Communist government in Tajikistan, backed actively by his government and Moscow, failed to defeat the Islamist-led camp. The result was a peace treaty between the warring sides signed in June 1997 in Moscow.

In Afghanistan too, in the Uzbek leader’s estimation, things have gone from bad to worse. In September 1996 the Taleban — ultra radical fundamentalists with Saudi and Pakistani links — seized Kabul from the moderate Islamists.

The only saving grace for Karimov is that the Afghan area adjoining Uzbekistan continues to be controlled by an anti-Taleban alliance, which includes an ethnic Uzbek leader, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, who is close to him.

But the situation in Afghanistan is far from stable. Either the current de facto partition of the country must be formalised, or one of the two warring sides must win unequivocally.

It is hard to see the anti-Taleban alliance, controlling less than a third of Afghanistan, retaking Kabul. For Karimov that means having to co-exist with the Taleban regime in Kabul.

A less violent but an equally depressing prospect awaits Karimov’s administration so far as Tajikistan is concerned. The Tajik peace treaty requires the formation of a transitional national unity government in Dushanbe, with the Islamist-led opposition t aking up a third of the cabinet seats. This would give Islamists a respectability in Central Asia that they have lacked so far.

It would make the Uzbek president’s task of projecting all Islamists as violent fanatics, deserving to be repressed, onerous.

The problem is that by suppressing simultaneously the secular opposition — centred around democracy, human rights and Uzbek nationalism — Karimov has created a situation where those who disagree with his government, and the ruling People’s Democratic P arty (PDP), find that they have little choice but to support Islamists. Due to their traditional ties with the mosque, Islamists have continued to function, albeit semi-clandestinely.

When the Uzbek government, unnerved by the bloody incidents in Namangan, banned the broadcasting of the call to prayer from mosques by loudspeakers during Ramadan, a common practice in most Muslim countries, the sisters and wives of the arrested Islamist s seized upon the issue. They called for the ban to be lifted.

By combining such a widely backed demand affecting all Muslims with a specific one — the release of their husbands or brothers — the Islamist women managed to outmanoeuvre the authorities.

In a larger context the veiled women in Tashkent also signalled that contrary to the impression that the Karimov regime has conveyed to the world that Uzbekistan has proved to be stony ground for an Islamist movement, political Islam if far from quiescen t there.

 
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