Africa, Headlines

POLITICS-KENYA: What a Prime Minister Might – and Might Not – Do

Najum Mushtaq

NAIROBI, Feb 24 2008 (IPS) - A fifth week of talks to end Kenya&#39s violent election dispute is scheduled to begin Monday, with the extent of power to be exercised by a new prime minister one of the key items on the agenda.

The creation of the prime minister&#39s post forms part of establishing a power-sharing government which it is hoped will see Kenya to move forward from the stand-off which ensued after the opposition rejected the outcome of recent presidential polls. Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) leader Raila Odinga, who looks set to take up the post, accuses President Mwai Kibaki of rigging the Dec. 27 vote to remain in office; international observers have also expressed concerns about the ballot.

Having agreed to create the post, negotiators are now grappling with how much authority the prime minister should have.

"The two teams have to reconcile two different ways of envisaging the…proposed office of prime minister," Paul Genchu, a political analyst based in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, told IPS. "The Kibaki team does not want dilution of presidential powers, whereas ODM would settle for nothing less than a prime minister with executive powers and independent of presidential veto."

While officials of the ODM and Kibaki&#39s Party of National Unity (PNU) are giving little away, observers here believe that the executive powers at issue include the control of government ministries and departments.

The minimum required by the opposition, ODM legislator Ababu Namwamba said Friday, "is the executive premiership as provided in the Bomas Draft" – this in reference to the initial version of a new constitution drawn up to replace Kenya&#39s existing, colonial-era constitution. The draft takes its name from &#39Bomas of Kenya&#39, a cultural venue outside the capital where the National Constitutional Conference gathered to draw up the 2004 document.

The draft provided for a powerful premier and the devolution of power to regions. It was subsequently altered by legislators to maintain strong presidential authority, and the amended version put to a national referendum in 2005. Following a determined campaign by the opposition and civic organisations, the amended draft was rejected by Kenyans.

"There must be a clear separation of state and government," Namwamba told journalists. In addition to the prime minister&#39s post, ODM also has its sights set on the two deputy prime ministers&#39 positions that have been agreed, and on high-profile cabinet portfolios.

Squaring talks with the constitution

If and when the two sides agree on the prime minister&#39s powers, they will have to come to terms with the equally difficult matter of how to make the post constitutionally tenable. Kenya briefly had a prime minister after it gained independence in 1963, the post being abolished by founding father Jomo Kenyatta in 1964.

"Two methods have been proposed: an act of parliament, the option favoured by the Kibaki team, and a constitutional amendment – which ODM wants," said Genchu. "Both procedures will have far-reaching consequences and the talks could make or break on this point."

Perhaps the only certainty is that Kenyans find themselves in uncharted territory. "But no one would want back to go to an artificial air of normalcy after what has happened," says Zafar Rajan, a human rights activist and constitutional expert. "There are too many things to be fixed before it could be business as normal."

Cost of Failure

With an agreement between the ODM and PNU having remained elusive, Kenyans are beginning to contemplate the ramifications of failure at the negotiating table, notably a renewed surge of the violence that has cost over 1,000 lives and displaced as many as 600,000 people, often along ethnic lines. Kibaki is a member of the Kikuyu, Kenya&#39s largest ethnic group – long resented for its political and economic dominance – while Odinga is a Luo.

Notes a Feb. 21 report by the International Crisis Group (ICG), &#39Kenya in Crisis&#39: "Armed groups are still mobilising on both sides. ODM…is under pressure from its core constituencies…to demand nothing less than the presidency, and its supporters could easily renew violent confrontations if Kibaki&#39s Party of National Unity (PNU) coalition remains inflexible." (The ICG is a Brussels-based think tank.)

However, the Kibaki administration "is buying time to wear down both the opposition and the international community&#39s resolve," the report adds.

"It benefits from the presidency&#39s extensive powers, including unlimited access to public resources. It insists the situation is under control and there is no power vacuum, tends to treat Annan&#39s mission as a sideshow while sponsoring alternative reconciliation processes, seeks to have Kibaki&#39s election recognised by neighbouring countries and continues to resist genuine sharing of executive power."

The Kenyan talks are being mediated by former United Nations secretary-general Kofi Annan. Last week, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice paid a brief visit to Nairobi to add her voice to the chorus of appeals for a timely resolution of the Kenyan crisis.

"The diplomatic intervention could not more high profile," says Rajan. "So, a failure could not only push Kenya off the brink, it will also undermine the moral and political authority of the international organisations and Western powers."

These words were echoed by Winnie Wanjara, a businesswoman. "I&#39m tired, very tired," she noted. "If someone as respected as Kofi Annan and as powerful as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice cannot make them agree to get into a grand coalition, there is not much hope of long term peace and stability."

Annan has said both sides in the talks realise that power-sharing needs to be underpinned by wide-ranging reforms to address the root causes of election violence, such as socio-economic disparities between Kenyans.

According to the ICG, "The ODM and PNU do not control the local violence. There is a chance to restore state authority and prevent renewed major fighting only if local leaders understand that their grievances are being addressed and concrete measures are being rapidly implemented."