Sunday, November 22, 2026
Analysis - Nadire Mater
- As the debris of last month’s earthquake is slowly being removed in the devastated Izmit Bay area, it is president Suleyman Demirel’s ghostly silhouette what takes its place, critics of the “godfather of Turkish industrialization” say.
“Our bottom is rotten,” Demirel has said, trying to explain the country’s enormous losses. “Our top is rotten,” replied columnist Umur Talu, from the Milliyet newspaper’s pages.
“An official who for the last three decades has been continually in charge of (the country’s) administration has no right to repeat us that our bottom is rotten…You are rotten, and you have rotten all of us, you have rotten our minds and our lives,” Talu wrote.
Talu’s unusually sharp criticism is not an exception. Critics generally converge on Demirel’s personal responsibility in decisions leading to the concentration of industrial sites in the Izmit Bay area, on top of a geological failure.
The region experienced a chaotic economic and urban growth in the last two decades, whose flaws dramatically surfaced on 17 August, when the ground trembled and badly-constructed buildings fell, burying some 13,000 people.
“As industry extended over on unstable soil on former potato fields and marshes, statesmen were exalting the ‘growth of Turkish industry’,” says economic analyst Gungor Uras, former Secretary General of the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association.
President Demirel is unapologetic: “The industry was concentrated here for this region was most convenient for its transportation facilities and abundant skilled labour,” he told journalists.
“Scores of installations initiated by Demirel with pompous ceremonies were built without licenses or proper planning, and without an environmental-hazard examination, ” recalls political analyst Bekir Coskun.
“Since the1960s we have been remaining under this administrative debris, and we are squashed,” he added.
Demirel first raised to power in 1965 at the age of 42, leading the Justice party, heir to the banned conservative-liberal Democratic party of former prime minister Adnan Menderes, who was overthrown by the army in 1960 and executed a year later.
Supported by the United States, as the vanguard post of NATO’s (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) southeastern flank, Demirel’s “cold war” governments implemented a western-type “development model” to compete with the “Soviet collectivism” of left-wing regimes in Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Lybia.
Son of a well-to-do rural family from the southwestern province of Isparta, Demirel was the first boy in the village to achieve a university education. He later enrolled in post-graduate studies in the US and started his career as a civil engineer in the Public Works ministry, quickly turning into politics.
Although his long march to the top was twice interrupted by army takeovers in 1971 and 1980, he managed to stay in the race thanks to solid support from the Turkish business class and rural voters. Since 1965, he was seven times Prime Minister until 1993, when he became President.
“The private sector is the engine of development,” he regularly said, and “the market is the sole (economic) regulator,” voicing the expectations of Turkey’s rising entrepreneurial class, which benefited from generous state subsidies, loans and tax incentives.
For Demirel, a staunch right-winger and nationalist politician, any criticism of the free-market model smelled of “communism,” an ideology he did not want to coexist with.
Considered a “champion of unlimited trade freedom” by Turkish business, he was equally keen at imposing severe restrictions to dissidents, banning left-wing parties and unions, as well as critical press.
In the heat of the 1970’s civil strives, some 5,000 people lost their lives to violent “anti-communist” campaigns of the “Gray Wolves”, the armed youth faction of the Nationalist Action party, a junior partner in Demirel’s “Nationalist Front” of the late 1970s.
At military trials held after the 1980 army coup, hundreds of “Gray Wolves” confessed to numerous murders of left-wing politicians, union activists, intellectuals and journalists.
“All this debris now in the heart of the Turkish industry is the outcome of Demirel’s barring the public from knowing the sustained criticism (of policies) by specialists,” says Yavuz Onen head of the Turkish Architects and Engineers Chambers Union.
“The pressure on specialized bodies like ours has stripped Turkish political and decision-making processes of content and of public scrutiny. Demirel is the godfather of that kind politicians,” Onen told IPS.
“It was Demirel himself who in the 1960s responded to calls of ‘planned development’ with cheap demagogy like ‘the nation needs pilaf (rice) not planning.’ We are now paying the bitter price of his obsessions,” he added.
” Demirel’s sins are not limited to his obsessions,” says economic analyst Mustafa Sonmez. “This plan-free growth inevitably ended up in a massive demand for housing by workers dumped into big cities in the wake of the great waves of internal migrations,” he observes.
“Demirel closed his eyes to the looting of public property where they built unlicensed shabby houses. At every election, those people were granted their title-deeds. They then sold their plots to contractors in exchange for two flats in the substandard buildings built on what was once public property,” he says.
“Demirel saw this as the rise of a ‘construction sector’.” Sonmez adds.
“The economists issued warnings, not necessarily because they were leftist, but out of alarm… but we were ignored, when not prosecuted,” he stressed.
In spite of criticism, Demirel has managed to become a champion of the earthquake victims, by vetoing last week a bill granting an amnesty to contractors, mafia bosses, killers hired by the secret service and others.
Such amnesty “hurts the public conscience and the feeling of equality,” he said, in explaining the veto, which was immediately followed by renewed media exaltations of Demirel’s stature as a statesman.
Overcoming two weeks of embarrassment and once again attempting to convert a defeat in political victory, he has also proposed a “transition to a presidential system thus granting ultimate power to a President elected by popular vote.”
No political analyst in Turkey had imagined in 1971 and again in 1980 that a President overthrown by the mighty Turkish army would ever resurrect. “Don’t make me laugh,” said army-backed prime minister Naim Talu in 1973, when asked whether Demirel had any political future.
But Talu is long gone and Demirel is Turkey’s head of State. Even current prime minister Bulent Ecevit, his bitter enemy in those turbulent three decades is finally convinced that “Demirel has passed the test of statesmanship.”