MEDIA-CULTURE: Reporting the Peace in Bosnia

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Tomas Miglierina (*)

SARAJEVO, May 12 1998 (IPS) - Most of the foreign correspondents in Bosnia-Hercegovina have packed up and gone home, leaving behind a local media slowly recovering from years of war-stoked propaganda, mistrust, and isolation.

Displacement, emigration, and death drained the country of veteran reporters. Most of the local journalists today are young enthusiasts who gained their experience during the war.

Media observers today express cautious optimism about the future, despite post-war realities such as a ravaged economy, a divided population, and still-strong influence by political forces. The Dayton agreement is one of the agents of change, both in the local media and in the tactics of the international organisations, which have shifted gears to focus on local journalism.

“We are aware there is a lot of misconception and strange perception of what we are and why we are here,” said Jan Stock, deputy spokesman for the Stabilisation Force’s (SFOR) multinational division in Banja Luka.

“I think this is changing for the better. The way the media operate, their accuracy in the story have improved immensely, and we are probably partially responsible for that.”

SFOR has the largest media machine of the Dayton implementing agencies. It has the biggest budget, the biggest staff, the strongest organisational skills, and even a Web site (www.nato.int).

Obviously, SFOR has its own “spin,” its own message to get out but Stock says it can help develop a healthy media scene in addition to keeping the peace.

“We have to try to help the media do their job… so that they can report accurately, without fear of discrimination,” Stock said. “That means reporting good and bad news in a fair and timely manner, even if it is something we in SFOR may not like to hear.”

Millions of dollars have been poured into Bosnia for media assistance that started during the war, for everything from facility rebuilding to media training and fostering of news exchanges between the federation and Republika Srpska.

Media waters note the situation has improved since 1996, when the Bosnain Serb Glas Srpski accused SFOR of polluting rivers and farms, quoting local peasants as spotting giant mutated eggs and huge crops. But it is still unusual today to see, for instance, local journalists challenging officials at a news conference.

Sometimes questions sound like political declarations. Most journalists outside Sarajevo do not speak much English; because most press officers do not know the local language well, informal exchanges are difficult.

During the war, journalists’ roles were clear. They reported the side of their ruling party, their source of military information. For the most part not even the bravest ones dared to question official information or seek other points of view. And even if they wanted to, they had no access to the other side.

United Nations peacekeepers and foreign officials came under fire from local journalists for allegedly taking sides or not doing enough to implement their mandate. They also had little chance of having their information reported impartially.

The UN’s statements, quoted in bits and pieces, often became a tool of local propaganda: U.N. criticism of one faction would be used and widely reported by all the others, but when it hit close to home it would be ignored. Even when the message was strictly humanitarian, there was little possibility for the media officers to spread it if it did not suit the local rulers.

A tight political grip by the ruling parties affected most of the local media scene; even formally private media were often controlled by political forces, and the few truly independent journalists had to fight their own personal battles with self- censorship.

In 1996, soon after its deployment, the Implementation Force (IFOR) took an important step to improve the media situation when it used its transport helicopters and trucks to take journalists from all sides to joint press briefings with other implementing agencies.

Muslim ‘Bosniak’ reporters started to appear in Prijedor, and Serbs in Travnik. Contrary to expectations, from the start there was much more curiosity and dialogue than animosity. Today, it is no longer exotic to see Serbian journalists attending briefings in Sarajevo or Bosniaks in Banja Luka, the capital of Republika Srpska.

The NATO operation has the most successful media strategy of the peace-keeping agencies, aiming to counter its “big brother” legacy with American-style media relations. This includes an open- door policy and projection of a friendly image.

Press officers take part in radio and television programs on many public and private stations and sometimes organise media opportunities such as displays of equipment or access to exercises and parades. Journalists complain, however, that when delicate operations come-such as the arrest of accused war criminals-SFOR media units, particularly outside Sarajevo, are late or unavailable for comment.

“They are there whenever they need to praise themselves,” says Erduan Katana, Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina correspondent in Banja Luka. Others, such as Slobodan Kragulj, from Doboj’s independent monthly Alternativa, criticise what they call SFOR’s blatant self- promotion. The Bosnians, known for their irony, often cannot restrain a smile when reading the peace slogans and self- congratulatory prose of SFOR publications.

The United Nations’ media machine is smaller and less photogenic; the mission has little hardware to show. But it is a good source of information on police behavior, law-and-order incidents, refugee return, and other civilian matters.

U.N. chief spokesman Alexander Ivanko, a veteran of Bosnia, is optimistic about the objective use of UN information by journalists, although, he says: “We still have some difficulties in the Serb Republic to get our message across.”

The media operations of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) have been less effective, though they play a major role in the implementation of the Dayton accord.

Besides their regular information sections, the two organisations are charged with media development. Support ranges from fostering government responsibilities such as licensing and media law changes to seeking sanctions in cases of inflammatory language or distortion of information.

Sanctions can include pulling candidates off polling lists, which the OSCE has done in some cases. The OSCE and the OHR also were involved in NATO’s confiscation of the transmitters of RTV Srpska- Studio Pale when its programming violated Dayton.

The role of the international community in Bosnia’s media scene might become even more pivotal and controversial, with plans by peace-implementation officials to create a special monitoring panel. The panel could intervene if authorities are deemed to be dragging their feet in areas such as media licensing or media legislation.

Such potential intervention – with more “big brother” implications — already concerns media observers in Bosnia and abroad.